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 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the dramatic decline of collective bargaining and trade union membership in the British private 
sector over the past thirty years, and much academic discussion of ‘marketisation’ in the public sector, 
national collective bargaining in English local government has remained remarkably robust - as 
demonstrated by the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (Millward et al. 2000). Most academic 
research on employment relations in the public sector has focused on ‘change’.  In this study I wish to 
examine the roots of ‘continuity’ and a surprising institutional survival. After three decades of reform, 
national bargaining still remains central to the local government employment relations architecture, and 
contrary to the ‘hollowing out’ thesis, national agreements are still the bulwark upon which both 
national and local government (and the related actors: trade unions, management, politicians) rely upon 
to engage in the process of joint regulation in the workplace.  
 
The study has three main objectives:  Firstly, to explore why the institutional actors support or do not 
support the national collective bargaining framework in English local government. Secondly, the extent 
to which national collective bargaining is supported and promoted applying an institutional theory 
analytical framework. Thirdly, what institutional processes explain the resilience of national collective 
bargaining in English local government? 
 
A sectoral study is used to explore the political dynamics that underlie the survival of national 
collective bargaining in English local government. This follows a ‘firm in sector’ methodology (Smith 
et al., 1990), in which a benchmark authority is compared and contrasted with eight other local 
authorities. The authorities were chosen by taking account of factors such as: size (employing more 
than 2,000 workers); type (metropolitan (7) and shire (2)); geography (north (2), midlands (4), south 
west (1) and south east (2)); and status (are they part of the national collective bargaining framework or 
outside of it).    
 
The ‘firm in sector’ methodology allows for the examination of issues at an organisational level, 
building on the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys, which have focused more at a macro level. 
The study will drill down in detail within the benchmark authority; however, the study is nevertheless 
dependent on understanding the wider sectoral landscape in which the benchmark authority is located 
and therefore considers how its experiences compare with local authorities who chose to belong or not 
belong to the national collective bargaining framework.    
 
The thesis makes three contributions. Firstly, it raises the issue of continuity within English local 
government employment relations and why national collective bargaining has continued to survive and 
remain relevant. Secondly, it considers what makes English local government different from other parts 
of the public sector, and what we can learn from this difference. Thirdly, it highlights the value of a 
new institutional perspective, as a tool for employment relations analysis.   
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Chapter One 
                                       Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the political dynamics that underlie the surprising survival of 
national collective bargaining in English local government and demonstrates that, 
despite the reforms that have taken place, national collective bargaining remains an 
integral part of the employment relations architecture. It fulfils the role of managing 
the political and managerial processes that are linked to central government and 
central-local relations and acts as a conduit between the institutional stakeholders in 
achieving the socio-economic outcomes that are required to deliver services to the 
public. The thesis highlights the neglected area of continuity and resilience in 
organisational frameworks linked to employment relations rather than the current 
emphasis within the public sector employment relations literature which highlights 
and focuses on change.  
 
The subject of my thesis is interesting on two levels. Empirically, national collective 
bargaining in English local government has been accepted as a given, without any 
research to ask why it has remained intact, even though marketisation has affected  
other areas of employment relations in both local government and the wider public 
sector. Secondly, from a theoretical standpoint, institutional theory has not been 
applied to this subject area, and its application has given valuable insights in this 
research that complement the sectoral study, which has covered a range of local 
authorities, trade unions and the local government employers. As a subject, the 
continued survival of national collective bargaining, has a particular significance 
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within the study of employment relations in the public sector, and specific to local 
government, it raises an intriguing question with the wider public sector, which has 
seen a move to local collective bargaining with the introduction of agencies in the 
Civil Service and trust status for hospitals in the National Health Services. The 
survival of national collective bargaining in local government is counter-intuitive, on 
initial observation, as local authorities are independent political organisations that 
would appear to have the means to set their own terms and conditions of employment, 
yet the majority do not, still relying on the national framework. The thesis will reveal 
how national collective bargaining in English local government is far more than a 
framework for setting an economic exchange between employer and worker, but is 
integral to the political and social processes that shape the conduct of local 
government governance, which the institutional actors are mutually dependent on to 
promote and further their own individual organisational objectives.      
 
The last thirty years have seen seismic changes in the UK’s employment relations 
landscape. The social, economic, legal, and political contexts in which organisations 
operate have seen the nature of employment regulation change in virtually all sectors 
of employment, both public and private. The rapid decline of collective bargaining, 
which historically had been the principal means of regulation in employment in the 
UK, has seen the decline in the coverage of agreements, trade unions’ agreements, 
and their capacity to influence employers diminish (Brown and Nash, 2008). 
Reflecting on the changes in industrial relations with the first four Workplace 
Industrial/Employment Relations Surveys ( Millward et al. 2000: 234) assessment 
was that collective industrial relations was no longer dominant in the British 
workplace: 
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“The Conservative government that came to power in 1979 confronted a system of 
collective employment relations that was dominant, though not universal …That 
system of collective relations, based on the shared values of the legitimacy of 
representation by independent trade unions and joint regulation, crumbled in the 
intervening eighteen years to such an extent that it no longer represents the dominant 
model.”   
However, this decline is not universal. In the public sector, collective bargaining is 
still the dominant form of pay determination – it is present in around 83 per cent of 
public sector workplaces and covers around 82 per cent of public sector workers. In 
contrast only 14 per cent of private sector workplaces use collective bargaining, with 
around 26 per cent of private sector workers having their pay set through collective 
bargaining (2004 WERS: 181).  
 
The thesis tries to understand the political dynamics that underlie the surprising 
survival of national collective bargaining in English local government and 
demonstrate that, despite the reforms that have taken place, national collective 
bargaining remains an integral part of the employment relations architecture. There is 
evidence of a shift to decentralised bargaining within some parts of the public services 
in the last twenty five years (Kessler and Purcell 1996). It has been argued that the 
‘hollowing out’ process has made national collective bargaining frameworks within 
the public services no more than façades of what they had previously been (Bach and 
Della Rosa, 2000; Thornley et al. 2000; Pollitt and Boukaert, 2000).  However, 
despite the process of marketisation introduced in the last thirty years across the UK 
public sector, the national collective bargaining framework in English local 
government still remains resilient and is at the forefront of public sector employment 
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relations. In local government pay determination has always been more flexible than 
elsewhere in the public services. Individual authorities have the discretion to follow 
national agreements which cover a wide range of occupational groups, and most 
choose to remain within the national framework. There are thirty four local authorities 
(out of 346) in England who have opted out of the national agreements for non-
manual employees (Local Government Association 2001). Most of the opt-outs date 
back to the late 1980s and reflect particular labour market pressures during that 
period. They reflect the then political control of these authorities by largely 
Conservative majorities and the wish to introduce performance-related pay (Bryson et 
al 1993). There have been no opt-outs since 1997 and some councils have re-joined 
the national negotiations. The major recent development in local government is the 
introduction of ‘Single Status’ in which the harmonisation of the two agreements for 
manual and non-manual employees into one agreement covering 1.5 million workers. 
The ‘Single Status’ agreement introduces a common pay spine and harmonisation of 
working hours and annual leave (White 1997).   
 
The conventional wisdom is that neo-liberal ideas have radically reshaped public 
sector HRM (Bach and Kessler, 2012; Corby and Symon, 2011; Bach and 
Winchester, 2003; Ironside and Seifert, 2000). Accordingly, both Conservative and 
New Labour governments have adopted free market competition policies, rooted in 
neo-classical economic theory (Schumpeter, 1963). For Noam Chomsky (1999), ‘The 
basic rules, in brief, are: liberalize trade and finance, let markets set prices (“get prices 
right”), end inflation (“macroeconomic stability”), privatise. The government should 
“get out of the way”’. The practical manifestation was privatisation of public services, 
the introduction of market mechanisms within local government, the civil service and 
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the NHS; and financial cuts and organisational restructuring. The Conservatives, 
under Thatcher and Major, saw this as a way of introducing outside competition 
through the discipline of the economic marketplace; while New Labour viewed 
marketisation as a means of introducing innovation and improvement into the 
provision of local government services which mimic private sector models of 
efficiency (Parker and Hartley, 1997; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Gamble, 2009).  
Though New Labour greatly increased public spending, to critics they still embraced 
the logic of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness through private/public sector 
partnership, which focused on service outcomes that were consumer rather than 
producer led. For some academic commentators, they merely continued the process of 
public service marketisation that began in English local government after 1979 (Smith 
and Morton, 2006).   
 
As a result, the public sector employment relations literature focuses predominantly 
on local government reform, in the wider economic and political context of the public 
sector, and on how this impinges on HRM (Corby and White, 1999; Bach and 
Winchester, 2003; Bach, 2010; Corby and Symon, 2011; Bach and Kessler, 2012). 
Research has been directed at the organisational level, addressing mainly the impact 
of central government reform, with a strong emphasis on ‘change’. This stresses: the 
distinct approach of public sector employment relations (Freedman and Morris, 
1989); its historical background (Pollitt, 1993); the blurring of the public/private 
sector divide (Roper et al. 2005); decentralisation (Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2005); the 
growth of flexibility (Rubery et al. 2002); the erosion of collectivism (Pollert, 2005); 
and the decline of the public sector ethos (Hebson et al., 2003). Since 1997, critics 
have seen Labour extending these neo-liberal reforms (Pollitt and Boukaert, 2000), 
 
 6 
though this analysis sits uneasily with the rise in public spending and employment 
from 1997 to 2010. The development of marketisation is linked to a growth of 
managerialism (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002; Reed and Anthony, 2003; and Reed, 
2004), crystallised in the phrase, new public management (Reed, 2004; Farrell and 
Morris 2007; Entwhistle and Martin, 2005). This is related to the growth of public 
service ‘quasi markets’ and their employment impact (Kessler et al., 2000). Although 
some commentators blur the entire period since 1979, two distinct public policy 
concepts are apparent. Under the Conservatives, the use of markets promoted their 
political ideological agenda – greater involvement by the private sector in the delivery 
of public services and breaking down the perceived producer interests within the 
public sector, while driving down costs, in particular labour costs. The Conservatives 
espoused a minimalist role for the state and saw its role to remove impediments to the 
functioning marketplace. (Gamble, 2009). New Labour, embraced the Conservative 
industrial and economic reforms when they came to office in 1997:   
“Britain needed the industrial and economic reforms of the Thatcher period”  
(Blair, 2010: 99) 
 However, New Labour although accepting the values and assumptions of 
neoliberalism, sought to promote a consensual approach based on promoting a social 
market model which allowed private sector involvement while also protecting 
workers through statutory intervention (Bach and Givan, 2010).       
 
Above all, the public sector HRM literature has neglected the dynamics of national 
collective bargaining frameworks. For this discussion, we must turn to the wider 
literature on collective bargaining. Korczynski (1997: 25) highlights the importance 
of the state and unions in the political process of establishing bargaining levels in the 
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Construction Industry in the UK. For Gospel and Druker (1998: 264) the survival of 
national bargaining in Electrical Contracting can be explained by sectoral and 
industrial characteristics, the existence of a centralised trade union and employer 
solidarity; while it has been sustained by institutions that seem to work and by a 
specific historical and ideological legacy. Both studies analyse why in these particular 
industries a national framework survives, when the wider private sector has 
decentralised. Similar research in the public sector has not been undertaken. Indeed, 
an over-schematic emphasis on ‘neo-liberalism’ and an obsession with ‘change’ may 
have obscured the complex political and HRM processes that continue to anchor the 
existing system. So the question is not why and how has local government HRM 
changed – which it is undoubtedly has – but why has it also stayed the same to a 
surprisingly degree? 
 
Public sector HRM has emphasized the nature and rate of institutional change and, as 
a consequence, little attention has been given to the question of continuity and the 
resilience of structures like a national collective bargaining framework. Neo-
Institutional and Path Dependency theories - offer some potential explanations for 
why the national framework continues to survive in English local government. Neo-
Institutional theory sees institutions as defined by and shaped by structured rules and 
shared meanings that have a regulative effect (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2008). These in 
turn create an environment where there is pressure to conform to institutional norms. 
These pressures have been categorised by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as: coercive - 
brought about by dependency on valued resources; normative – brought about through 
the diffusion of ideas by professionals across organisations; and mimetic – brought 
about by uncertain conditions leading to mimicry of successful organisations.  Not 
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conforming to these institutional pressures brings into question the legitimacy of an 
organisation, an attribute that is pivotal in establishing and maintaining institutions 
(Phillips et al. 2000). Alternative structures and practices are perceived as: ‘less 
appropriate, desirable, or viable’ (Dacin et al., 2002: 47).   
 
In a similar vein, Path Dependency explains why organisations or systems continue to 
operate in their own particular way. The strong version recognises that some 
institutions are deeply embedded, which makes any radical departure from established 
patterns of behaviour difficult. The stakeholders invest so much in operating within 
the parameters created by their institution that they are unwilling to consider seriously 
any alternative pathway: they become locked into established ways of doing things 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005).  There are inbuilt self-reinforcing mechanisms that foster 
institutional persistence and continuity (Hall and Taylor, 1996) and promote 
‘internalisation’ on the part of the actors, who become very reluctant to deviate from 
path dependency rules (Greif and Lanitin, 2004). The soft version allows for change 
and recalibration (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). According to Teague (2009), ‘mindful 
action’ by actors can lead to endogenous path departure (Garud and Karnoe, 2001), or 
critical junctures and moments can also trigger the same process (Thelan, 2002). On 
the other hand, Grabher (1993) identifies three distinctive kinds of ‘institutional lock-
in’: functional lock-in, which relates to the effectiveness of institutions in carrying out 
the tasks they were put in place to do; cognitive lock-in, that relates to the rules, 
conventions, and norms that become embedded in the actions of individuals; and 
political lock-in, the extent to which the various institutions of the state and other 
social forces are committed to preserving traditional institutional structures.  
 
 
 9 
All these theories ask similar questions of change and continuity in employment 
systems. For my research I followed Scott’s (2001: 52-55) three pillars of legitimacy 
in the analysis of my empirical material on national bargaining in local government. 
These are: regulative, ‘rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning’; normative, 
‘legitimate means’ and ‘value ends’; and cultural-cognitive, meaning systems, 
common beliefs and cultural frames. All varieties of Neo-Institutional theory suggest 
that the functioning of present day employment institutions will be influenced by their 
historical legacy; in the case of local government by the Whitley and Good Employer 
models. Events that have shaped their past will in turn influence organisational 
choices and responses to both internal and external environmental pressures (Pierson, 
2000). Given that national collective bargaining only survives with the support (active 
or passive) of key stakeholders (trade unions, general management, HRM 
practitioners and councillors), Scott’s framework allows us to ask why they continue 
to support national bargaining and how strongly they do so. In this way we can both 
assess the reasons for and weight of their support for the status quo and hypothesise 
the circumstances in which they might abandon it.  
 
A sectoral study was chosen to explore the central research question of why national, 
centralised collective bargaining, continues to survive as the dominant means of 
employment regulation in local government. This follows a ‘firm in sector’ 
methodology (Smith et al., 1990), in which a benchmark authority was studied in the 
context of English local authorities, and was compared and contrasted with a number 
of other local authorities that fall into three categories: leaders, followers, and 
deviants.  The thesis examined the period from 1979 until 2007. The research relied 
on interviews with the principal stakeholders – trade union representatives, managers, 
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and politicians – at an authority, regional and national level across a number of local 
authorities both within and outside the national framework.  
 
These individuals could be described as elite policy actors: experienced operators in 
their respective areas who brought their wealth of experience to the organisational 
roles they performed. The application of an institutional theory framework to my 
research has allowed me to examine important questions around the themes of: 
examining similarities and differences between local authorities; the relationship of 
institutional actors with regard to structure and behavior in the context of: authority, 
regional and national level; the relationship between ideas and interest of actors; and 
the tensions that arise between actors as they seek to fulfil their respective objectives. 
Institutional theory has allowed me to analyse a rich combination of historical and 
comparative research which in the case of my research has been invaluable in 
providing a means of exploring the individual actors within local government and the 
processes that shape and define collective bargaining. It also offers explanations for 
why national, centralised bargaining continues to survive in local government.     
 
The aim of the research was to explore a number of key questions: 
 Why the institutional actors supported or did not support the national 
collective bargaining framework in English local government 
 The extent to which national collective bargaining was supported and 
promoted applying an institutional theory (Three Pillars of Institutions) 
analytical framework  
 What institutional processes explain the resilience of national collective 
bargaining in English local government 
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The thesis is organised so that the first three chapters give a context to the study and 
examine: The changing landscape of UK employment relations; Public Sector 
employment relations; and Local Government Employment Relations. Chapter four 
examines institutional theory and how this was applied to the sectoral study 
undertaken, while the methodology chapter discusses why a sectoral study was chosen 
and the process of how the research was conducted. The empirical section of the 
thesis consists of three chapters: The benchmark authority; the leader and follower 
authorities; and the deviant authorities. Each chapter within the empirical section 
starts with an outline defining the type of organisations examined and in turn 
examines: Historical background and their political leadership; the impact of the 
Conservative governments’ (1979- 1997) and the New Labour government’s (1997-
2007) reforms; and the role of the actors – trade unions, management and politicians 
within these organisations. Each of these chapters has an analysis section that applies 
the Three Pillars framework to each of the actors, which illustrate the degree of 
strength and support they show towards the national collective bargaining framework. 
Each chapter in the empirical section of the thesis concludes with a discussion that 
highlights the key issues that have been illuminated by the fieldwork and how this 
contributes to the wider discussion and issues that are linked to the chapters in the 
empirical section.  
 
The thesis will show that the institutional stakeholders, whether at an authority, 
regional or national level have been bound to different degrees by the national 
collective bargaining framework, which they have seen as the foundation stone of 
joint regulation in local government. The application of institutional theory has 
allowed me to identify the processes that shape and define collective bargaining and 
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offers explanations why national, centralised bargaining continues to survive in 
English local government.   The nature of local government being a political 
instrument of the local electorate has seen it develop an employment relations 
architecture which is pluralistic by nature. Local government management has 
historically been based on political accountability, rather than through the economic 
marketplace and links between management practice and public policy were 
considered legitimately compatible with good organisational governance. All of these 
factors have been inextricably linked to the national framework and therefore it has a 
powerful hold on all the stakeholders within local government. This supports the 
contention that it is mutually expedient for the stakeholders within local government 
employment relations to continue to support and promote national centralised 
collective bargaining in local government, so long as it provides the forum for 
providing bargaining outcomes that are acceptable to the parties involved.   
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                                             Chapter Two 
                                    
                                    The UK Public Sector 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter traces the development of the UK public sector over the period from 
1979 until 2007. During this time the public sector has undergone large scale 
structural reform, firstly, under the Conservative’s marketisation programme, and 
secondly, under Labour’s modernisation project (1997-2007). The chapter traces and 
assesses the impact of these reforms focusing on how they shaped employment 
relations. 
 
The chapter begins with examining the context of the public sector - how it is made 
up and locating its position within the UK economy. The history of the public sector 
is explored by looking at the institutional arrangements that developed from the end 
of the First World War, through the post 1945-1979 period and how public sector 
employment relations, despite the reforms that it has undergone, is still cast by the 
historical legacy of the Whitley system.  An examination of the public management 
and employment relations literatures shows how they have helped to contribute to the 
debate and our understanding of the reform process and the distinctive nature of the 
public sector.  
 
The Context 
 
In the last thirty years the UK’s labour market and industrial sectors within it, have 
been subject to major economic structural reforms that have sought to boost efficiency 
and effectiveness. Public sector reform over this period has been a high priority issue 
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amongst policy makers in most OECD countries (Eliassen and Sitter, 2008). Demand 
for public services grew with demographic changes that saw raised consumer 
expectations combined with changing economic conditions and the need to control 
public expenditure. These pressures created a situation where policy makers had to 
examine the way in which public services were delivered.  
 
Public services are shaped by multiple stakeholders who have diverse interests. In the 
case of employment: trade unions, employers, management, occupational groups and 
politicians, have differing positions on what they believe makes for efficient and 
effective public services. It is within this context that UK governments over the last 
thirty years have entered into a process of public sector reform that has focused on 
how the workforce is organised, resourced and managed. The size of the public sector 
workforce and its reduction has been a preoccupation of Conservative governments 
wishing for a smaller state. However, the political rhetoric has not matched the 
actuality. For example, despite the decline of the public sector workforce in the 1980s, 
total public sector employment over a twenty year period (1991-2010) remained fairly 
constant at 6 million ( Hicks and Lindsey, 2005; and Bach and Kessler, 2012). (see 
Table 2.1). The resilience of public sector numbers has been attributed to the nature of 
the services that are provided. Many services take the form of unmediated interaction 
between worker and service user, as in, the patient, pupil, or prisoner. Any reduction 
in public workforce numbers therefore has a demonstrable impact on service delivery, 
which in turn, has broader social, economic and political consequences (Bach and 
Kessler, 2012). Since 1997, when a Labour government came to power, it has seen 
policy makers’ focus on questions around work organisation, employee engagement 
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and patterns of working rather than crude workforce reductions (Bach and Kessler, 
2007).   
 
Over the last thirty years both Conservative and Labour governments have undertaken 
public sector reform with their own models of reform, which they have rarely been 
satisfied with the results. The social and political consensus that existed from 1945 
until the mid-seventies was shattered by the Conservatives coming to power in 1979 
and their eighteen years in office, where they sought to ‘roll back the frontiers of the 
state’. After 1997, the Labour governments re-focused on a modernisation programme 
(Newman, 2001).   
 
Table 2.1 UK Public Sector employment (selected years); Seasonally adjusted 
Headcount (Thousands) 
 Central 
government 
(incl. NHS) 
Local 
government 
Civil Service Total public 
sector 
1991 2,306 3,072 589  
1992 2,274 2,788 598 5,593 
1995 2,156 2,758 552 5,368 
1997 2,079 2,728 513 5,175 
1999 2,115 2,735 504 5,202 
2001 2,232 2,771 522 5,376 
2003 2,434 2,832 560 5,639 
2005 2,564 2,923 570 5,854 
2007 2,505 2,941 539 5,785 
2009 2,594 2,926 533 6,091 
2010 2,572 2,885 515 6,014 
Source: Hicks and Lindsey 2005; ONS 2008; 2010. 
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Public Sector History since 1979    
1979 saw the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher introduce a 
programme of public sector reform that was focused on reducing public expenditure 
and shrinking the state. At the heart of the Conservative reform process was to shrink 
the size and scope of the public sector and open it up to private sector competition 
through marketisation (Bach, 2010; Bach and Winchetser, 2003; Corby and White, 
1999; Corby and Symon 2011; and Bach and Kessler, 2012). The Conservative 
governments over an eighteen year period: privatised former nationalised industries 
and public services, ‘contracted out’ services within the NHS and local government, 
and established NHS trusts and Civil Service agencies. These changes were 
ideologically driven by the Conservatives’ belief that private sector intervention and 
the introduction of market forces would promote competition and increase the 
efficiency of service provision while curtailing public spending, which it believed the 
public sector had gone out of control. The Conservatives were critical of public sector 
trade unions for promoting their members interests over the interests of the services 
that their members provided, while equally being critical of public sector managers 
for being inefficient and not providing ‘value for money’. The interests of ‘producers’ 
had prevailed over those of the ‘consumers’ of public services (Le Grand, 2003).   
 
The Labour governments under Tony Blair accepted the Conservative public sector 
reforms which they had inherited but pursued a programme for ‘modernising 
government’ (Cabinet Office, 1999), designed to emphasize service quality and 
service standards rather than cost minimization. Labour rather than relying on market 
style reforms looked to promote co-operation between the public and private sectors, 
and between different parts of the public services, and introduced a performance 
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management framework to oversee the process    (Bach and Winchester, 2003).  The 
ten year period from 1997 until 2007 saw Labour governments commit to large scale 
investment in the public sector which was integral to its modernisation programme. 
This modernisation programme saw major structural and compositional changes in the 
workforce and the means by which they were managed. This was linked to Labour’s 
wish to ensure that there was a maximum return on their investment in the sector.       
 
The Literatures 
It is useful to examine the literatures that have shaped and informed the debate on 
public sector reform over the last thirty years and how they can be used to make sense 
of these reforms that have shaped employment relations in the public sector. The two 
literatures of most interest are public management and employment relations.   
 
Public Management Literature 
Public management literature distinguishes three models of public service delivery 
based on hierarchy, markets and networks.  The relationship between these models 
has been debated and contested over the years and have underpinned the discussion 
that has occurred. One model of public administration centres on a bureaucratic model 
characterised by a rational system based on explicit rules and a system of hierarchical 
authority underpinned by functional specialisation. The bureaucratic model limits 
discretion through prescriptive, strictly regulated procedures that creates 
administrative adherence rather than managerial action. This was the dominant model 
that was prevalent in public sector organisations before 1979. After 1979 the 
perceived stranglehold of the bureaucratic model, which had become the dominant 
model for public administration since 1945, was challenged as more ‘dynamic’ and 
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‘flexible’ public services were demanded and public management, in particular New 
Public Management,  came to the fore:  
“The public management movement of the 1980s and 1990s was a reaction against 
those in public law and public administration who put the focus on constitutional and 
institutional design of the machinery of government. It stressed production 
engineering and managerial leadership, rather than rule bound bureaucracy as the 
essence of executive government.” (Hood, 2005: 14). 
 
New Public Management has many strands to its makeup – part theoretical, part 
ideological, and part solution driven – and this has led to three definitions: 
 NPM is a shorthand for the ideological tradition  of ‘managerialism’ and 
‘neo-Taylorism’ (Pollitt, 1993) 
 NPM is used synonymously with business-centred management practices 
imported from the private sector (Hood, 1990) 
 NPM is an umbrella term covering the transformation of bureaucratic, 
paternalistic and democratically passive public services into efficient, 
responsive and consumer –oriented ones (Ranson and Stewart, 1994)   
Attempts at unpacking the notion of NPM have led to it being seen: as a way of 
implanting private sector initiatives into the public services; highlighting competition 
amongst service providers through a contractual/commercial framework; enhancing 
managerial prerogative; and promoting centralised performance management 
(Newman, 2001; Power, 2001).  
 
Within the UK public sector context, the literature has focused on policy outcomes 
connected with the introduction of NPM.  Three areas have been highlighted. Firstly, 
the shift in authority from professions to general managers as a result of a switch in 
focus from inputs to outputs of services, emphasising management having direct 
operational control while being accountable to a central auditing framework (Power, 
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2001). Secondly, the disaggregation and the fragmentation of the public sector, with 
the growth of semi-autonomous agencies, and NPM’s use as a process to bring 
coherence to the new fragmented landscape of the public sector, emphasising 
management by contract rather than by hierarchy (Bach and Kessler, 2012) .Thirdly, 
the use of incentives and targets to regulate managerial and workforce behaviour (Le 
Grand, 2003).  The public sector literature has shown that with the move from 
management by hierarchy to management by contract there has been a fracturing of 
public service functions which has resulted in the proliferation of outsourcing and the 
creation of executive agencies, resulting in the hollowing out of the state (Rhodes, 
2007).  
 
Employment Relations Literature 
Public sector employment relations literature has focused on the institutions - trade 
unions, employers and the state. Particular interest has always been given to the trade 
unions (Beaumont 1992; Ironside and Seifert, 2000; Symon, 2011). While detailed 
studies of manager and worker behaviour has examined the formal and informal rules 
which govern the workplace, and the external influences beyond, which shape it 
(Batestone et al. 1984; Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2005; Cunningham, 2011). The 
relationship between the institutional actors and the means by which the employment 
relationship is regulated and controlled, while balancing the collective and individual 
interests has been a recurring focus for UK public sector employment relations (Bach 
and Winchester, 2003; Bach and Kessler, 2012; Corby and White, 1999; Corby and 
Symon, 2011). Gospel (1992) identifies three analytical domains to examine the 
relationship between the actors: 
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 Industrial Relations – examining the collective side of the employment 
relationship, focusing on trade unions, employers, and collective bargaining 
 Employment Relations – examining the employment relationship between 
employer and individual worker, focusing on recruitment, reward, working 
patterns, equalities and performance appraisal 
 Work Relations -   relates to worker tasks and responsibilities, and how they 
are structured and organised, focusing on the shape and nature of work, as 
well as how work routines are designed to control worker attitudes and 
behaviours     
These analytical domains have underpinned the study of employment relations for the 
last sixty years and they have been invaluable in evaluating the changing contours of 
the UK public sector employment relations landscape. Through these domains three 
narrative themes have underpinned the study of public sector employment relations: 
the model employer; work experience; and institutions and actors.   
 
The ‘Model Employer’ 
The ‘model employer’ borne out of the Whitley Committee of 1917, saw in the inter-
war years, the formation of joint regulation of employment relations in the public 
sector. Whitley saw a public policy commitment to trade union membership as a 
means of promoting industrial citizenship, and collective bargaining as a means of 
determining pay and conditions of employment. Its consolidation post 1945 saw 
governments recognise their responsibility as an employer to promote ‘best practice’ 
in managing the public sector workforce and be an exemplar to other employers in the 
wider economy. Trade unions were integral to the development of joint regulation and 
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were promoted by governments which saw trade union membership grow between 
1945and 1979: 
 “The post-1945 public sector employment relations model was characterised by 
strong centralised and complex bargaining structures at a national level; a diversity of 
bargaining groups and bargaining agents along sectoral and occupational lines; a 
commitment by both sides to conciliation and arbitration to avoid industrial conflict; 
and for many public servants, a continuing emphasis upon pay comparability with the 
private sector.”  
(Corby and White, 1999: 6).       
 
The Whitley system from which the ‘model employer’ developed produced a set of 
institutional arrangements which were bureaucratic and pluralistic in nature. 
Collective bargaining was within a national framework that was jointly determined 
and strove to ensure transparency and standardisation of conditions of employment. 
As a consequence it was seen to produce a narrow employment relations agenda as 
the national framework gave little opportunity for local or workplace employment 
relations to develop. From 1945 up until the mid-seventies much of the public sector 
employment relations literature was limited to fairly prosaic descriptions of the 
national bargaining machinery (Levinson, 1972).  The ‘downside’ of the model 
employer was the capacity for the national framework to become a lightning 
conductor for public sector industrial conflict when governments from the 1960s 
onwards started to apply income policies to public sector workers that tested and 
eventually broke the consensus that had come out of the Whitley system (Winchester, 
1983; Ironside and Seifert, 2000). These conflicts, however, right up until the 
departure of the Callaghan administration in 1979, were still played out at the national 
level, and did not question the viability of the national framework as being central to 
employment regulation in the public sector.  
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From 1979 onwards the Whitley system was undermined by successive Conservative 
governments. The Conservatives no longer subscribed to the model employer, as they 
did not support trade union membership proactively and wanted to restrict and curtail 
collective bargaining. In particular, the Conservatives saw national systems of pay 
bargaining and representation as being incompatible with their wish to introduce 
marketisation to public services. For instance, over the course of eighteen years, the 
Conservative governments sought devolution in collective bargaining, and achieved 
varying degrees of success. Illustrative of this is within the Civil Service where they 
successfully abolished national bargaining with the creation of semi-autonomous 
executive agencies across the Civil Service functions that fragmented bargaining units 
(Kessler et al. 2006). Similarly, the introduction of an internal market and the creation 
of hospital trusts as a consequence of the National Health Service and Community 
Care Act 1990, within the NHS undermined national collective bargaining (Corby, 
1992). The 1980s and 1990s saw Conservative governments introduce employment 
relations reforms that were drawn from what it perceived to be as ‘best practice’ from 
the private sector. They were particularly attracted to HR practices that favoured 
focusing on the individual worker rather than on collective interests.  
 
The Hollowing Out Thesis 
 
The ‘hollowing out’ thesis came to the fore in the early 1990s when it was highlighted 
by the political theorist, R.A.W. Rhodes (1994).  Rhodes argued in the British 
political context, that the hollowing out of the state had begun in 1979 when 
institutions of the state, during the 1980s and 1990s, had undergone dramatic changes 
as a consequence of the public sector reform process and the introduction of the 
privatisation and marketisation agenda. He argued that government was no longer a 
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wholly unified and autonomous institution which was equated with the constitutional 
sovereignty of parliament and a centralised executive (Rhodes, 2000).  
 
Rhodes’ hollowing out thesis has two main elements. Firstly, that it holds that 
centralised political institutions are breaking up. Fragmentation reaches into the very 
heart of the state, where executive segmentation is now the most striking feature. He 
defines the core executive as: 
“all those organisations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and 
integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of 
conflicts between different elements of the government machine” (Dunleavy and 
Rhodes, 1990).  
 
Secondly, the centre is losing its grip on the rest of the state. The functional policy 
networks that the core networks seek to police are resistant to direction and control. 
Putting the two elements together, Rhodes (1994) contends that:   
“the state becomes a collection of inter-organizational networks made up of 
governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate.”  
 
This fragmentation of the British state has created a situation in which multiple power 
centres possess the means of entering into bargaining processes within and between 
policy networks. Rhodes’ core argument is that the ‘Westminster model’ of political 
governance, characterised by the executive supremacy of central government and 
parliamentary sovereignty, has in effect been diminished. Central governments since 
1979 have in effect delegated executive and political responsibility away from 
themselves to subsidiary bodies, with functional and institutional specialization, that 
operate both within and outside the formal boundaries of the state.  In essence the 
British state has become less reliant on centralised bureaucratic hierarchies and 
moved away from being a large, dominant, bureaucratic entity to one of many public 
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sector agencies engaged in the policy development process. This dilution of 
centralised state power has been described as ‘hollowing out’.    
 
Rhodes’ ‘hollowing out’ thesis infers a political shift concerning the transition from 
government to governance. The hollowing-out trends at the heart of government 
during the 1980s served to multiply the number of self-administered 
interorganisational networks within the state, especially in the delivery of services 
(Rhodes, 1995; Rhodes 1996). This has resulted in a new form of governance without 
government, a trend, according to Rhodes that:  
“ has important implications for the theory and practice of British government’  
(Rhodes, 1995: 18)     
 
This government-to-governance narrative by the beginning of the millennium had 
become accepted by political thinkers (Smith, 1998; Loader, 2000; Richards and 
Smith, 2002). However, despite the hollowing out thesis becoming pre-eminent in 
political thinking, there were dissenting voices within the political literature. Holliday 
argues that real political events during the 1980s conspired to give the hollowing out 
thesis a sheen of plausibility: 
“It would seem that the rather eccentric politics of a passing era in British politics 
have been confused with a real structural change” (Holliday, 2000: 175)       
 
Holliday rejects the hollowing out of the state thesis, as he argues the evidence to 
show that the centralised structures within the state are breaking up is difficult to 
substantiate. He prefers to emphasize that although the state is finding itself operating 
in a more complex and difficult environment, dealing with a larger number of 
institutional actors that are shaping public policy, the state nevertheless, has a core 
that is still substantial and is the key driver of public policy in Britain.          
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The undermining of national collective bargaining in the public sector in the 1980s 
and mid-1990s, led to commentators questioning its sustainability and ability to 
remain relevant to employment relations in the sector. As we have seen, the 
‘hollowing out’ thesis (Rhodes, 1994) raised the issue of the dramatic changes and 
consequences of public sector reform. The promotion of privatisation and 
agencification were leading to a ‘diminished central capacity.’  It has been argued that 
marketisation of the public sector and the de-centralisation of the management of 
employment relations across the sector has hollowed out and eroded the primacy of 
national collective bargaining arrangements (Bach and Della Rosa, 2000; Thornley et 
al. 2000; Pollitt and Boukaert, 2000). The hollowing out thesis has become an 
academic orthodoxy within the British public sector industrial relations literature with 
the widespread de-centralisation of employment relations. 
 
Work Experience  
Within the public sector, historically, a high emphasis has been placed on the intrinsic 
worth of occupations, particularly amongst white collar, professional occupational 
groups. As a consequence a rich narrative has developed revolving around the 
questions of enrichment and degradation (Bach and Kessler, 2012). Enrichment and 
degradation have become a key narrative in exploring the changing landscape of 
public sector employment relations. The employer model, as already discussed 
encapsulated transparency and fairness within employment relations practices that 
promoted: open competition in recruitment and selection procedures, high levels of 
job security, career opportunities through internal career ladders, and guaranteed pay 
increases based on service and comparability with the private sector (Bach and Della 
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Rocca, 2000). However, it must also be acknowledged that during the period when the 
employer model was widely accepted within the public sector there were inequalities 
in the treatment of female and manual workers which illustrated occupational 
segregation  in the public services (Winchester, 1983). 
 
From 1979 onwards through successive Conservative and Labour governments, 
professions within the public sector have faced challenges to their autonomy and 
discretion as managerial controls have tightened. The Conservatives, with NPM 
shaping their public policy, saw public sector professionals as a major constraint on 
the reform process seeing them as part of the ‘problem’ rather than the ‘solution’ in 
defending ‘producer’ rather than ‘consumer’ interests. This erosion of discretion and 
autonomy has been examined through applying labour process theory and showing 
how tightening management systems that focus control and performance monitoring 
have de-skilled professional occupations within the public services (Harris, 1998; 
Ironside and Seifert, 1995).  
 
However, it must also be recognised that while many traditional professions have 
suffered under the reform process there has been the rise of new professions. Under 
Labour and their modernisation programme, a new cadre of professional has come to 
the fore in the public sector – the assistant. Assistant roles like, teaching and health 
care assistants, have been promoted and recognised by government (Blair, 2002; 
Cabinet Office, 2008) for their contribution in helping to improve the delivery of 
public services. While the role of assistants has offered opportunities for women, who 
are predominantly employed in these roles improved pay and career prospects (Bach, 
2011), it is arguable that the promotion of assistants by government has been a way of 
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employing cheaper and less unionised workforce, reducing public service reliance on 
the established professions, whose role has been questioned (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2002).  Ultimately, despite the challenge to public professions by governments over 
the last thirty years, they have remained resilient, and their authority within the 
workplace has remained deeply engrained, while they have shown themselves to be 
adaptable to the political and organisational environment they find themselves in.      
 
The Institutional Infrastructure and the Distinctiveness of the Public Sector 
A great deal of attention has been given within the employment relations literature to 
the institutional underpinnings that support and promote the employment relationship. 
Dunlop (1958) showed how systems theory provided the analytical and theoretical 
basis to make industrial relations an academic discipline in its own right. Dunlop’s 
system focuses on the three principal actors – the employer, the unions and the state – 
and how they interact through the bargaining machinery that is in place to produce 
substantive and procedural rules that shape the employment relationship between 
them. Within the public sector context it has been recognised that it is distinctive 
because: 
“unlike the private sector, the fabric of public service employee relations is shot 
through with the important dimension of political power.” (Corby and White, 1999: 3) 
 
and the public sector employers and management’s dilemma that they: 
“derive … from the inherently political nature of the values and objectives which 
must inescapably govern the direction taken’ (Storey, 1992: 55) 
 
Thus the state as an employer enters into an employment relationship shaped by 
political contingency (Ferner, 1988). The public sector has to adapt and be responsive 
to its political masters who are ideologically driven by their political agendas that are 
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dependent on electoral support. Consequently, employment relations in the public 
sector operates in an uncertain, cyclical, and values-based dynamic not present in the 
private sector (Kessler, Heron and Dopson, 2008).  Political contingency casts the 
relationship between the actors in the public sector and as a result employment 
relations are founded on the twin pillars of transparency and accountability. A 
distinctive feature that runs through the public sector to different degrees is the dual 
nature of the employer as an actor.  Firstly, the employer acts as a - politician, 
accountable to the electorate. Secondly, the employer has the role of – management, 
who act and deliver the wishes of their political masters. Between them they have to 
balance the political aspirations and the reality of delivering services to the public. A 
criticism of the public sector employment relations literature is that it has focused 
primarily on the three principal actors – state, trade unions, and employers to the 
exclusion of other interest groups who might have a legitimate role in regulating the 
public services employment relationship (Bach and Kessler, 2011). This has been 
highlighted in the last decade with the expansion and growth of the third/voluntary 
sector in the provision of public services (Cunningham, 2011).  
 
An Appreciation of the Literatures  
By studying both the public management and employment relations literatures we can 
see that there are similar areas of interest which complement each other. The public 
management literature has illuminated the management and political processes that 
underlie the reforms that have been introduced in the last thirty years. In an 
employment context, it has examined human resource management, focusing on how 
reforms have affected workers as individuals. While the employment relations 
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literature has focused on institutional actors that represent collective interests, and 
how these interests have been affected by the reform process. 
 
Bach and Kessler (2012) highlight that there are important differences between the 
two literature perspectives. Firstly, the public management literature has focused on 
upstream consequences of public service delivery mechanisms, concentrating on the 
organisational and management context and the nature of employer policy. In 
contrast, the employment relations literature has not been defined by a managerially 
driven agenda, but instead, has sought to understand worker interests through the 
trade unions as an institutional actor within the public sector employment relations 
rubric (Fairbrother, 1996; Ironside and Seifert, 2000; Tailby and Winchester, 2005). 
Secondly, the public management literature has tracked the application and 
assimilation of private sector management practices within the public sector 
highlighting their differences (Flynn, 2007; Martin, 2005).  
 
The employment relations literature while acknowledging the influence of private 
sector employment practices on the public management, takes a more guarded 
approach, viewing the assimilation of private sector employment practices as being 
variable between public sector organisations (Duncan, 2001; Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 
2005).  Within the employment relations literature there is still a prevailing view that 
despite the impact of reforms, UK public sector employment relations continues to be 
rooted in the broader, political, economic and social environment that gives it its 
distinctiveness as an employment sector (Storey, 1992; Corby and White, 1999; Bach 
and Winchester, 2003; Bach, 2010; Corby and Symon, 2011; Bach and Kessler, 
2012).       
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the continuous process of reforms within UK public sector 
employment relations over the last thirty years. It has looked at how political ideology 
has shaped the reform process and how this in turn has affected the employment 
relationship between state, trade unions and employers.  The structural reforms within 
the public sector have seen far reaching changes in the organization and management 
of public services, with an emphasis on ‘user’ rather than ‘producer’ interests. While 
equally, over the last thirty years the boundaries between the private and public sector 
have changed, with the private sector providing more public services, and in the last 
ten years the emergence of the voluntary sector as a service provider. There has been 
a degree of assimilation of private sector employment relations practice within public 
sector employment relations, but it still remains that the diversity of institutional 
arrangements and employment practices within both sectors seems more notable than 
the similarities.            
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                                          Chapter Three 
                                English Local Government  
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the historical development of local government 
focusing on the post 1979 period which saw a major transformation through a 
reforming process initially implemented by the Thatcher governments of the 1980s 
and followed through by the Labour government under Tony Blair since 1997. The 
chapter assesses the nature of these changes and how the Conservative and Labour 
administrations shaped them for their own political objectives. The chapter provides a 
foundation for understanding the local government employment relations landscape 
and how this was shaped by the reforms that permeated every level of local 
government. 
 
The chapter begins with examining local government in the political system which 
looks at the historical relationship between local and central government. It goes on to 
explore the tensions between central and local government and how this has militated 
often into divisive political confrontation. The Thatcher years are assessed through 
defining Thatcherism from three interpretative standpoints and this in turn leads on to 
an evaluation of the impact of local government reforms under the Conservatives and 
how this has impacted on employment relations. Finally the chapter ends by looking 
at the Labour government under Tony Blair and the Labour project for local 
government reform through the introduction of Best Value and the impact of new 
public management.    
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Local Government Employment – Facts and Figures 
Local authorities are major employers within their local areas and as an employment 
institution within the national labour market a significant employer. Local authorities’ 
services are labour intensive and up to half their expenditure goes on employment 
costs (Wilson and Game, 2002). Birmingham City Council as the largest local 
authority in the country employs 52,000 workers or the equivalent of 30,000 full time 
equivalents (B.C.C., 2007). The contemporary UK workforce of 30 million, (Machin, 
2007), is made up of almost two and a half million that work in local government with 
a pay bill that amounts to some £35 billion (Local Government Association, 2007).  
 
Changing numbers   
The major growth in local authority employment took place in the 1960s and the early 
part of the 1970s. From 1979 to the late 1980s, despite the efforts of the Conservative 
government to reduce the size of the public sector, numbers remained fairly static at 
around 3 million – the steady reduction of manual workers during this period being 
largely cancelled out by the increase of non-manual workers (Local Government 
Employment Digest, 1997). The biggest losses came about during this period from the 
abolition of the metropolitan councils in 1986, the change of status of bus and 
municipal airport staff in 1986/87, and the transfer of polytechnics and higher 
education institutions out of local education authority control in 1989. In 1993 the 
compulsory outsourcing of the waste disposal function in all local authorities 
combined with the loss of control of further education institutions saw local 
government employment in England fall by a fifth by the mid-nineties although in 
certain services like social services and planning numbers increased. By the end of 
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Blair’s tenure the downward turn had been stabilised to a workforce of two and a half 
million. 
 
The Composition of the Workforce   
Since the Second World War the composition of the local government workforce has 
changed dramatically. The last thirty years have seen women become the dominant 
gender engaged principally in part time white collar work. Full-time male workers, 
who had constituted over half of the local government workforce in 1954, were by 
2000 down to 23 per cent and easily outnumbered by full-time (29%) and particularly 
part-time (42%) women workers (Wilson and Game, 2002).   Local government in the 
last thirty years has at an authority and national level promoted an equalities agenda 
that has sought to address the issue of representation in the workplace. A number of 
initiatives have been taken to recruit and retain workers who are perceived to be 
disadvantaged in the local government workplace. These groups being: women, ethnic 
minorities and people with disabilities. In the last ten years this has been extended to 
look and tackle workplace discrimination against: age, religion, and sexual 
orientation. Family friendly policies have been in place in local government for the 
last thirty years which have sought to tackle issues around balancing work and family 
responsibilities. This has become more of a priority as women have become a central 
component in the local government workforce and have become the predominant 
gender in many of the professional occupational groups like: Environmental Health, 
Social Work and Human Resource Management.  
 
Employment policies in local government have adapted to reflect the changing 
composition of its workforce. Equity in pay and conditions of employment has been 
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achieved between full and part-time workers and this can be seen in the 
superannuation and holiday and sick pay entitlements that were harmonised in 
1993/1994 (White, 1997).  The process of Single Status which began in 1997 and was 
formally implemented in 2007 has seen a harmonisation of terms and conditions of 
employment between manual and non-manual workers. This has been achieved 
through a comprehensive job evaluation programme throughout all the English local 
authorities that has seen the introduction of a single pay spine for all workers below 
Chief Officer Level. The composition of the local government workforce is reflective 
of the public it serves with more women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities 
being employed within it. This has been achieved because of the political will of 
national and local politicians to actively promote equalities in the local government 
workplace for both organisational and wider general public interests.       
 
The Structure of Local Government in England   
The present local government structure was established by a series of legislative 
changes that began in the mid-seventies and continued through to the present day. In 
England there are 346 local authorities which are within the following categories: 
 Two tier ‘shire’ counties 
 The London Boroughs 
 Metropolitan Districts 
 Unitary Authorities  
 District Councils 
 
If there is a common theme which links the reorganisation initiatives of successive 
Conservative (1979-97) and Labour (1997-2007) governments, it is a belief that a 
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unitary system of local government (town and parish councils excluded) is preferred 
to a two tiered system (Leach, 2009). Central government’s preference for the unitary 
system is based on the practicality of having 200 unitary authorities with an identical 
range of responsibilities making it easier to manage and ultimately control from the 
centre. The unitary system offers central government the perceived benefit that 
because unitary authorities are larger they offer economic efficiencies that allow 
authorities to become technocratic as they focus on service management, 
administration, and efficiency that are perceived to be better at delivering public 
services. It is argued (Copus, 2006; Stewart, 2003) that this perception is not 
necessarily based on reality and is based primarily on central government’s wish for 
political and financial control.  
 
The two tier system of local government is messier than the unitary system as the 
differences between counties and districts about issues they have shared 
responsibilities for can be potentially problematic from a service delivery point of 
view and can lead to disputes about the allocation of resources. From a management 
perspective it has been argued that the two tier system is unworkable. However, there 
is a counter argument that the two tier system has a real democratic strength in that it 
better aligns with the different levels of community identity at different levels that the 
unitary system cannot readily replicate. The two tier system recognises that different 
spatial scales are appropriate for different services and functions e.g. development 
control at the district, whilst highway planning at the county level. The last thirty 
years have seen a process of central government driven local government 
reorganisation initiatives that have seen the promotion of a technocratic model that 
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has favoured focusing on economic outcomes rather than local democracy 
considerations (Wilks-Heeg and Clayton, 2006).        
 
The nature of local government services means that its workforce is made up of 
diverse occupational groups that up until 2007 were defined into three principal 
categories that had their own conditions of employment.  Non manual workers were 
covered by the administrative, professional, technical and clerical (APT&C) 
conditions of service. Manual workers had manual conditions of service, while craft 
workers were governed by national conditions of service for craft workers. All three 
employment groups were party to national agreements which were applicable to local 
authorities across the country who were in the national framework and formed the 
collective bargaining structure that was based on the Whitley Council system that 
produced annual pay settlements and conditions of employment. There are thirty 
separate national joint negotiating councils and committees who determine pay and 
conditions in local government, but the focus in this work will concentrate on the two 
principal employment groups, APT&C and manual workers. 
 
Below the national joint councils are Provincial Councils that are joint employer/ 
trade union organisations made up of elected members from each local authority 
within a specific geographical area together with full-time and lay trade union 
representatives. The Provincial Councils act as appeals bodies to settle disputes which 
have not been resolved at an authority level. The Provincial Councils are represented 
on the national joint councils as well as employers’ representatives from the local 
authority associations. The employers’ associations since the Second World War have 
morphed from the Local Authorities Conditions of Service Advisory Board 
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(LACSAB); into the Local Government Management Board (LGMB); and finally into 
the Local Government Employers (LGE). The role of these associations has been to 
coordinate and service the employers’ side of the national negotiating bodies.  
 
The Green Book – Local Government Conditions of Service  
 
Within English local government the National Joint Council represents local 
authorities and former APT&C non manual employees and former NJC manual 
workers. The National Joint Council promotes local democratic control of services to 
the community as the primary role of local government. The principal role of the NJC 
is to reach agreement, based on shared values, on a national scheme of pay and 
conditions for local application throughout England. The Constitution of the National 
Joint Council is to promote stable industrial relations and negotiation and consultation 
between local authorities as employers and recognised trade unions.   
The National Joint Council has a strong commitment to joint negotiation and 
consultation at all levels. Co-operation between employers, employees, and unions is 
seen as pivotal in successfully deliver local government services. The national 
agreement consists of two parts – Part 2 and Part 3. 
Part 2 
These are key provisions which are for application by all local authorities to all 
employees covered by the NJC. They are basic provisions which constitute a standard 
throughout England. Key national provisions are: 
 Equalities 
 Official Conduct 
 Training and Development 
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 Health, Safety and Welfare 
 Pay and Grading 
 Working Time 
 Leave 
 Part Time Employees 
 Temporary Employees 
 Sickness Scheme 
 Maternity Scheme 
 Car Allowances 
 Reimbursement of Expenditure 
 Continuous Service 
 Period of Notice to Terminate Employment 
 Grievance Procedures 
 Disciplinary Procedures 
 Trade Union Facilities 
     
Part 3 
Other national provisions may be modified by local negotiation. The party proposing 
change must state in writing what changes are sought and why the parties must then 
seek agreement. Where agreement is not possible, either party (employer or trade 
unions) may refer the failure to agree to the provincial joint secretaries for 
conciliation. If the provincial conciliation is unsuccessful, the provincial secretaries 
may recommend further procedures for resolution of the difference, including 
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conciliation, mediation or binding ACAS arbitration.  The provisions with an element 
of discretion delegated to individual local authorities are: 
 Pay and grading  
 Working Arrangements 
 Sickness Absence Schemes 
 Child Care and Dependants 
 Car Allowances 
 Ill Health, Disablement, and Death Benefits   
 
Trade Unions in Local Government 
Historically, a large number of trade unions have been recognised for collective 
bargaining purposes within local government. Up until 1993 the largest trade union 
within local government that represented white collar interests were the National and 
Local Government Officers’ Association (NALGO) which led the negotiations on the 
National Joint Council for APT&C workers. NALGO subsequently merged with 
NUPE and COHSE to form UNISON in 1993 and UNISON has the largest 
membership within local government. Manual workers within local government have 
historically relied on the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TG&WU) and the 
General Municipal and Boilermakers’ Union (GMB).  In 2007 the TG&WU merged 
with Amicus to form UNITE and it has continued to draw on membership from the 
manual and craft occupational groups within local government.           
 
All the principal trade unions in local government whether UNISON, UNITE or the 
GMB or in their  old incarnations of NALGO or the T&GWU have over the last thirty 
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years sought to defend the national collective bargaining framework. This has been 
for both procedural and substantive reasons. The trade unions within local 
government have relied on a professional cadre of full time officers which have 
preferred national bargaining for logistical and political control within their respective 
trade unions. Full time officers have been able to effectively prepare, negotiate and 
police national agreements from a national standpoint and the national collective 
bargaining framework has allowed the trade unions to organise, mobilise and 
campaign on a national basis which has aided them in producing national pay claims 
across the whole of local government. The trade unions have resisted local bargaining 
as it threatens their organisational and procedural arrangements and in turn their 
internal government with a potential shift from the full time  to lay officials within 
their unions and the consequent question of servicing local bargaining with 
inexperienced negotiators.  Since 1990 a small number (34 out of 346) of local 
authorities have left the national collective bargaining framework and so despite the 
trade unions opposing local bargaining they have nevertheless had to develop a 
strategy for continuing to promote their support for a national agreement while also 
supporting local branches where local authorities had withdrawn from the national 
framework. Trade unions have developed support structures within opt out local 
authorities that share information and data on settlements and agreements that have 
helped local trade union representatives negotiate agreements at a local level.  
 
NALGO back in 1989 waged a national strike supporting the primacy of national 
bargaining in local government. The union stood firm on the concept of national pay 
scales and a national agreed pay settlement process. The employers at the time wanted 
to implement a two stage pay deal which set minimum rates nationally but allowed 
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local authorities to set their rates above the minimum in order to meet labour market 
demands. The employers also wished to relax some of the national conditions of 
service like national standards on working time and unsocial hours payments. These 
changes were viewed by NALGO as ‘strings’ and as NALGO’s National Local 
Government Chair, Jim White said these: ‘strings represent the most dangerous and 
insidious attack on conditions of service of APT&C staff since the national agreement 
was first constituted in 1947’ (Ironside & Seifert, 2000: 280). The national strike saw 
500,000 workers come out and the employers eventually capitulating and 
withdrawing the proposal to relax national conditions of service.  This resultant loss 
led to a number of local authorities, most notably Kent County Council, in 1990 
withdrawing from the national framework.      
 
In the last twenty years all of the principal trade unions (UNISON, UNITE, and the 
GMB) have taken the position that they maintain their defence of national bargaining 
but have acknowledged that the level of collective bargaining has seen the 
development of local bargaining at an authority level as a process of making local 
authorities more flexible to the changing economic environment they are operating in. 
The unions, however, have argued that the flexibility required at an authority level 
can be achieved within the national framework and therefore it still should be seen as 
underpinning the process of job regulation within local government. The unions have 
resisted the idea of decentralisation as it is a potential threat to their recognition and as 
already mentioned it has implications for internal union organisation. Trade unions 
favour national collective bargaining because it takes pay outside of the workplace, 
and is based on a ‘rate for the job’ which is universally applicable across all local 
authorities and is seen as a bulwark in protecting local government workers against 
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occupational grade erosion. National collective bargaining allows the trade unions to 
organise national campaigns on pay and conditions of service that can mobilise their 
membership across the country as demonstrated in the late 1980s and more recently in 
2004/2005. The effectiveness of these campaigns to promote and defend conditions of 
service has been seen as pivotal in trade unions recruiting and retaining their 
membership. National collective bargaining is seen by the trade unions as integral to 
fulfilling their employment relations objectives in a framework that underpins the 
process of joint regulation in local government.    
    
The Local Government Association –  
A National Voice for Local Government  
 
The English local government reorganisation in the 1970s saw a rationalisation of 
local government’s national representation with the creation of three associations: The 
Association of County Councils (ACC), the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(AMA), and the Association of District Councils (ADC). In 1997, after much 
infighting and manoeuvring it was decided that the unification of the three 
associations offered the best prospect of furthering local government interests at a 
national level (Entwistle, 2002). As a consequence of this decision the Local 
Government Association was formed. The Local Government Association because it 
brought together different interest groups found it challenging to promote their 
respective positions. The LGA has been criticised for not opposing more vigorously 
some of the government’s centralist policies. However, it does represent over three 
hundred authorities in England and can legitimately argue that in the time it has been 
in existence it has been an influential umbrella organisation for local government and 
succeeded in promoting a joined up approach to local government interests that its 
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predecessors had struggled to do. The nature of the LGA is political as it has to 
represent its member councils and this affects it political and economic agenda. 
Historically, local authorities’ political control nationally has reflected a counterpoint 
to central government as is the case since 2004 when the majority of councils were in 
the hands of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats but Labour controlled central 
government. The seats on both the central executive and each of the sixteen policy 
executives that steer the work of the association reflect this political composition.  
 
In all the local government employers’ associations (Local Authorities Conditions of 
Service Advisory Board, Local Government Management Board and the Local 
Government Association [Local Government Employers]) since 1947 have supported 
and promoted the national collective bargaining framework. David Thomas, the last 
Secretary of LACSAB (the predecessor of the LGE), captured succinctly the raison de 
etre of all the local government employers’ associations when he said:  
‘The guiding principle over the years has been to observe the better features of 
Whitleyism. That expression has been defined and redefined over the years but, in 
[the] Employers’ Strategy Debate, Whitleyism was [is] accepted as meaning that, as 
far as possible, employers and employees should seek to reach joint agreement on pay 
and conditions of service; that the complexity of modern day employment structures 
makes it necessary for representatives of employers to negotiate with representatives 
of employees; that collective bargaining should be conducted within an agreed 
framework at national, regional and local  level; that there needs to be a “long stop” 
arrangements for conciliation or arbitration; and that both parties [employers and 
trade unions] should take responsibility for seeking to resolve problems peacefully by 
negotiation and for honouring agreements.’  (Kelly, 1991: 200)             
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The local government employers’ associations have and are intrinsically institutions 
whose very existence have and are predicated on the promotion of joint employment 
regulation and national collective bargaining and have been central to achieving their 
employment relations objectives. National collective bargaining suits the Local 
Government Employers as it allows them to focus on: organisational, financial, and 
human (intellectual) resources that maximises the economies of scale that comes from 
negotiating as a single body on behalf of local authorities across the country. National 
collective bargaining has been critical to the continued relevance of local government 
employers’ associations as they have been given a pivotal role in negotiating and 
implementing employment agreements that unify the local authorities under a single 
bargaining umbrella. The concentration of negotiating know- how at a national level 
both within the trade unions and employers has allowed them to develop 
comprehensive agreements that provide national coverage while also being flexible 
enough to allow managerial and trade union discretion at an authority level to reflect 
local variations in service delivery requirements. National collective bargaining has 
avoided the potential ‘leap frogging’ of pay between local authorities and has 
managed a supply led sector labour market where local authorities are competing for 
similar skilled occupational groups like Environmental Health and Trading Standards 
Officers who are in short supply.  
 
The Local Government Employers’ (LGE) still see national collective bargaining as 
the most effective and efficient way of managing employment relations within local 
government because it ensures that local authorities can get on with the day to day 
management of their local services while nationally through the LGE their pay and 
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conditions of employment can be negotiated and agreed in a national framework that 
seeks to ensure the collective interests of the three hundred local authorities and the 
workers who work within them.            
 
 
The Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions 
The Department formed in 2001 was created from the former Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DTLR). Historically, local government in 
the post war period had come under of the Department of the Environment but in the 
1990s there was a move in Whitehall to create conglomerate departments as in the 
case of the DTLR which has an eight member ministerial team and has a core staff of 
3,400. The DTLR is not a direct service provider but oversees activities at an arm’s 
length through a supervisory framework like the Audit Commission. This mode of 
operation means that the Department’s budget is over £56 billion of which £35 billion 
goes to local government. The DTLR is extensively involved in all aspects of policy 
and legislation dealing with local government’s modernisation agenda, Best Value, 
and local service agreements. The DTLR is at the centre of extensive and informal 
network in Whitehall relating to local government matters.  Numerous central 
government departments have their own interests in local government. They are 
handled through formal and informal civil service meetings, various ad hoc groups 
and committees. While the DTLR provides directives and guidance to individual 
authorities, it spends much of its time with the representative bodies like the Local 
Government Association.      
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Government Offices for the Regions     
If the Local Government Association is the national voice of local government, the 
nine Government Offices – coordinated through the Regional Co-Ordination Unit 
(RGU) in the Cabinet Office – are the regional voice of central government (Wilson 
and Game, 2002). Created in 1994, they bring together the former regional offices of 
the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, Education, and 
Employment, and Trade and Industry.  They have since taken over the functions also 
from the Home Office, the Department for Works and Pensions and the Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport. These Government Offices are now responsible for £6 
billion of government expenditure. Their principal function is to work in partnership 
with local communities, businesses, local authorities, and other public and voluntary 
organisations overseeing and managing spending programmes. With the Regional Co-
Ordination Unit providing a single focus in Whitehall for regional issues, the 
Government Offices are seen by central government as a key element to what the 
Labour administrations have liked to call ‘joined-up government’. Understandably 
local authorities have seen the Government Offices as financial gatekeepers to 
resources that previously had come in many cases to local government directly and 
also a threat to their local political and economic influence, particularly with the 
Labour government’s promotion of elected regional government. The Government 
Offices and their engagement with local politics and economic development represent 
a process of change for local government that is equally felt in other public sector 
organisations like the NHS and Civil Service where these institutions autonomy and 
power is being eroded by an opening up of public services to other potential 
providers.            
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Local Government in the English Political System 
To understand local government employment relations it is necessary to appreciate 
the historical and political development of it as a public institution. The place of local 
government in the English Constitution is ambiguous and ambivalent. Little 
recognition is given to culture, language, or economic structure and central 
government has an all-powerful influence on the social, economic, legal, and political 
outcomes that make the United Kingdom what it is. Despite this local government has 
existed in England since the Norman Conquest and it has long been regarded as the 
principal bulwark in protecting the people from the over centralisation of the political 
process. By example, historically, the local control of law enforcement through the 
police constabularies has been valued as protecting the population from the control of 
the state’s entire machinery of coercion by a single minister. Local government has 
been an invaluable means in giving people control over their local affairs through 
lobbying and voting for local politicians while also being a counter balance to 
national government. Local authorities provide the only fora in which public officials 
can be held accountable to elected representatives, apart from Parliament. The town 
hall is closer to citizens than Whitehall and it can be argued that as service providers, 
local authorities can be more aware of local problems and desires and be more 
responsive to them (Wilson and Game, 2002; Travers, 2005; Wilks-Heeg and 
Clayton, 2006) .    
 
It must be recognised that the power at the centre is constitutionally absolute in that 
Parliament is sovereign and has complete command over local government. It can 
grant or withhold powers from local authorities and it can equally create or abolish 
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them as it thinks fit. The doctrine of ultra vires reinforces that control because local 
authorities cannot undertake activities that they have not been specifically granted 
powers by legislation.  The relationship between central and local government can be 
characterised as being tense as central government constantly seeks to intervene in 
local affairs, for three main reasons. The first is to implement its main policy 
commitments, often through legislation. The second is to prevent local authorities 
from pursuing their own financial and expenditure agendas that might be contrary to 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Finally, central government believes that it has to 
ensure that there is a consistency and quality of local government services across the 
country. Since the early eighties this has been achieved through the Audit 
Commission who have audited and measured local government outputs through pre-
defined performance criteria. 
 
Local government has been viewed by ministers, civil servants and MPs with a 
mixture enthusiasm and suspicion. In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill saw 
local government as an essential part of representative democracy but in contrast 
social reformers like Edwin Chadwick saw local authorities as corrupt vestries whose 
dilatory and venal failures needed to be countered by central government intervention 
(Chandler, 1991; Kingdom, 1991). Today, local authorities are seen both as defenders 
of local opinions and values against the centralising control and diktat of Whitehall 
and equally as monolithic and bureaucratic organisations that are inefficient and do 
not meet the needs of the modern electorate (Travers, 2006).    
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Central – Local Relations 
Since 1979 the relationship between central and local government has seen some of 
the bitterest political confrontations.  Under the Thatcher administration the tension 
was as a direct consequence of a government which was intent on wholesale public 
sector reform that limited local political discretion. Central government took full 
advantage of its sovereign power over local government which saw an erosion of 
local political power and ultimately a dilution of its powers to deliver services to the 
public. 
 
A well-trodden debate about central – local relations has seen arguments develop 
down two distinct paths.  The first one, that local authorities are agents of the central 
government and are responsible for carrying out the instructions of ministers and 
Parliament. The second one that local authorities are in partnership with central 
government in providing services to the public. They act as stewards of central 
government and are left to discharge their responsibilities, with central government 
intervening only if the steward’s conduct is found to be unsatisfactory. The broad 
outlines of policy are determined nationally; local authorities play a substantial part in 
interpreting those policies and mobilising the resources to make them happen. This 
approach restricts central government to a regulatory role that oversees standards of 
service through inspectorate bodies. Local authorities through bodies like the Local 
Government Association and Local Government Employers represent local 
authorities’ interests and act as a common voice.   The first approach was very much 
the path the Conservative administrations pursued in the 1980s and 1990s while the 
Labour administrations have preferred the partnership approach which has seen local 
authorities act as stewards for central government. 
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By 1997 it was viewed that Britain’s governmental framework had become hyper 
centralised. The Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe (CLRAE) were concerned with the UK’s ‘hypercentralisation’ of government 
which saw central government appointing quangos displacing the service providing 
role of local authorities. While the centralised controls of local government finance 
was viewed by CLRAE to be undermining local democracy (Loughlin, 2001).  In the 
ten years since 1997 the Labour governments have devoted more attention to local 
government than any of the three post war Labour governments. Traditionally, it was 
the Conservative Party which was preoccupied with local government reform, 
initiating three post war reorganisations. The Labour governments from 1997 onwards 
endorsed and extended rather than rolled back the mixed economy that had been 
cultivated by the Conservative governments over an eighteen year period. The Labour 
governments saw their reforms as ‘modernising’ and invigorating local government 
(Laffin, 2007). The reforms were seen as a process of eliminating the ‘old culture of 
paternalism and inwardness’ (DETR, 1998: 8, quoted in Bouvaird & Martin, 2003: 
18). 
 
The Labour governments since 1997 have introduced four successive stages of the 
Local Government Modernisation Agenda which has seen the introduction of over 
twenty individual policies that range from performance management regimes like 
Best Value and Comprehensive Performance Assessments; to new council 
constitutions which have required councils to replace their traditional-based decision-
making structures with an executive in the form of a leader and cabinet or elected 
mayor. A notable initiative is the introduction of Public Service Agreements between 
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central government and individual authorities that requires them to establish‘joined-
up’ partnerships for the provision of services. These reforms under the Local 
Government Modernisation Agenda have been seen as lacking a coherence as the 
policies have been driven by different aims and strategies with  limited evidence of  
any synergy between them (Downe and Martin, 2006). Downe and Martin conclude 
that the Local Government modernisation Agenda can be viewed as an evolutionary 
process where central government has tried out initiatives and changed and adapted 
them as they have seen their efficacy in practice. Added to this the use of 
inspectorates to monitor and control local government services have further 
compounded the ability of local authorities to control their own local requirements 
and expectations (Davis et al., 2004).   
 
These reforms have turned local authorities into passive recipients of central 
government policy initiatives. This creates an environment where central policies 
eclipse local accountability in which local government follow: ‘central government’s 
lead, rather than setting their own agendas’ and ‘evidence suggests to date the LGMA 
has encouraged an environment in which many authorities rely upon strong external 
pressure exerted by Government’ (Martin & Bouvaird, 2005: 86). The experience of 
the Local Government Modernisation Agenda has highlighted that local government’s 
reform programme has been driven by central government and local government has 
been ‘curiously passive’ (Stewart, 2000). However, it should be pointed out that 
historically local government has exhibited a passivity and deference to central 
government. Past instances of local authority resistance to central government as in 
the nineteen eighties under the Thatcher governments can be viewed as an anomaly 
because those Labour authorities which challenged the Thatcher governments did so 
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for partisan rather than for territorial reasons (Lansley et al., 1989). The long-standing 
nationalisation of local politics has long limited the forces of localism (Laffin, 2008).              
 
The last thirty years have seen an unparalleled growth in central government 
intervention in local government. During the ‘Golden Age’ of local government 
expansion in the thirty five years after the Second World War the concerns over local 
autonomy were muted (Laffin, 2006). Local authorities enjoyed sustained growth and 
mostly followed the centrally sponsored and professionally dominated consensus 
across major policy areas. During their period in office after 1979, the Conservatives 
pursued a politics of austerity which arguably had a limited impact on public 
expenditure; however, it did put in place a detailed framework for controlling local 
government spending that restricted the autonomy of local authorities dramatically. 
Once New Labour entered office, they did reinvest in the Public Sector but the 
spending was equally tightly controlled. New Labour sought to promote the concept 
of value for money and defined public services by their consumer led outcomes while 
seeking to limit the resurgence of producerist interests, namely public sector unionism 
and the urban left of the 1980s (Entwistle & Laffin, 2005).   
 
Controls and Constraints on Local Government 
As discussed earlier the effect of the ultra vires doctrine on local government gives 
them partial autonomy constitutionally. National governments can, through 
parliamentary legislation, create, abolish, restructure, and amend powers of local 
authorities as when they see fit. Local authorities, equally, are empowered to provide 
or secure the provision of services, but only within a framework of national legislation 
and therefore local authorities are ‘creatures of statute’ (Travers, 2005). Legislation 
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has become the most direct instrument of central control of local government in the 
last thirty years. The Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997 produced well 
over 210 Acts of Parliament affecting local government. This use of statutory 
compliance on local government saw a marked departure from the pre 1979 position 
which was characterised as being more informal and consensual (King and Stoker, 
2002). Statutory instruments are legal devices that are borne out of Acts of Parliament 
that delegate law making powers to appropriate government ministers. This allows a 
minister to supplement provisions necessary for the general purposes of an Act of 
Parliament. This secondary legislation although coming through Parliament is not 
generally scrutinised in any detail because on average 3,500 statutory instruments 
pass through Parliament annually which covers all aspects of civil and criminal law. 
Illustrative of this within a local government context is: The Local Government 
(Structural Changes) (Further Transitional Arrangements and Staffing Regulations 
(2009, S.I. No 486), and The Local Government Pension Scheme (Amendment) 
(No2) Regulations 2008 S.I. No 2989 which impact on organisational structures and 
pension schemes. Statutory instruments have been used as a means of fleshing out a 
government’s primary legislation so as to strengthen if they choose their control of 
local government’s activities. As a legislative instrument it has been used to great 
effect by governments over the last thirty years to curtail local government autonomy. 
 
Complementing the raft of statutory instruments government departments produce 
circulars that are issued to local authorities as guidance and advice on how they 
should carry out their responsibilities. Local authorities have always viewed circulars 
as vehicles for central direction. However, some circulars are derived from 
negotiation with local authorities that do take into account local interests and do 
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contain useful practical advice. Despite this, the sheer number of circulars issued 
annually makes them a powerful and continuous reminder of central government’s 
presence.  
 
English local government operates within a complex and often subtle legal 
framework. Central government through its parliamentary sovereignty has the 
ultimate authority through its executive powers of direction and supervision to control 
local government. However, local authorities over the years have acquired substantial 
powers of discretion promotion and experimentation in the manner in which they 
provide services to the public. When issues of policy and interpretation of legal 
obligations are in dispute between central and local government it is often brought 
before the courts by a process known as judicial review. This process of legal 
challenge has increased dramatically in the last thirty years and was a particular tool 
favoured by the Thatcher governments. In 1974 leave for judicial review was sought 
160 times. By 1995 this figure had increased to 4400 (Loughlin, 1996). It is arguable 
that this increase can be attributed to central government’s wish to control local 
government’s autonomy through relying on the courts. Even where judgements have 
favoured local authorities’ ministers have used the parliamentary process to change 
the law which is another illustration of the primacy of parliamentary sovereignty. 
When the Labour government came to office in 1997 it also found judicial review a 
useful legal process and over the ten year period of Blair’s period in office it 
continued to have a prominence although as we shall see New Labour preferred the 
use of inspections to rein in local government autonomy. 
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The Thatcher governments promoted the use of Judicial review while Labour under 
Blair preferred the use of inspections as a means of compliance. There has always 
been a tradition within local government of an inspectorate regime appointed by 
central government particularly within education, the fire and police services. 
However, by 2001 those inspectorates already in existence had expanded, and new 
ones introduced to oversee the assessment of Best Value within local authorities. 
Under the auspices of the Audit Commission the Best Value Inspection has seen local 
government services reviewed and assessed under nationally defined performance 
criteria set by central government departments. Nearly all council services come 
within its remit, and all inspected services receive a ‘star ranking’ of their quality, cost 
effectiveness, and their likelihood of future improvement. The reports and rankings 
provide detailed information on an authority’s perceived performance. However, the 
process has been seen by many authorities as counterproductive in helping to improve 
local services. Perceived as excessively bureaucratic and confrontational, inspections 
have been described as ‘Red book reviews’ resembling the young Red Guards from 
China’s Cultural Revolution, ‘denouncing their erstwhile comrades as they clutched 
Mao’s Red Book. This time they were holding the Audit Commission’s Seeing is 
Believing’ (Duffield, 2000: 12). This observation encapsulates a view that inspections 
were conducted as a means of making local authorities answerable to central 
government rather than to the local electorate and politicians.        
 
Financial control of local authorities has increasingly been used over the last thirty 
years as a means of imposing central government’s will on local government (see 
Table 3.1). This has been achieved by firstly regulating the amount of money each 
authority can spend and secondly by scrutinising the way in which that money is 
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spent. The government by effectively capping budgets of local authorities and tightly 
controlling investment can and does tightly restrict local spending. Financial scrutiny 
is exercised through the Audit Commission which has a statutory responsibility for 
auditing local authorities. Set up in 1982 it is accountable to central government it has 
powers to establish a local authority’s actions for: 
 Legality – did it have the statutory authority to spend the money in the 
way it did? 
 Reasonableness – did it act in the way a reasonable body would? 
 Wilful misconduct – was anyone recklessly indifferent about whether the 
course of action was illegal? 
 
Since Labour came to power the Audit Commission has also emphasised the question 
of value for money and how councils achieve the ‘3Es’ – economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness – in their use of resources.  
 
It would be one sided to say that the Audit Commission has been subservient to 
central government. It has been critical of central government policy when it has 
deemed it appropriate, and has supported local authorities whose priorities it has 
thought are in the local public interest. However, it is an institution of central 
government and has been responsible for producing a plethora of league tables of 
performance indicators which enable local authorities (and the government) to 
compare their expenditure and efficiency records with each other across the country. 
The danger that local government faces with such an audit regime is that there is a 
potential to see the costs of local services and not truly understand the value of them.          
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Table 3.1 Central Government Funding of English Local Government 1979-2007 
 
                           Financial Year               Government Grants  (£ million) 
1979-80                                13,639 
1980-81                                13,778 
1981-82                                14,998 
1982-83                                16,352 
1983-84                                16,764 
1984-85                                17,002 
1985-86                                17,889 
1986-87                                18,334 
1987-88                                18,950 
1988-89                                19,112 
1989-90                                19,997 
1990-91                                20,556  
1991-92                                20,813 
1992-93                                21,320      
1993-94                                21,685 
1994-95                                23,679 
1995-96                                23,335 
1996-97                                23,003 
1997-98                                23,840 
1998-99                                25,291 
1999-00                                26,421 
2000-01                                27,809 
2001-02                                31,469  
2002-03                                32,634 
2003-04                                41,777 
2004-05                                45,258 
2005-06                                45,838 
2006-07                                49,093 
Local Government Financial Statistics England No.20 2010  
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The Public Nature of the State as Employer:  
The Impact of European Union Law 
 
In the last thirty years both Conservative and Labour administrations have in their 
respective ways sought to remould the public sector and emulate private employment 
practices. However, the European Union has intervened to maintain the distinct 
identity of public service workers through European Union law. The distinction 
between public and private workers in European Union law arises largely as an 
unexpected consequence of the particular way in which the relationship between 
European Union law and domestic law has been structured. Responding to member 
states’ recalcitrance, the European Court of Justice has developed the doctrine of 
direct effect, whereby EU law can be enforced directly in domestic courts even if 
domestic legislation requires otherwise. While some treaty articles, notably Article 
119 on equal pay for equal work is enforceable on both private and public sector 
organisations, most directives are not directly enforceable on private sector 
organisations. The direct effect doctrine is justified by the European Courts of Justice 
because it is argued that member states should not be allowed to rely on their own 
failure to perform the obligations which a directive entails (see the following cases: 
Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health Authority [1986]; 
and NUT v Governing Body of the Church of England (Aided) Junior School [1997]).  
 
The EU law definition of the ‘state’ is therefore of crucial importance, especially at a 
time when the boundaries of the state and the private sector are continually shifting. 
The case law of the European Court has consistently revealed a broad approach to this 
question.  As a start and in direct contrast with the assumption domestically, the Court 
has refused to take the view that in its role as an employer the state is 
indistinguishable from private sector employers. Instead the Court has held that, 
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where a person involved in legal  proceedings is able to rely on a directive against the 
state, he or she may do so regardless of the capacity in which the latter is acting, 
whether employer or public authority ( Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and 
South West Area Health Authority [1986] IRLR 140 ECJ.). In the seminal case of 
Foster v British Gas [1990], the European Court went on to define the state broadly, 
to encompass any body which had been responsible for providing a public service 
under the control of the state and has for that purpose special powers beyond those 
which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals. It is 
clear from this definition that the civil service and its agencies, the National Health 
Service, and local authorities are emanations of the state and therefore are subject to 
the direct effect doctrine. 
 
The Conservative and Labour administration have in their respective ways tried to 
mirror public sector employment practices with those of the private sector. However, 
the European Union has viewed that the state’s role as an employer is unique and 
essentially public. This view is an affirmation of the historical legacy of the Welfare 
State defined by public accountability and the direct delivery of services to the public. 
European Union Law has helped to reinforce Whitleyism within local government 
and the process of joint regulation that is at the heart of local government employment 
relations practice.          
 
            
The Thatcher Years  
The Thatcher administration that came to office in 1979 marked a distinct turning 
point for local government. It saw the end of a laissez faire approach to the 
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management of local government which had been the established pattern of conduct 
between central and local government by both the Conservatives and Labour up until 
then and what can only be described as an assault, which saw the very existence of 
local government challenged and questioned (Kingdom, 1991). 
 
 
Thatcherism and Local Government 
At this point it is important to define the nature of Thatcherism as a political and 
ideological process. A number of writers have endeavoured to explore the values and 
beliefs that Thatcherism has drawn on (Hall and Jacques, 1983; Kavanagh, 1986; 
King, 1987; Gamble, 1988).  Despite considerable agreement, these assessments do 
evidence important differences of perspective. On the one hand there is a relatively 
pure view of Thatcherism which regards it as a concerted attempt to recreate the UK 
according to the tenets of a relatively rigid set of ideological principles. Authors like 
Hall and Jacques have argued that it is a distinctive new-right political philosophy, 
based on a powerful belief in the free market and equally a disdain for state 
intervention. It was argued that the Conservatives’ election victory in 1979 marked a 
radical shift in post-war politics, designed to dismantle the post-war consensus and 
replace it with a new consensus built on these right wing principles (Hall, 1979). On 
the other hand there was a view that Thatcherism was based on pragmatism. It was 
based more as a political strategy rather than being defined by a purity of political 
ideas (King, 1987). In this characterisation, Thatcherism is still seen as embodying a 
certain set of principles, but to the extent to which these were either coherent or 
widely accepted enough to form a master plan is played down. Instead, Thatcherite 
policies are suggested to have evolved from a general set of beliefs which, over time, 
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gained credence among ministers within the Thatcher administrations, resulting in a 
series of progressively more radical measures. 
 
The contrasting views of Thatcherism have important implications for the way in 
which the experience of local government is interpreted. Where the ‘pure’ 
interpretation of Thatcherism is argued, local  government reforms have generally 
been regarded as a key element of a new-right wing blueprint that the Thatcher 
administrations set about implementing as soon as they came to power in 1979 
(Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). However, those who take the ‘pragmatic’ 
interpretation see the events in less explicit ideological terms, arguing that the 
Thatcher administration’s policies towards local government were developed over 
time. This reflects the proposition that the Thatcher administrations became 
increasingly radical as the 1980s progressed (Stewart and Stoker, 1995). There is even 
a third ‘ultra-pragmatic’ interpretation which rejects all ideological considerations 
almost entirely and argues that the Thatcher administrations centralised power as a 
political strategy designed to ensure their own political survival (Bulpitt, 1989).       
 
Thatcherism – an ideological attack on local government 
Duncan and Goodwin (1988) argue that the local government reforms of the 1980s 
were shaped as a consequence of a Thatcherite ideology. They apply a theoretical 
framework derived from Marxist principles that draws on an argument advanced by 
Miliband (1973) that the local state could act as an obstacle to the central state and 
offered the possibility of working-class gains to be made at the local level. Duncan 
and Goodwin contend that the uneven development of capitalism has implications for 
the local state, in that it produces significant policy variation. The local state acts as a 
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conduit for specific interpretations of capitalism and provides a mechanism through 
which local representation can seek to influence responses to that interpretation. In 
certain localities, where a radical interpretative and representational role becomes 
dominant, the local state may develop strategies that are antagonistic to the central 
state, as was seen with some Labour controlled authorities in the 1980s. As a result 
such councils are thrown into direct conflict with the central state, which may then 
seek to impose its own interpretation on the local state. 
 
Duncan and Goodwin argue that because of the local state’s potential to obstruct or 
contradict the central state, the central government has always sought to control local 
authorities, however, until 1979 political autonomy was tolerated ‘within strict overall 
constraints’ (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988: 50).   The Thatcher administration of 1979 
could no longer accept this position and were committed to ‘introducing the values of 
the market place into all areas of social and economic life’ (Ibid: 49) the government 
was determined to remove all possible obstacles to this policy. Consequently, the 
government immediately set about centralisation on two fronts: control of local 
government finance and control of policy areas in which local government played a 
significant part. This process was part of the government’s ‘plan to reshape Britain 
from above.’ (Ibid: 50). 
 
Thatcherism – a pragmatic approach to local government reform 
Counter to the ideological ‘pure’ approach some observers argued that the 
Conservatives on assuming office in 1979 had no clear strategy for local government 
reform (Stoker and Stewart, 1995b). They contend that the government had no 
predetermined strategy and that it ‘learnt its strategy through experience’ (Ibid: 2). 
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They acknowledged the ideological influences that shaped Conservative thinking but 
rather saw the Conservatives approach to local government reform as evolutionary. 
They point to the fact that as experimental policies proved successful they adapted 
and built upon them, while others that floundered were ‘adapted and changed to 
overcome resistance or implementation of failure’ (Stoker and Stewart, 1995a: 192). 
Conservative central government was also constrained by Conservative controlled 
local authorities from initiating a full scale attack on coming to power in 1979 
(Butcher et al., 1990). Interestingly, in Kenneth Baker’s autobiography he mentions 
Baroness Thatcher’s ambivalent attitude towards local government: 
“Margaret did not have much time for local councils, which she expected to be agents 
of central government. She said to me once with a resigned sigh, ‘I suppose we need 
them’. However, many activists in the constituencies were councillors, and some MPs 
had served as councillors, as I had done …. So there was something schizophrenic in 
our attitude to local government”. (1993: 111)   
Stoker and Stewart argue that this sentiment is illustrative of the lack of any degree of 
consistent application of principles to local government reform and they suggest that, 
‘The government’s approach to changing local government has certainly been 
inconsistent; it is becoming increasingly incoherent’ (Stoker and Stewart 1995a: 194).     
 
Thatcherism – the Ultra-Pragmatic Approach to Statecraft    
A third interpretation of the Conservative governments’ approach to dealing with 
local government is developed by the notion of the politics of statecraft put forward 
by Bulpitt (1986; 1989).  Bulpitt contends that the local government reforms that were 
pursued by the Conservative administration post 1979 were not particularly 
ideologically driven but rather shaped by the political elite to further their own vested 
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interests. The political elite Bulpitt contended sought to ‘protect and promote what it 
perceives to be its own interests’ (1989: 56).  He goes on to say that ideological 
considerations are only used ‘to justify, or add gloss to, behaviour and decisions 
already determined by statecraft considerations’ (Ibid: 56). The major factors 
influencing governmental strategies are therefore assumed to be ‘the art of winning 
elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office’ 
(Bulpitt, 1986: 21). 
 
Bulpitt presents an historical account of central-local relations which suggests that the 
governing elite under Thatcher regarded the traditional autonomy of local authorities 
as a threat to its idea of statecraft. In the period from 1920s to the 1960s the British 
state operated as a particular statecraft regime in which the roles of central and local 
government were clearly distinguished. This ‘dual polity’ approach established the 
national state’s focus on the ‘high politics’  of economic and foreign policy, while 
local authorities focused on undertaking activities associated with ‘low politics’ of 
welfare and municipal services. This approach gave local authorities a high degree of 
autonomy and discretion in managing local services while they in turn accepted the 
role of the centre without really questioning it. However, this bargain was set by the 
national elite, since for local authorities ‘the survival of the autonomy they possessed 
rested in the hands of others, in particular the national party leaders and their 
continual perception that their interests did not require central control’ (Bulpitt,1989: 
67). From 1979 onwards the governing elite no longer endorsed this bargain and 
driven by new self-interest considerations saw it to their advantage to restrict the 
autonomy of local government. The Conservatives ‘did not arrive in office determined 
to clobber local authorities’ (Ibid: 68), rather the political resistance to the 
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Conservative project of public expenditure control from Labour controlled authorities 
led to central government’s crackdown that was simply ‘the easiest option to 
frustrated politicians’ (Ibid: 65). The resistance encountered by the Thatcher 
administrations from local government led to the dilution of local government powers 
and the provision of services as the Conservative governments sought to protect its 
privity in wielding political control and power in the country.            
 
Local Government Reform under Thatcher             
Over three terms in office the Thatcher administration mounted an attack on local 
government on three fronts. Firstly, it compelled local authorities to conform to the 
Government’s stated intention to reduce the proportion of the gross domestic product 
which is absorbed by public spending. In 1979 public spending accounted for 43% of 
the gross domestic product (Flynn, 2007). The Conservatives thought that rate payers 
needed protection from profligate local authorities who in the opinion of the 
government levied high rates for extravagant activities that were not necessary. The 
Thatcher administrations were the first to control local authorities’ spending on an 
individual basis rather than as had been done in the past where governments had 
relied on their ability to control the national totals of local authority spending. This 
approach had been very successful with annual outcomes of each spending round 
being within 2% of the government’s expectations (Pritchard, 2003).  The 1980 Local 
Government, Planning, and Land Act enshrined the Conservatives approach to 
managing local government by introducing a Rate Support Grant that calculated a 
local authority’s financial allocation on what each council needed to spend to provide 
a standard level of services rather than the old method of calculation which relied on 
using the past spending of an authority to set its new budget. Under the legislation 
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those authorities that failed to comply with the prescribed spending limits would be 
subject to financial penalties as determined by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment. The legislation created the means by which the government could ‘cap’ 
the expenditure of individual authorities. This effectively removed the discretion of 
local authorities to set their own level of rates which they had enjoyed for centuries 
and emasculated their autonomy to self-determination.    
 
The second front began after the Conservatives won their second term of office in 
1983. The Conservatives began the process of breaking up the six metropolitan 
county councils and the Greater London Council. Their abolition was widely opposed 
within local government as being detrimental to the large conurbations that they 
served but with the publication of the Government’s White Paper, Streamlining the 
Cities, (DoE, 1983) it made clear that the Government’s view was that these councils 
did not have any substantive role and that they were monoliths of ‘a fashion for 
strategic planning, whose time had passed’ (DoE, 1983). It was well known that the 
real impetus to abolishing these councils was that they had become a major opposition 
to the Government as they were Labour controlled. The seven councils ceased to exist 
on 1 April 1986 and were replaced by a messy structure of joint boards composed of 
members of the district councils in each of the metropolitan county area (Leach and 
Game, 2001). With the demise of these councils the Conservatives introduced urban 
development corporations which were tasked with the redevelopment of the decaying 
inner city areas. They took over many of the planning functions and powers from 
local authorities and they were empowered to raise private finance for capital projects 
which saw them override local authorities in planning decisions. (Wilks-Heeg and 
Claydon, 2006).       
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The third front was a direct onslaught on the way in which local authorities provided 
their services to the public. Of all the changes introduced by the 1979-97 
Conservative governments, the most far-reaching were those associated with 
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) – particularly if it is seen as one dimension 
of the ‘New Right’ privatisation or contracting-out strategy of those governments. 
This began in 1980 but gathered pace rapidly after the third Thatcher administration 
was re-elected in 1987. Before 1979, it was accepted more or less without challenge 
that local authorities provided the services for which they were responsible by their 
own directly employed workforce. The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 
empowered local authorities to submit services to competitive tender,   so that if a 
private contractor submitted a tender lower than that of the in-house provider the 
private firm would then be able to provide the service on the authority’s behalf. The 
lowest bidder criterion meant that local authorities were prevented from imposing 
conditions on such issues as trade union rights, employment protection, sickness 
benefit, pensions, training, and equal opportunities that might ‘ have the effect of 
restricting, distorting or preventing competition’ (Local Government Act 1988, s.7(7) 
). Under CCT cost was always the ultimate arbiter, rather than quality (Wilson and 
Game, 2002).  
 
Three key pieces of legislation: The Local Government, Planning, and Land Act 
1980; The Local Government Act 1988; and The Local Government Act 1992 drove 
the CCT process, and were the articulation of New Right thinking that came out of the 
‘think tanks’ – the Adam Smith Institute, the Institute of Economic Affairs, and the 
Centre for Policy Studies. Their argument and that of like-minded politicians within 
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the Conservative Party – Nicholas Ridley (1988) and Michael Forsyth (1982) – was 
that the contracting out of services formerly provided monopolistically by central and 
local government or by agencies like the National Health Service would lead to both 
improved service provision and reduced costs. It would challenge the ‘dependency 
culture’ imbued by the Welfare State and would lead to less and smaller government.  
Those opposed to CCT, on the other hand, noted the potentially reduced role not only 
of elected and democratically accountable local authorities but also of trade unions. 
CCT was part of the Conservative government’s comprehensive attack on trade union 
power and public sector pay bargaining and on the strong financial and institutional 
links between the public sector trade unions and the Labour Party. From an historical 
perspective the financial savings from CCT were shown not to come from increased 
efficiency, but from cuts in workers’ pay and conditions (Colling, 2003).         
 
The Impact of CCT on Management 
Despite the Conservatives introducing Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) its 
impact on the local government landscape was gradual.  There was no universal 
‘takeover’ by the private sector but rather a varied picture from service to service and 
authority to authority. Some services were far more attractive to private sector bidders 
than others, but only in building cleaning and construction were more than half of all 
contacts won by outside bidders (Stewart, 2000).  At the other end of the scale Direct 
Service Organisations were successful in retaining at least three quarters of contracts 
in leisure, and housing management and legal services (Local Government 
Association, 1998). In all services Direct Service Organisations tended to win a 
disproportionate share of the larger contracts and one in every six authorities had no 
contracts at all (Local Government Association, 1998). What the Labour government 
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inherited in 1997, therefore, was a mixed economy of in-house and external provision 
in a majority of authorities. 
 
Although the introduction CCT did not see a takeover from the private sector it did 
nevertheless have a fundamental impact on the landscape of local government 
employment relations. Whether retaining or losing contracts, all local authorities had 
to adapt quite fundamentally their patterns of management and organisation in 
response to CCT which saw them develop internal markets in the form of client 
functions that oversaw the contracting process. It is quite ironic that CCT did not spell 
the beginning of the end of local authorities being direct providers of services but 
rather focused councils to win contracts in-house, through them streamlining and 
strengthening their management processes to make them more competitive with 
outside competition.         
 
From Competition to Collaboration - Labour and Best Value  
Competition was the overarching approach of the Conservative governments to 
improving local government services in their eighteen years of power from 1979. 
1997 marked the first Labour government under Tony Blair to inherit a public sector 
that had been subject to a process of ‘marketisation’ that had substantially altered its 
nature as a framework of institutional organisations that were designed for public 
service and were no longer demand but supply led. The Blair administration did not 
dismantle the internal markets and competition that had been introduced by the 
Conservatives but rather refined them to their own ends. The Blair administration saw 
the market as a source of improvement and innovation (Entwistle and Martin, 2005). 
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But it was argued by some that although there was a change in language it was the 
continuation of the same policy by other means (Teisman and Klijn, 2002).   
 
However, although there were echoes of the Conservative administrations’ emphasis 
on competitiveness this was more focused on national competitiveness in general and 
the Blair administration’s belief in the emergence of a global knowledge society and 
its concern about the perceived low levels of human capital and productivity in the 
UK (Giddens, 2000). Labour’s policy approach was distinctive because it argued that 
state intervention and investment in local government was integral to enhanced 
competitiveness. This contrasted with the Conservatives who saw public spending and 
investment as jeopardising wider economic growth and competitiveness (Bach, 2002). 
 
The Blair administration emphasised the role of the enabling state. However, this was 
from a regulatory rather than an ownership perspective and this became of central 
importance in the government’s public sector reform agenda. The Blair administration 
was not overly concerned with the question of ownership and were more concerned 
with public service delivery. Tony Blair stated, ‘what matters is what works’ 
(Timmins, 2001: 21) and while the Blair administration acknowledged that ownership 
may be important to public service producers, it was viewed that it was of little 
interest to the public who used these services. The Blair administration demonstrated 
that it supported a mixed economy within the public sector as it recognised that the 
private and voluntary sectors had a role to play in delivering public services which are 
publicly funded but not necessarily publicly provided. The Blair administration 
acknowledged that CCT had ‘ made costs of services more transparent’, and the 
‘detailed prescription of the form and timing of competition led to unimaginative 
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tendering, and often frustrated rather than enhanced real competition’ (Department for 
Environment, Transport, and the Regions – DETR 1998, p56). Therefore Labour 
withdrew CCT, replacing it with the ‘Best Value’ regime in April 2000 (Martin, 
2000).  Best Value would require local authorities to review their services by 
embracing ‘innovative approaches to commissioning, procuring, and providing 
services which genuinely challenge existing ways of doing things’ (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister – ODPM, 2003, p9). 
 
It has been argued that Best Value was an acknowledgement by the Labour 
government of the continued importance and relevance of private sector delivery in 
public services. However, they saw the use of the market in rather different terms to 
the previous Conservative governments. The 1998 White Paper explained that while 
competition was ‘an essential management tool’ the Best Value regime ‘should not be 
interpreted as a requirement to put everything out to tender’ (DETR, 1998, p57). 
Rather the government wanted to ‘create the conditions under which there were likely 
to be greater interest from the private and voluntary sectors in working with local 
government’ (DETR, 1998, p57). The draft guidance to the Best Value regime 
distinguished itself from CCT by explaining that the government would ‘not seek to 
prescribe a uniform approach’ (DETR, 1999, p1). The government wished the local 
authorities to implement the regime ‘imaginatively in the spirit which it has been 
designed’ (DETR, 1999, p3).      
 
The Best Value regime helped the Labour government establish its credentials as an 
administration committed to service for end users, namely rate payers. Although it 
had scrapped CCT it had not given free rein to producer and union interests. Best 
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Value managed to finesse the dilemma between compulsory and discretionary market 
testing and its acceptance by all the stakeholders in local government and its opaque 
nature, allowed it to mean different things to different people. Viewed from a political 
perspective Best Value was a success because it neutralised problems for the Labour 
government by establishing its reputation for governing competence with the 
electorate. However, in practice the Best Value regime was found to be excessively 
prescriptive and bureaucratic with local authorities and service providers, with them 
having to conform to an ever increasing performance management process. This 
focused heavily on indicators that were more concerned with centralist outcomes that 
were linked to a central government agenda for local government rather than local 
outcomes that were tailored to local service delivery needs. The introduction of Best 
Value by the Labour government served as an important political lightning conductor 
to absorb criticism from the Conservatives that they were competent overseers of the 
public sector. However, the weight of ideological baggage associated with Best Value 
meant that its original requirements were soon diluted to make the regime work in 
practice. Local authorities did not have to review their functions every five years 
(DTLR, 2002) and the Audit Commission did not require local authorities who were 
classified as good or excellent under the comprehensive performance assessment 
exercise to produce a Best Value Performance Plan (ODPM, 2004). In practice by the 
end of Blair’s administration in 2007 the Best Value regime had fundamentally 
changed from its introduction in 1999. It was no longer central to Labour’s credibility 
as a means of showing its political competence to manage local government but rather 
one of a number of performance management initiatives that had served its purpose in 
promoting the wider New Public Management agenda.          
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Conclusion 
This chapter has set the context in which employment relations has developed in local 
government as a consequence of both the external political, economic and legal 
environment. The chapter has shown how local government in England has developed 
particularly in the last thirty years and the impact that central government has had on 
shaping local government through its reforms. The consequences of these reforms 
have been explored by examining the relative perspectives of the principal actors 
within local government; namely: central government, trade unions and employers.  
 
Central government, both under Conservative and Labour administrations, have 
sought to put a tighter rein on local government both politically and financially. A raft 
of legislation has created a legislative framework that has impinged in all areas of 
local government activity and regimes like Compulsory Competitive Tendering and 
Best Value have in their different way sought to influence and shape the provision of 
local government services through frameworks that make local authorities more 
directly accountable to central government. 
 
Trade unions have been engaged in a defence of local government workers conditions 
of employment which have been under constant attack since 1979. The process of 
marketisation has created a commercial working environment which has seen private 
sector encroachment on local government provisions in the delivery of services to the 
public. Trade unions responses have been shaped by the occupational groups they 
service. Those that primarily represent manual and craft workers (UNITE)) have  had 
to be pragmatic, adapting to the commercial environment that their members face. 
While unions primarily representing non manual workers (UNISON), which have not 
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felt the full force of marketisation have been able take a more entrenched position that 
has not compromised on the concept of maintaining a centralised, national collective 
bargaining framework which legitimises the continued importance and relevance of 
trade unions in shaping the conduct of employment relations in local government.      
 
Employers, reflecting the political control of individual local authorities, have had to 
adapt their political objectives to comply with the legislative framework that has come 
out of central government and has shaped local government reform since 1979.  This 
compliance has been relatively straight forward if the political control at an authority 
level has reflected the political control of central government, but more problematic if 
it does not. Historically, with the majority of local authorities being in opposition 
control to central government political control, local authority employers have had to 
often deal with the incompatibility of local and national political objectives. This 
clearly was the case with the introduction of CCT and the outsourcing of services to 
the private sector, which was introduced by a Conservative government but was 
vigorously opposed by Labour controlled councils who defended services in-house 
services. The reality facing employers is that in order to finesse a position that 
satisfies the central-local relations they have had to engage in a process that 
incorporates reform of employment practices that reflect the political and economic 
realities that face them as public service institutions operating in an increasingly 
commercial environment.       
 
Their positions have shaped the conduct of employment relations and the framework 
of collective bargaining which is the foundation stone of joint regulation in local 
government. By having an appreciation and understanding of the inter – relationship 
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between the actors and the historical context in which these relationships have 
developed it will help me explore and examine and offer an explanation to my central 
question - why does centralised, national collective bargaining continue to survive in 
English local government?          
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                                          Chapter Four 
          New-Institutional Theory and Employment Relations 
 
Introduction 
The study of public sector employment relations in the last thirty years has 
emphasized the nature and rate of institutional change, and as consequence little 
attention has been given to the question of continuity and the resilience of some 
employment relations structures – in the case of local government the national 
collective bargaining framework. The theoretical underpinning of the study will look 
to institutional/path dependency theories to offer an analytical reference point that can 
help to offer some potential theoretical explanations of why the national collective 
bargaining framework continues to survive in English local government. I hope by 
applying institutional theory to my empirical work I can capture the underlying 
dynamics of the employment relations landscape within English local government and 
how the actors within it shape it.  
 
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will look at institutional 
theory and the concept of path dependency, more specifically Scott’s (2001) 
analytical framework of Three Institutional Pillars will be examined. The second 
section will look at the use of institutional theory in employment relations research, 
examining how academics have used institutional theory in their research. The final 
section will show how institutional theory fits with the aims of my research.    
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Section One 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory at its essential core allows us to examine and analyse the 
interaction of actors within institutions. It provides a means of looking at 
organisations outside the traditional economics perspective and seeing how they are 
embedded in wider institutional environments. Institutional theory highlights how 
organisations are shaped by customs and practices that are either direct reflections of, 
or responses to, rules and structures built into larger environments (Powell, 1998). 
Institutional theory allows us to examine how the behaviour of organisations is not 
solely subject to economic market pressures but equally the social and political 
pressures both formally and informally, from institutional actors and regulatory 
agencies that impact on organisations.  
 
Employment relations at its core is about understanding the rules governing 
employment, together with the ways in which rules are made and changed, interpreted 
and administered between employers, trade unions, and the state. Clegg (1979:2) 
refers to this process as job regulation. Clegg identifies five methods for making 
employment rules: 
 Collective bargaining – jointly by trade unions and employers or managers 
 Employer or managerial regulation – where rules are laid down unilaterally by 
employers or managers 
 Trade union regulation – where unions make rules concerning the jobs of their 
members and try to enforce them on employers 
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 Statutory regulation – where the state prescribes legal rules governing aspects 
of employment generally or for particular classes of undertaking, with 
statutory arrangements for their enforcement. 
 Custom and Practice (a form of cultural cognitive) – although not strictly a 
method of making rules, is a process by which rules evolve.  A custom does 
not have force because anyone one can prescribe it, but because it has become 
accepted. Consequently there is no prescriptive way of changing a custom. 
             
 Within my research the process of homogenisation and the conformity of local 
authorities’ structures, which influences the conduct of institutional actors, raises the 
issue of isomorphism. Isomorphism represents a key concept in institutional theory. 
Isomorphism as a constraining process forces the institutional actors within local 
government to resemble each other as they face similar political and economic 
challenges (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is illustrated in organisational 
structures with functional similarities, e.g. Housing and Environmental functions 
under the single umbrella of a department, where local authorities across England 
have a similar departmental composition. Focusing on institutional isomorphism, 
DiMaggio and Powell identified three institutional mechanisms that influence 
organisational decision making: 
 Coercive mechanisms, which emanate from political influence and the 
problem of legitimacy; 
 Mimetic mechanisms, which are standard responses to uncertainty; and  
 Normative mechanisms, which are associated with professionalisation.   
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Within the context of my research, coercive mechanisms include the influence of: the 
trade unions; employment and social legislation at both the domestic and European 
Union level; and the government as the executive function of the State. Each of the 
institutional actors within local government (trade unions, management, and 
politicians) is shaped intrinsically by both national and local politics. The mimetic 
mechanisms within local government are seen in the adoption of strategies for dealing 
with central government diktat, in which local authorities imitate each other to a 
greater or less extent according to their hierarchical status within local government. 
This is illustrated by the role of the Local Government Association (LGA) which at 
both a national and regional level co-ordinates its membership, made up of 300 local 
authorities in England, in its advisory capacity, helping to shape local authorities’ 
responses to the external environmental challenges that face them in delivering public 
services.  
 
Normative mechanisms address the relationship between management policies and 
the background of employees in terms of education, work experience, and 
occupational group. Within local government many of the occupational groups are 
unique to the sector, and within the professional, white collar occupations have 
established networks linked through the professional institutions which regulate the 
conduct of members. Illustrative of this are the Chartered Institute of Environmental 
Health Officers and the Trade Standards Institute, who regulate practitioners, 
overseeing professional conduct while acting as a voice for their profession. These 
professional occupational groups have been identified as a source of isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), often taken for granted as important in developing 
organisational norms. In a similar manner the formal and informal networks between 
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the trade unions and political parties that operate in local government have an equal 
effect on creating and defining organisational norms within the local government 
rubric. Within local authorities the day to day working relationships between trade 
union representatives, managers and politicians creates informal networks between 
these groups that facilitates the dialogue process at the formal, structural level within  
local authorities.     
 
The application of institutional theory, I hope, will give me insights into the 
underlying processes that shape the process of joint regulation and help me to 
understand the internal and external contextual factors that continue to make the 
national framework relevant to local government employment relations. Institutional 
theory offers an opportunity to analyse the nature of collective bargaining in the 
context of the public sector reforms introduced by the Conservative and Labour 
administrations over the last thirty years. The application of institutional theory to 
examine employment relations issues has an established foundation, as shown in the 
works of: Purcell (1999); Hope-Hailey (2001); Paauwe and Boselie (2003); Greener 
(2002); and Teague (2009). 
 
Constructing an Analytical Framework – Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions 
An influential element of my research is to understand the development of local 
government and how this in turn has shaped the collective bargaining framework. 
However, my empirical research while gaining important insights from past academic 
contributions, must adopt an analytical approach that seeks to identify more closely 
the diverse strands that make up contemporary employment relations in local 
government. To this end, I will apply Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions. The choice 
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of Scott’s three pillars of institutions ties in with my wish to engage with the wider 
social sciences, looking at employment relations questions through a wider analytical 
prism, that is inclusive, “with space for traditional IR as well as Marx, Weber, 
Durkheim, Parsons, Giddens and even Geertz” (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2008). As a 
form of process analysis it engages with real-life institutions which lend itself to my 
research interest, examining the trade unions, management and politicians within local 
government and as an analytical framework it is sympathetic to employment relations 
institutionalism.  
 
Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions offers three analytical elements that make up the 
composition of an institution. Each of the pillars is important in themselves, but 
equally in combination with each other. However, because they operate through 
distinctive mechanisms and processes, it is important to define them. The regulative, 
normative and cognitive pillars are seen as integral elements in helping us understand 
how institutions work. The three elements form a continuum, moving: “from the 
conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted” 
(Hoffman, 1997: 36). Scott sees these elements contributing, in interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing ways, to a powerful social framework, one that encapsulates and 
exhibits the strengths and resilience of structures (Scott, 2001: 51). The table below is 
helpful as I discuss each element. The columns contain the three pillars, which Scott 
characterises as making up or supporting institutions, while the rows define the 
principal dimensions along which assumptions vary.  The table and definitions also 
show how Scott’s pillars link to the three isomorphic processes of DiMaggio and 
Powell outlined above.  
 
 
 82 
Table 4.1 Three Pillars of Institutions  
  PILLAR  
 REGULATIVE NORMATIVE COGNITIVE 
BASIS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
Expedience Social Obligation Taken-for-grantedness 
  Shared understanding 
BASIS OF ORDER Regulative Rules Building Expectations Constitutive Schema 
 
MECHANISMS Coercive Normative Mimetic 
LOGIC Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
 
INDICATORS 
Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation  
Common Beliefs 
Shared Logic of Action 
 
 
BASIS OF 
LEGITIMACY 
Legally Sanctioned Morally Governed Comprehensible 
Recognizable 
Culturally Supported 
Source: Scott, 2001 
 
The regulative pillar focuses on how force is used to ensure that institutional actors 
comply. The emphasis is very much on legal order, and adhering to procedures that 
outline both rights and obligations and the consequences of non-compliance with 
clearly defined sanctions. The regulative pillar is based on the principle of the rule of 
law and general rule making e.g. collective bargaining (Clegg, 1979), which is clearly 
defined, monitored and enforced within the institutional setting. Illustrative of this 
within the local government context is the disciplinary and grievance procedures that 
outline rights and obligations of both employers and employees and supplements 
employment law through a quasi-judicial/ legal framework. It is administered through 
a tiered system that encompasses within an authority level, functions and departments, 
going through to a corporate decision making body, normally overseen by politicians; 
to a regional and national level that is composed of  representatives from employers, 
trade unions , and politicians from local and central government. The regulative 
pillar’s framework can be characterised as relying on force and actors conforming to 
rules that they see as being expedient to their individual and common interests.     .       
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The normative pillar emphasises the values that underpin rules and introduce a 
prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life (Scott, 2001: 54).   
The normative pillar looks at values and norms – values are seen as notions of the 
preferred, which are set within a framework of accepted standards of behaviour that 
are shaped and judged against institutional structures. Norms specify how things 
should be done. They define the means by which values can be pursued in a mutually 
acceptable way. Within local government this is shaped by the political, legal, 
financial, and social objectives that characterise how it provides public services. In the 
employment relations context the rights and responsibilities of trade unions, 
management and politicians are defined through the organisational structures within 
individual local authorities and the national conditions of service which are defined by 
the national collective bargaining framework. The national collective bargaining 
framework is an exemplar, providing the means of addressing cultural and social 
issues within this structure, allowing the actors the capacity to act both individually 
and collectively to achieve their respective organisational ambitions within the local 
government employment relations rubric. 
 
The cognitive pillar is the third and last institutional perspective in Scott’s analytical 
framework. Within the cognitive pillar actions are legitimised by their accordance 
with a range of appropriate external cultural scripts and assumptions, rather than the 
conscious adherence to internalised values, social obligations, formal laws, or moral 
norms. This is illustrated in local government through the behaviour and attitude of 
politicians, management and trade unions in dealing with change brought about 
through external intervention, primarily through legislation, and their shared public 
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service ethos. Despite differences of perspective, all three groups of actors emphasise 
the importance of public services both in delivery and provision terms. However, the 
means of achieving this common goal is often contested within the employment 
relations arena where their individual interests are melded within the collective 
bargaining framework to produce outcomes that are acceptable to the actors and 
promote the overriding interest of local government to keep control of public service 
provisions.    
 
Up until the 1980s employment relations scholars focused on the regulative and 
normative pillars within institutional theory that was characterised as old 
institutionalism. However, new institutionalism, introduces the cognitive institutional 
pillar, and the cognitive dimension has allowed employment relations scholars to go 
beyond examining rule making and values; and look at common beliefs and the 
shared logic of action amongst institutional actors. The application of Scott’s three 
main institutional pillars - regulative, normative and cultural cognitive – will be a 
useful analytical framework for examining national collective bargaining in local 
government  as it will help me to address important questions around a number of 
themes. These include similarities and differences in the actors support of national 
collective bargaining; the relationship between ideas and interest within each of the 
actor groups; and the tensions that arise between actors as they seek to fulfil their 
respective objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 85 
Path Dependency 
In my search to explore why the national collective bargaining framework continues 
to survive in local government, I will also use the concept of path dependency, 
another key aspect of institutional theory. The strong version of path dependency 
recognises that some institutions are deeply embedded, which makes any radical 
departure from established patterns of behaviour difficult in such contexts. The actors 
invest so much in operating within the parameters created by their institution that they 
are unwilling to consider seriously any alternative pathway: they become locked into 
established ways of doing things (Ebbinghaus, 2005).  There are inbuilt self-
reinforcing mechanisms that foster institutional persistence and continuity (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996) and promote ‘internalisation’ on the part of the actors, who become 
very reluctant to deviate from path dependency rules (Greif and Lanitin, 2004). For 
example, Grabher (1993) identifies three distinctive kinds of ‘institutional lock-in’: 
functional lock-in, which relates to the effectiveness of institutions in carrying out the 
tasks they were put in place to do; cognitive lock-in, that relates to the rules, 
conventions, and norms that become embedded in the actions of individuals; and 
political lock-in, the extent to which the various institutions of the state and other 
social forces are committed to preserving traditional institutional structures.  
 
The soft version of path dependency allows for change and re-adjustment by the 
actors (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). According to Teague (2009), ‘mindful action’ can 
lead to path departure as a consequence of the actions of the actors (Garud and 
Karnoe, 2001), or critical crossroads and moments can also trigger the same process 
(Thelan, 2002). Path dependency offers me an opportunity to examine and explore 
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within a comparative framework why national collective bargaining remains relevant 
to the majority of English local authorities while in others it does not.  
 
Varieties of Capitalism  
The last twenty years have seen wide-ranging political and economic developments 
amongst capitalist economies that have resulted in a broad convergence in the 
institutions of these economies as they have adopted a neoliberal political economy.  
This has challenged institutional theory by questioning how useful institutional 
legacies are in providing explanations for the development of capital political 
economies. However, the varieties of capitalism approach, associated with Hall and 
Soskice (2001), has responded to this challenge by simultaneously synthesising 
institutional work and to move beyond it by putting the needs of capitalist 
organisations at the centre of analysis and emphasising the co-ordinating functions of 
institutions (Howell and Givan, 2011: 233).  
 
Varieties of capitalism while using path dependency, focuses on the roles of 
institutional complementarities and comparative institutional advantage. Varieties of 
capitalism highlights, like wider neo-institutional theory, how organisations rarely act 
in isolation from each other, but are likely to have interactions and complement each 
other. This complementary behaviour creates an environment where organisations 
reinforce each other, forming interlocking bonds with each other that creates spheres 
of influence across political, economic and social landscapes. It is this inter-
relationship that makes particular institutions resistant to change.  The application of 
Varieties of Capitalism is compatible with my sectoral level study, as the local 
authorities within English local government are bound and shaped by each other, and 
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in turn the institutional actors are cast by this the political, economic and social 
environment that they find themselves in.      
 
The Varieties of capitalism approach has its place in contemporary institutional 
theorizing and how it examines change. Varieties of capitalism see existing 
institutions largely shielded from outside environmental shocks and institutional 
continuity, with some minor adaptation to change, being emphasised. I think the 
varieties of capitalism and my chosen approach to examining institutional change and 
continuity within my area of interest show the breadth of potential theoretical models 
that can be adopted. If we look to Hyman and Ferner’s contribution (2001, 1994, and 
1992), they look at the question of understanding varieties of industrial relations by 
focusing on identifying types of trade unionism by referring to: market, class, and 
society. They identify how broad economic change puts pressure on national 
institutions, which bend but do not break. Hyman raises the question of whether 
increased global competition and market liberalism would lead to an erosion of 
national industrial relations systems. He then poses the question – what would happen 
to the different national institutional systems when the grip of ‘inherited traditions’ 
was relaxed and space opened up for actors to restructure those institutions (Hyman 
and Ferner, 1994: 4). My thesis takes up this challenge by examining change, 
continuity and resilience in the English local government employment relations 
system over the last thirty years.   
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Section Two    
Within in this section three papers are examined to illustrate how institutional theory 
has been applied to employment relations. The first paper, by Paul Teague, uses the 
concept of path dependency to examine the evolution of conflict resolution in Ireland 
and Sweden. The second paper, by Neil Rupidera and Peter McGraw, examines 
change and continuity within the Indonesian industrial relations system. The third 
paper, by Ian Greener, uses path dependency to explore continuity in the NHS and the 
constraints on policymakers attempting to introduce change.         
 
Paul Teague’s paper, Path Dependency and Comparative Industrial Relations: The 
Case of Conflict Resolution System (2009) uses the concept of path dependency to 
explain the evolution of conflict resolution in Ireland and Sweden. He recognises that 
within the study of comparative industrial relations that a key theme has always been 
the nature and rate of institutional change/ inertia across industrial relations systems 
(Teague, 2009: 499). He draws attention to the debates that have emerged, principally 
the extent to which neo-liberalism has eroded the function of collective industrial 
relations institutions in many advanced economies, and within the varieties of 
capitalism literature, the suggestion that the composition of an economy influences 
the manner in which it changes over time (Ibid: 499). He finally relates to the 
literature that has looked at the extent to which national industrial relations systems 
have been resistant or receptive to extra national institutions that have supplemented 
established domestic rules, laws,  and conventions that shape the workplace (Ibid: 
500).  Teague argues that despite a rich and longstanding tradition of developing 
theoretical frameworks to assess how industrial relations systems evolve over time, 
the concept of path dependency, has been neglected in industrial relations. Path 
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dependency he contends may be useful in: “explaining why the nature and rate of 
change in industrial relations systems differ, leading to divergences persisting across 
systems.” (Ibid: 500). 
 
In Teague’s examination of the conflict resolution systems in Ireland and Sweden, 
which are embedded in two contrasting systems of industrial relations, Anglo Saxon 
and Corporatist, he illustrates that although both systems have experienced 
institutional change, the divergence between them has continued to remain. Both have 
followed contrasting institutional pathways to reforming procedures that have 
reflected their historical, economic, legal and social heritage. From a theoretical 
standpoint, Teague thinks that the hard version of path dependency is not compatible 
with explaining the evolution of industrial relations over time as, in his view, it is too 
rigid. The hard version is based on institutions being deeply embedded, making 
change from within difficult because actors invest so much in operating within the 
parameters set, that they are unwilling to consider an alternative institutional  
pathway, and therefore they become locked into established ways of doing things 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005). Institutional change is, in these circumstances, almost always 
brought about by external environmental factors, and the rate of change experienced 
is dependent on the severity of the external shock.  
 
The soft version of path dependency sees institutions adapting to changing 
circumstances both internally, with ‘mindful action’ on the part of the actors, where 
they develop new paths internally. The actors in response to changing external 
environmental factors, often characterised as ‘critical moments’, can trigger a process 
of pathway departure (Thelen, 2002). The soft version of path dependency 
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acknowledges the importance of actors being able to shape and re-shape the 
institutional landscape they find themselves in. It attempts to avoid the over-
determination of institutional embeddness. Teague sees the soft version of path 
dependency as a more applicable framework to assess the evolution of industrial 
relations activity over time.  The soft version is seen as a means of assessing the scale 
and nature of changes experienced by the two conflict resolution systems. Teague’s 
case study supports the idea that changes to established pathways can come from 
within, and are cast by the institutional actors within industrial relations systems. 
Most of the changes that occurred in the two systems examined were precipitated by 
internal rather than external developments.      
 
Teague in his case study identifies a number of discernible patterns of institutional 
change that have shaped the Irish and Swedish systems. In Ireland he identifies the 
process of displacement, where new economic and social developments have 
undermined the established rules and procedures, moving from collectivist principles 
underpinned by trade union support to non-union organisations which are shaped by 
individual rather than collective employment law rights. As a consequence, the 
traditional collective voluntarist industrial relations system in Ireland has been 
considerably weakened. He characterises these developments as gradual and that: 
“there has been no critical conjuncture” (Teague 2009: 516) but rather a process of 
layering, where additions and amendments to the system produce, often 
unintentionally, a destabilising effect on the procedures and rules within the system. 
The collective voluntarist conflict resolution system in Ireland has not disappeared but 
rather has become fragmented, leading to a weakening of ‘cognitive’ lock-in, which 
relates to rules, conventions and norms that become embodied in the actions of 
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individuals and organisations and establishes the dividing line between acceptable and 
unacceptable action. This has seen fewer organisations, namely private sector 
employers, subscribe to the idea that the conflict resolution system has to be organised 
along collective lines. Political lock-in refers to the extent to which the various 
institutions of the state and other social forces are committed to preserving traditional 
institutional structures. This has equally diminished as successive governments have 
subscribed to social partnership at the expense of the collective voluntarist system that 
characterised industrial relations in Ireland up until the 1980s.  
 
Teague illustrates how the conflict resolution system has become fragmented but 
equally has not become disorganised, as a number of sub-systems have emerged in 
parallel with the existing system.  He identifies three sub-systems: 
 One where parts of the economy uphold collective voluntarism, this can 
be seen in the  public sector, where employers and trade unions support 
an institutional disputes resolution framework established by the state in 
the form of the Labour Court, but maintain as a principle that collective 
bargaining should be the first means of resolving disputes; 
  One sub-area is the emergence of individual employment rights 
representation. The vast majority of Irish workplaces in the private sector 
are now non-union; as a result dispute resolution systems are being 
designed in the absence of trade union influence. With the increase in 
employment legislation (Duffy, 2005) the emergence of a rights based 
dimension to disputes resolution has further undermined collective 
voluntarism in Ireland as industrial relations is increasingly regulated by 
the law and has opened up a process which involves people interacting 
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with employment relations as legal subjects and not as members of a 
collective institution like a trade union. 
 One sub area defined as  social partnership – where central national 
social agreements have, in the last twenty years, effectively controlled 
pay bargaining and to a great degree curtailed industrial action through 
promoting collaborative interactions between trade unions and employers 
(D’Art and Turner, 2002). The social partnership process has fostered 
new formal and informal approaches to addressing industrial conflict 
(Teague, 2005), which can be seen in the 2000 national social agreement, 
the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, which established the 
National Implementation Body (NIB), whose membership is comprised 
of the Secretary General of the Department of  An Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister’s Office), the Director General of Irish Business and Employers’ 
Confederation (IBEC) and the General Secretary of the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU). The NIB has policed the social partnership 
agreement and intervened, where necessary, to quell potential 
employment disputes (Teague and Donaghey, 2004).  Social partnership 
emphasises the need for speedy intervention to resolve workplace 
disputes, which are perceived to be a malign influence on employer-
union relationships, and engagement of social partners in conjunction 
with Government. This approach is associated with corporatist rather than 
Anglo Saxon industrial relations which is based on the assumption that 
employer-union disputes are often a consequence of their differing 
interests.            
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In conclusion the Irish system of conflict resolution is not organised around a 
distinctive pathway, but rather has developed a number of pathways that reflect the 
changing composition of the employment sectors within the Irish labour market. The 
three sub areas have developed disputes resolution frameworks that reflect the nature 
of industrial relations practice within these particular employment sectors, recognising 
that the historical attachment to collective voluntarism is no longer applicable in large 
parts of the labour market, and that social partnership and employment rights activity 
have become relevant conduits to establishing disputes resolutions frameworks that 
reflect the changing nature of industrial relations in Ireland. 
   
The Swedish conflict resolution system, although undergoing change has gone down a 
different institutional road to Ireland. At its heart the Swedish system has maintained 
its core values of collectivism and self-regulation. Conflict management in Sweden 
has been enshrined in a three tier system of collective agreements. The main trade 
union confederation, Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), and employers’ 
organisation, Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen (SAF), concluded a national collective 
agreement, which was subsequently supplemented by agreements at the industry and 
workplace levels. This has led to Sweden being described as the Mecca of European-
style corporatist industrial relations in the 1970s and 1980s (Katzenstein, 1985). The 
three tier system was challenged in the late 1980s as employers became dissatisfied 
with it, wanting to develop decentralised wage bargaining that would be more 
responsive to particular economic sectors (Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2003). The SAF 
withdrew from centralised wage negotiations in 1990. This move threatened the 
Corporatist approach and the collectivist ethos of Swedish industrial relations. With 
density levels still high, trade unions were not going to simply accept this and the 
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early 1990s saw a rise in industrial disputes across all sectors of the Swedish 
economy, but in particular the manufacturing sector. The social democratic 
government set up a group of experts known as the Rehnberg Group to prevent the 
end of corporatism in Swedish industrial relations. The Group set up a procedure 
whereby trade unions and employers were provided with comprehensive economic 
and wage data and the facility of mediators.  
 
The government in response to the disputes of the early 1990s promoted social 
partnership, inviting trade unions and employers to discuss creating a more orderly 
collective bargaining procedure. This led in the manufacturing sector, where the 
majority of the disputes were occurring, the trade unions and employers signing a 
comprehensive agreement called the Cooperation Agreement on Industrial 
Development and Pay Determination. This agreement was a template for promoting 
collective bargaining in a manner that promotes ‘industrial development, profitability 
and competitiveness’. The agreement saw the creation of an Industrial Committee, 
consisting of trade union and employer representatives that presided over a 
collaborative procedure for collective bargaining. The success of this agreement 
within the manufacturing sector saw a similar agreement introduced in the public 
sector (Thornqvist, 2007).  
 
The Swedish system has not shifted towards the individualisation of conflict 
resolution and can be considered an example of institutional redeployment within the 
context of the continuity of the established path dependency route. The system has 
managed to retain its underlying character, maintaining collective industrial 
agreements that have adapted to new operating rules, while still adhering to the 
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collectivist ethos which underpins Swedish industrial relations. This is illustrated in 
the Cooperation Agreement on Industrial Development and Pay Determination drawn 
up in 1997, which catered to both trade unions and employers interests. The trade 
unions saw it protecting the collective rights of workers, and the employers saw it as a 
way of locking trade unions into industrial relations stability without re-entering 
corporatist wage bargaining.  Teague refers to this as a process of hybridization, 
“accommodating new developments in a manner that sustains the core features of the 
pathway.” (Teague: 517)       
 
Comparison of the Irish and Swedish systems in the case study reveals how the 
weaker path dependency upheaval in Sweden can be attributed to having a highly 
integrated system, where well established arrangements exist between employers and 
trade unions at the local and sector levels to address workplace disputes.  Mediation 
and arbitration are emphasised and the law is the last form of redress once these 
procedures have been exhausted. In comparison, Ireland has become an open system, 
creating a wide range of institutional routes for the resolution of disputes. The 
weakening of collectivism and the promotion of employment law focusing on 
individual rights has seen collective agreements eroded in Ireland. In contrast, the 
option to settle disputes in Sweden were more restricted which made the development 
of the individualistic route to conflict resolution more difficult to establish. In 
Teague’s words: “the Swedish conflict management system had stronger inbuilt self-
reinforcing mechanisms that worked for institutional persistence and continuity: 
institutional lock-in was more robust” (Teague: 518).  
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Teague highlights that equally as important as the continuity and collectivist conflict 
resolutions practices in the Swedish system was the ‘mindful action’ of Swedish 
employers to create a new industrial relations path in the mid-1990s.  Employers 
launched an assault on the established corporatist system, which was partially 
successful in changing wage setting arrangements but was unsuccessful in recasting 
the industrial relations system along individualistic lines as the trade unions were 
strongly supported. The trade unions had the necessary influence to veto over what 
type of industrial relations system they would participate in and: “Employers had the 
capacity to decide not to participate in corporatism, but not the power to push through 
their own industrial relations agenda”. (Teague: 518). As a consequence the trade 
unions could defend ‘political lock-in’ with the traditional collectivist principles of 
Swedish industrial relations and ensure their continuation.    
 
This case study manages to convey an important aspect of comparative industrial 
relations, explaining why established arrangements within an industrial relations 
system decline in some circumstances and persist in others. Teague’s case study 
highlights the potential usefulness of the theory of path dependency to comparative 
industrial relations, and its application in my research is relevant in exploring the 
sectoral dimension and nature of continuity and resilience of the national collective 
bargaining framework in English local government. 
   
Institutional Change, Continuity and Decoupling in the Indonesian Industrial 
Relations System (Rupidara and McGraw, 2010) examines change and continuity 
within the Indonesian industrial relations system. The paper applies institutional 
theory in analysing the different institutional actors, and focuses on three periods – the 
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Old Order (1945-1965), the New Order (1965-1998), and the post-New Order (1998-
present).   
 
Rupidara and McGraw when considering the question of change and continuity in 
Indonesian industrial relations apply a theoretical framework from institutional theory 
to evaluate the mechanism operating to promote change and/or stability across the 
three periods. Their research looks at recent changes across a long timeline covering 
the three periods over the last sixty years. Using institutional theory allows them to 
make informed judgements about the relative institutional stability, while examining 
the role of institutions and actors within the industrial relations system in preserving 
and promoting continuity. Applying an institutional theory analytical framework 
allows Rupidara and McGraw to consider multiple institutional logics which may co-
exist in combination and sometimes in competition with one another.         
 
Rupidara and McGraw analysis of the Indonesian industrial relations system relies on 
using both sociological and historical institutional perspectives, which they argue 
allows more comprehensive consideration of the main pillars of institutions, i.e. 
regulative, normative and cognitive, in parallel with examining the critical events that 
shaped Indonesian industrial relations history. They examine how the actors and 
institutional mechanisms connect with each, both formally and informally; how the 
diffusion of ideas and institutional isomorphism shape or constrain the choices that 
actors make; and how the actors have mobilized power to influence change within the 
prevailing institutional logics.  
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Rupidara and McGraw in their research face a particular challenge; while the 
Indonesian industrial relations system is superficially simple structurally, beneath the 
formal structures rest more complex practices embedded in prevailing institutional 
logics. These refer to how organising principles shape the behaviour of institutional 
actors; producing formal and informal rules of action, interaction and interpretation 
that guide and constrain the actors.   This characteristic reflects loose institutional 
arrangements that tolerate mismatches among institutional pillars, i.e. regulative, 
normative, and cognitive institutions (Scott, 2008). The process of ‘decoupling’ 
creates a situation where structure is disconnected from activity and activity from 
results (Fiss, 2008).  ‘Decoupling’ allows a situation to develop where a radical 
change in structures may co-exist with the unchanged behaviours of actors whose 
thinking is deeply rooted in pre-existing institutional ideas.  
 
Their paper questions the changes that have been highlighted in the last ten years, 
questioning their sustainability and some of the claims made about their radical 
departure from past practices. They argue that despite some profound changes there 
are still strong elements of institutional continuity that can be traced back over the 
sixty years studied.  They show that despite the changes introduced to the industrial 
relations system since 1998 with labour market reforms driven by a neo-liberalist 
agenda, there is evidence of continuity particularly in the role and ideology of 
government, freedom of expression, and form of unionization. They identify deeper 
issues of behavioural continuity at the cognitive cultural level, which are more 
profound and deeply rooted, and act as a brake on introducing reforms that are 
espoused but are not implemented effectively. This is illustrative in government 
bureaucracy not enforcing labour statutes and regulations, corruption in business, 
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politics and even within the labour movement. They characterise a political 
environment which is shaped by opportunism and the manipulation of economic and 
social systems for self-interest.   
 
The trade unions over the three periods examined have been to less or greater extents 
controlled by the governments of the day. During the Old Order (1945-1965), 
governments gave a degree of freedom to the labour movement, at least during the 
period 1945-1957, when unions flourished. Basic protections of labour rights were 
also established in progressive legislation covering working hours, child and female 
work and labour inspections (Manning, 1993). However, the trade unions were mostly 
controlled by the political parties and were not shaped by worker interests primarily, 
but were rather political adjuncts to successive governments, promoting a political 
agenda that has been characterised as being driven top-down by politicians, where 
union policy and strategy were dictated by the party leadership (Hadiz, 1997). Under 
the New Order (1965-1998) from the 1973 until 1998 it dissolved the existing trade 
unions and created one state-sanctioned union, Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia 
(FBSI) which in 1985 became Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia. Key positions in the 
union were held by staff from the ruling party, Golongan Karya and by military 
personnel (La Botz, 2001). This union never played its role as a representative body 
for its members, but merely became the voice of government’s interest in industrial 
relations issues (Rupidera and McGraw, 2010). Under the post New Order (1998- 
present) the governments have allowed the re-emergence of trade unions as a 
consequence of international pressure, however, this is the context of a highly 
fragmented labour movement. There are now almost 100 hundred unions which are in 
competition with each other; their fragmentation reflects the ideological ‘haziness’ of 
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the Indonesian labour movement (Silaban, 2009) which reflects wider Indonesian 
politics where fragmentation is a key feature, with diverse political groups making up 
the political landscape. The deep ideological divisions within the labour movement 
make the trade unions relatively ineffectual in promoting and representing worker 
interests.     
 
Rupidara and McGraw’s work illustrates how the Indonesian industrial relations 
system has operated under parallel, even competing logics exerted by different 
institutional pillars and by the actors within it. These competing logics have created a 
restraining effect on reform initiatives, giving rise to continuity within the Indonesian 
industrial relations system. Rupidara and McGraw’s paper shows how at different 
times institutional mechanisms both shape and restrain actors as well as providing 
opportunities to change them. They show that any reform process within an industrial 
relations system must appreciate and embrace an holistic approach to change, that 
acknowledges the wider understanding and characteristics of institutions, including 
pillars (Scott, 2008); mechanisms, such as isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983); path dependency ( Thelen, 2002 ); and the transferability of ideas between 
institutions.       
  
Understanding NHS Reform: The Policy-Transfer, Social Learning, and Path-
Dependency Perspectives (Greener, 2002) is an account of the National Health 
Service reforms from the 1980s through to the mid-1990s.  Greener uses path 
dependency to explore continuity in the NHS and the constraints upon policymakers 
attempting to introduce significant change during this period. Greener refers to the 
notion of “conjuncture”, in which a combination of events creates a change in the 
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internal and external environment that impacts on an institution, to help to explain the 
timing of NHS reforms, and the interplay between a range of diverse events within the 
organisational structure that create opportunities for change.  
 
Greener emphasises the importance of the British political system, in particular how it 
creates noncoalition governments which effectively gives power to a core executive 
based around the cabinet system of government. As long as the cabinet can enforce 
discipline over the parliamentary party, it can pass whatever legislation it thinks can 
promote its political objectives, especially where a large parliamentary majority 
exists, as with the Thatcher governments from 1983 until 1990. Equally, the system of 
funding places control at the heart of government, the NHS is funded through general 
taxation, which gives the Treasury an important voice in the setting of its budget.  
However, despite the NHS being centrally financed the discretion given through the 
“concordat” between the medical profession and the state (Klein, 1995) giving the 
medical profession considerable autonomy in the operational running of the service. 
This autonomy gives the medical profession considerable veto power over reform 
proposals. As Greener observes: “The NHS is centrally financed, but it is not always 
clear that it is centrally run” (Greener, 2002: 170).     
Greener goes through the conjuncture of events that allowed the reforms to take place, 
which are attributed to: 
 The Thatcher administration’s increased authority after the 1987 general 
election 
 The increased heterogeneity of the medical profession  
 The existence of earlier management reforms  
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 The template offered for an alternative organisational structure, and its lack of 
threat to both patients and the general public 
These factors, Greener argues, gave the government a window of opportunity to 
introduce reform during the 1980s and mid-1990s, however, the government was 
equally constrained by the existing organisational structure, where the institutional 
actors, particularly the professional occupational groups, had strong regulative, 
normative, and cognitive ties to the existing NHS structure, despite their professional 
rivalries. The government sought to ‘divide and rule’ by questioning the legitimacy of 
the British Medical Association to be the voice of the medical profession and tried to 
exploit the differences between the specialisms, appealing to the Royal Colleges, in 
the reform process. This approach had limited success and the reforms that were 
implemented during this period focused on the procurement of resources and the 
marketisation of non-medical services similar to the regime introduced in local 
government for manual, direct services, with the implementation of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering.    
 
Under the Thatcher government the cabinet adopted a ‘closed cabinet’ approach to 
reform, not consulting with the key institutional actors in the policy formulation 
process. This was a questionable strategy because despite having a strong political 
mandate, it failed to recognise that it required the compliance of the medical 
profession to secure effective change, and not doing so created a resentment that made 
the reforms more difficult to implement. There was a degree of ‘political lock-in’ to 
reforming the NHS, there was a consensus amongst the three principal political 
parties that recognised the NHS transcended the political bargaining and reforming 
process that other public services were subject to.  The NHS had become the secular 
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religion of the UK, with the public’s absolute faith in it as an institution of public 
good.  The Conservative government recognised this political reality.  The public had 
an expectation that the NHS should provide health care that was free at the point of 
delivery, universal and comprehensive, and any attempts to change any of these 
elements risked political unpopularity. The continuity of the NHS as an organisation 
is tied up in it being a distinctive example of socialized medicine, with a high degree 
of central control over funding. A change of financial arrangements carries the risk of 
control over the total amount spent on health care and a corresponding increase in 
state expenditure. As long as funding comes from general taxation it will continue to 
limit the scope of health care reform, therefore creating an economic lock-in with the 
existing NHS institutional structure. Greener’s work shows that where health 
professionals view reforms as being managerial in nature, they are often vetoed or 
ignored. Greener succinctly sums up: “While health care remains a key general 
election issue, substantial reform of the care system in the U.K. will be difficult 
because of the ease with which its proposers can be labelled as “privatising” or 
“dismantling” the NHS.” (Greener, 2002: 176) Greener’s paper applies path 
dependency theory as an analytical framework to help understand the conditions for 
institutional reform, in this case the NHS, and how their origins, implementation, 
significance, and constraints, offers insights into the institutional reform process.   
  
The three papers examined in this section illustrate how institutional theory and 
specifically the concept of path dependency, in comparative employment relations 
research, can be a useful means of exploring and analysing actors and institutions.  
We see how at different times, institutions can shape and restrain actors as well as 
providing opportunities to change them.       
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 Section Three    
The application of institutional theory to my study of national collective bargaining in 
English local government will examine questions around: 
 Why do local authorities, of varying sizes and political composition, across 
the country, support and adhere to the national collective bargaining 
framework? 
 Why other local authorities choose not to be in the national framework? 
 How the actors within local authorities: trade unions, management, and 
politicians, shape and influence the support of the national framework? 
  How are we to regard institutional actors’ behaviour in their organisational 
settings? Does it reflect the pursuit of rational interests and the exercise of 
conscious choice, or is behaviour primarily shaped by conventions, routines, 
and habits? 
 How do rules, public policy, and laws shape the regulative, normative and 
cognitive processes of the institutional actors within local government?         
 How do political ideological beliefs shape the nature of operations in local 
government? 
 Why do institutional actors and the majority of local authorities within 
English local government conform to the national collective bargaining 
framework? Is it because it is expedient to their individual and collective 
interests; in economic, social, and political terms? Is it because of a moral 
imperative borne out the public service ethos to serve the public and its 
interests? Or is it as a consequence of conceiving no alternative? 
 Is the national collective bargaining framework a vehicle for promoting 
stability and order within English local government?       
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Applying path dependency to my study will help me develop a line of enquiry around 
the custom and practice (the cultural-cognitive dimension) of establishing the means 
by which terms and conditions of employment are set through collective bargaining 
and how the principal institutional actors in local government – the state, 
employers/management (including human resource management), trade unions, and 
politicians (nationally and locally) – shape the outcomes of this process. Path 
dependency offers a means of analysing and understandings the development and the 
shaping of the institutional actors, and has the potential to offer an explanation as to 
why national collective bargaining has remained so resilient despite the reforms of the 
last thirty years, and still is integral to English local government employment relations 
architecture.  
 
Conclusion 
An important aspect of comparative employment relations is explaining why 
established arrangements to manage the employment relationship decline in some 
employment sectors and persist in others. In my study examining collective 
bargaining in English local government, institutional theory and the concept of path 
dependency, will be useful in examining why centralised national collective 
bargaining in local government has continued to survive amongst the majority of local 
authorities (over 90%) despite the local government reforms over the last thirty years. 
The chapter has looked at institutional theory and the concept of path dependency, 
while specifically illustrating the application of Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions. 
The three papers in which institutional theory and path dependency are used, 
illustrates their appropriateness and potential usefulness in my own work, as they will 
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help to illuminate and explore the complex and inter-dependent relationship of the 
institutional actors, and why they continue to support centralised national collective 
bargaining in English local government.       
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                                      Chapter Five  
                                      
                               Research Methods 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the research methods adopted in my study, and their suitability. 
The chapter will examine the different methodological approaches to research; the 
particular methodological traditions in industrial relations research; the development 
of the research design in my study; and the practical details and processes of data 
collection in my study.  
 
Despite the dramatic decline of collective bargaining and trade union membership in 
the British private sector over the past thirty years, and much academic discussion of 
‘marketisation’ in the public sector, national collective bargaining in English local 
government has remained remarkably robust - as demonstrated by the Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys. Most academic research on employment relations in 
the public sector has focused on ‘change’.  In my study I wish to examine the roots of 
‘continuity’ and a surprising institutional survival. After three decades of reform, 
national bargaining still remains central to the local government employment relations 
architecture, and contrary to the ‘hollowing out’ claim, national agreements are still 
the bulwark upon which both national and local government and the actors within it 
(trade unions, management, politicians, and central government) rely upon to engage 
in the process of joint regulation in the workplace.  
 
A sectoral study has been chosen to explore the political dynamics that underlie the 
survival of national collective bargaining in English local government. This follows a 
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‘firm in sector’ methodology (Smith et al., 1990), in which a benchmark authority is 
studied and is compared and contrasted with eight other local authorities. The 
authorities were chosen by taking account of factors such as: size (employing more 
than 2,000 workers); type (metropolitan (7) and shire (2)); geography (north (2), 
midlands (4), south west (1) and south east (2)); and status (are they part of the 
national collective bargaining framework or outside of it).    
 
The ‘firm in sector’ methodology will allow me to examine issues at an organisational 
level, building on the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys, which is focused 
more at a macro and sectoral level. A sectoral study goes beyond a case study because 
although my research will drill down in detail within the benchmark authority, the 
study is nevertheless dependent on understanding the wider sectoral landscape in 
which the benchmark authority is located and considers how its experiences compare 
with local authorities who chose to belong or not belong to the national collective 
bargaining framework.    
 
A process of purposive sampling (Bryman, 2001) was conducted to establish the 
individuals that would be interviewed and were selected on the basis of their 
relevance to the research questions. There was a ‘snowball’ effect with the interview 
process, as through interviewing people I was recommended to see others who might 
contribute further to my research. The study relies on interviews with the principal 
stakeholders – trade union representatives, managers, and politicians – at an authority, 
regional and national level across a number of local authorities both within and 
outside the national framework. These individuals can be described as elite policy 
actors (Hantrais and Ackers, 2005): experienced operators in their respective areas 
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who bring their wealth of experience to the organisational roles they perform. All 
interviewees have been involved in local government for at least twenty years, and the 
majority have worked in a number of local authorities, allowing them to compare and 
contrast their experiences across the local government sector as a whole.  Fuller 
details on interviewees are provided later.   
 
The Purpose of the Research     
The nature of research is very much shaped by its end use, and this has a major effect 
on the research strategy adopted (Hakim, 1987). Hakim distinguishes between 
theoretical and policy-based research. Theoretical research focuses primarily on 
identifying causal relationships and explaining real world phenomena. The long-term 
aim is to develop knowledge and understanding. Policy research focuses on changing 
real life situations and informing policy makers’ concerns. Various distinctions can be 
drawn between the two approaches, with policy research more likely to be: multi-
disciplinary; conducted at a number of levels; based on representative samples rather 
than those that cannot be generalised; involve respondents who are institutional role 
holders; and involve complex causal processes (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998: 12). 
Industrial Relations research, historically, has always been closely associated with 
policy formulation, linking it with the policy-based model. However, the last twenty 
years have increasingly seen industrial relations research focusing on hypothesis 
testing.  
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Theoretical Perspectives 
Of the theoretical perspectives available to the researcher, positivism and 
interpretivism are arguably the most influential. Historically, positivism was the 
dominant epistemological paradigm in social science from the 1930s through to the 
1960s, its core argument being that the social world exists external to the researcher, 
and that its properties can be measured directly through observation. Central to 
positivism is that ideas only deserve to be incorporated into knowledge if they can be 
put to the test of empirical experience.  This, in the context of the positivist 
perspective, can only be achieved through the accumulation of data. Positivism has 
been described as ‘one of the heroic failures of modern philosophy’ (Williams and 
May, 1996: 27).  Adopting a positivistic stance is not only about adopting certain 
approaches to the design of research studies. It implies that the results of research will 
be presented as objective facts and established truths (Crotty, 1998). Popper (1968) 
argues that no theory can ever be proved simply by multiple observations, since only 
one instance that refutes the theory would demonstrate it as false. According to 
Popper, theories cannot be proved to be true – they can only be proved to be false. 
 
Intrepretivism looks for ‘culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of 
the social life-world’ (Crotty: 1998: 67). From this perspective, there is no, direct, 
one-to-one relationship between ourselves and the world around us. The world is 
interpreted through the classification schemas of the mind (Williams and May, 1996). 
In terms of epistemology, interpretivism is closely linked to constructivism. 
Interpretivism asserts that natural reality and social reality are different and therefore 
require different kinds of method. While the natural sciences are looking for 
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consistencies in the data in order to deduce ‘laws’, the social sciences often deal with 
the actions of the individual. Thus as Crotty (1998: 68) says: ‘Our interest in the 
social world tends to focus on exactly those aspects that are unique, individual and 
qualitative, whereas our interest in the natural world focuses on more abstract 
phenomena, that is, those exhibiting quantifiable, empirical regularities.’ This 
methodological tension is reflected in Weber’s notion of ‘Verstehen’, which 
emphasizes the need for ‘interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive 
at a causal explanation of its cause and effects’ (1947: 88).  My research adopts a 
broadly interpretivist approach, as I am interested in examining the social life world 
within local government. I wish to understand the thoughts and actions of the 
institutional actors and establish the reasons why the national collective bargaining 
framework remains an important bulwark with local government employment 
relations.       
 
Research Strategy - Inductive and Deductive Approaches  
The two main approaches to research strategy are the deductive and inductive 
approaches. The deductive approach begins with a universal view of a situation and 
works back to the particulars while the inductive approach moves from fragmentary 
details to a connected view of a situation. Inductive research is normally, although not 
exclusively, based on qualitative research methods, which works from the bottom – 
field- upwards. Its primary focus is to understand and explain how and why 
institutions develop as they do. They are studied holistically, that is, in their social, 
economic, and historical context. The inductive approach has been useful in 
developing policy advice and middle-range theory (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998). 
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Longitudinal studies of institutions over time have proved beneficial in developing 
insights that further our knowledge into how they work. The deductive approach, in 
contrast, as already mentioned, moves from the top – theory – downwards, seeking 
general laws that are applicable to a wide set of situations through the application of 
hypotheses. In the employment relations context these have tended to emanate from 
the fields of economics and other social sciences. In the deductive approach, 
hypotheses are tested against empirical facts, often relying on quantitative research 
methods.  In the case of my study, it was informed by an interpretivist epistemological 
approach, with a mixture of both deductive and inductive approaches to theory, with 
the literature and my personal experience producing thematic questions that could be 
complemented by new questions coming out of the empirical fieldwork.    
 
Methodological traditions in industrial relations research 
Within British industrial relations research has historically favoured a qualitative 
approach which has been: “inductive, qualitative, concerned with applied/ policy 
oriented problems and relatively a-theoretical (or) at most concerned with middle 
range theory” (Whitfield and Strauss, 2000), or what Marginson refers to as the 
“empirically founded inductive tradition of the field” (Marginson, 1998: 384). 
However, internationally, industrial relations research methods have varied between 
countries and the underlying influence of specific subject disciplines like labour 
economics and sociology.  In the United States, where labour economics has played a 
key role in shaping industrial relations, quantitative research has become the dominant 
research method, accounting for the of majority research there. While in Britain, 
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research in the last thirty years has been equally balanced between both qualitative 
and quantitative research (Frege, 2005).   
 
However, within British industrial relations, the last twenty years have seen a 
noticeable shift in emphasis towards deduction and quantification in mainstream 
academic journals. The pre-eminence of the Workplace Industrial 
Relations/Employment Relations Surveys, which have produced large data sets across 
all the UK’s industrial and employment sectors, has seen a switch in research 
emphasis from examining institutions and collective issues, to that of the individual in 
relation to the employment relationship with the employer, characterised with human 
resource management practice. It has been argued that with the development of 
technology and the ability to process large data sets, this has impacted on the use of 
qualitative methods like the case study, in industrial relations research (Ackers and 
Wilkinson, 2003: 451), which has seen the tradition of sociology in industrial 
relations become diluted and economics becoming more dominant.     
 
The debate within methodological research methods still centres on the question of 
which approach is better – qualitative or quantitative as illustrated in Table 5.1 
(Bryman, 1998). In many respects this debate is argued by the respective proponents 
of each, from a philosophical position that is shaped by: culture, politics, and 
academic discipline. In practice, researchers have taken a pragmatic approach, seeing 
that qualitative and quantitative methods can be complementary to each other. 
Surveys can inform case study design and likewise case studies can inform surveys – 
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a two way process shaping case study research or informing findings (Marginson, 
1998).        
Table 5.1 Strength and Weaknesses of Qualitative and Quantitative Research          
 Strengths Weaknesses 
 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative 
Research 
Seeing through the eyes of the people being 
studied and understanding the social world they 
live in 
Description and the emphasis on context – 
descriptive detail highlights the importance  of 
the contextual understanding of social 
behaviour – norms and values must be 
understood in context 
Emphasis on process – qualitative evidence 
conveys a strong sense of change and flux  
Flexibility and limited structure - allows the 
researcher to develop research methods that are 
appropriate to the social world they are 
examining. Keeping structure to a minimum 
enhances the opportunity of genuinely 
revealing perspectives of the people and 
institutions  that are being studied  
Problems of generalisation 
Difficult to replicate 
The perception of lack of perceived 
transparency 
 
 
 
Quantitative 
Research 
 
 
  
Generalisability – research findings can be 
generalised beyond the confines of the 
particular context in which the research was 
conducted 
Replication- the reproduction of research which 
seeks to minimise individual researcher’s 
biases and values 
Causality – a wish to not only identify 
phenomena but to explain it. 
Limited understanding of processes 
– failure to distinguish people and 
social institutions 
The measurement process possesses 
an artificial precision and accuracy   
The reliance on instruments and 
procedures hinders the connection 
between everyday life 
The analysis of relationships 
between variables creates a static 
view of social life that is 
independent of people’s lives 
Source: Bryman, A. (1998) Quantity and Quality in Social Research            
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Brown and Wright (1994) encapsulate the complementary nature of both 
methodological approaches: 
“Large-scale surveys are in much of social science best iterated with in-depth 
fieldwork. Unless their questions receive constant refreshment from the case studies, 
they cease to engage with the phenomena they seek to observe and measure. Unless 
case study findings are placed in a statistical perspective, their significance may be 
ignored” (Brown and Wright, 1994: 162).       
In the case of my own research, I will build upon the data presented in the Workplace 
Industrial/Employment Relations Surveys of the last thirty years, which have 
provided valuable data on identifying the changing contours of industrial relations in 
Britain (Blanchflower, Bryson and Forth, 2007). The WER/WIR surveys over the last 
thirty years have provided valuable insights into the longer term trends encompassing 
employment relations affecting UK workplaces. The surveys provide not only an 
important ‘snapshot in time’ but also contain a rich longitudinal   content which will 
enable me to identify workplace continuities and change over this period. The 
WER/WIR surveys will complement my sectoral study, as I will drill down and focus 
specifically on local government. The data extrapolated from the surveys will act as a 
reference point for framing my empirical fieldwork. However, it is important to 
recognise the limitations of the WIR/WER surveys. Although they show patterns of 
change in the employment relations landscape, they do not reveal the process which 
explains why change occurs, or how the actors involved in the changes make sense of 
them. In the case of national collective bargaining in the public sector, the surveys tell 
us that it has survived, but not how and why. 
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The sectoral study, with its qualitative emphasis, will allow me to examine the fine 
grain detail of why the national collective bargaining framework continues to survive 
in English local government. My study will be context-sensitive (Edwards, 2005), 
applying institutional theory to explore my subject matter. By probing the views and 
opinions of elite policy actors, all experienced participants in local government 
employment relations, I will get a greater understanding of my subject matter, and this 
detailed qualitative enquiry will illuminate ‘what people believe is happening’ to the 
national framework in local government. My study will bring out the ‘lived 
experience’ of the actors and the institutions they inhabit, and rather than an over 
emphasis of deterministic institutional explanations, will show how the actors, 
whether trade unions, management or politicians, shape the employment relations 
environment they operate in. This approach, I believe, will produce ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973) from the benchmark authority and the other authorities examined, that 
will illuminate and offer explanations into the continual survival of national collective 
bargaining in English local government.       
 
My study relies on adopting an historical perspective, viewing local government 
employment relations and its development in its historical context. The time frame of 
– 1979- 2007 starts with the political rupture of 1979 with the coming to power of a 
Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher and 2007, which saw Tony Blair 
step down after ten years in office as Prime Minister of a Labour government. This 
historical approach to my sectoral study will, I believe, produce a comprehensive and 
an authoritative blend of description and analysis that will help to explain interesting 
social phenomena like the survival of the national collective bargaining in local 
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government, and make a contribution to our understanding of public sector 
employment relations.   
 
Research Approach and Design: A Sectoral Study   
A sectoral study, using a ‘firm in sector’ methodology (Smith et al., 1990) is ideally 
suited for examining the reasons for the continued survival of the national collective 
bargaining in local government. It will allow me to explore themes raised through the 
literature, focusing on:  local authorities, trade unions, and employers’ associations 
and the individuals that make up these organisations. A sectoral study will help me 
examine local government employment relations practice between the different 
institutional stakeholders, specifically in detail within one local authority, and more 
generally across a selected number of local authorities. Stake (2000) argues that a 
sectoral study, as a scion of the case study method, can prove invaluable in adding to 
understanding, extending experience and increasing conviction about a subject. Yin 
(1994) suggests that a sectoral study can be viewed as: “an enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (Yin, 1994: 13). A sectoral 
study can attribute causal relationships rather than just describe a situation, which is 
useful when a researcher is trying to uncover a relationship between a phenomenon 
and the context in which it is occurring. A sectoral study is ideally suited to exploring 
the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ the national collective bargaining framework 
continues to exist in local government.   
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Criticisms of the Sectoral Study Approach  
It must be pointed out that the sectoral study approach is not universally accepted by 
researchers as being reliable, objective and legitimate. A fundamental criticism is the 
issue of the approach’s inability to generalise, which is levelled by advocates of 
positivism (Gummerson, 1991). However, in Yin’s opinion, this criticism is equally 
applicable to quantitative methods of research, and sectoral studies are generalizable 
to theoretical propositions and not to populations (Yin, 1984: 21). It has been argued 
that the method lacks sufficient rigour, but as Yin (1994) points out, this is often 
down to the sloppiness of the individual researcher who has allowed equivocal 
evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions. 
Yin points out that bias is as much of a problem for other research strategies, such as 
designing questionnaires for surveys (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982), or in the conduct 
of historical research (Gottschalk, 1968).      
 
The Research Process and Data Collection   
My fieldwork research began in April 2009. I wrote to eighty individuals across 
twelve organisations comprising of: local authorities, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations.  Within each letter (Appendix 1) I outlined the nature of my research 
and my wish to interview a representative cross-section of the principal actors who 
were involved in employment relations in local government. Through this method 
fifty individuals across the twelve organisations got back to me and agreed to be 
interviewed.  
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Table 5.2 List of Participants Interviewed  
Benchmark Authority 
Name Position Organisation 
B F Director of Employment 
Relations 
Authority 1 
N B HR Manager Authority 1 
M C HR Manager Authority 1 
F F Retired Director Authority 1 
L T Operational  Head of 
Waste Management 
Authority 1 
P G Street Cleansing  Manager Authority 1 
M N Refuse Collection Manager Authority 1 
J M Head of Food – Public 
Health 
Authority 1 
J Y Operational Head of 
Trading standards  
Authority 1 
R B Head of Environmental 
Health 
Authority 1 
T M Retired Head of Waste 
Management 
Authority 1 
 
   
M J Retired Director Authority 1 
M A Labour Councillor Authority 1 
P K Labour Councillor – 
Shadow Cabinet Member 
of the HR Committee 
Authority 1 
C R  Labour Councillor Authority 1 
M W Liberal Democrat 
Councillor – HR 
Committee 
Authority 1 
A R Conservative Councillor – 
Cabinet Member – HR 
Committee 
Authority 1 
 
 
 
Leader Authorities 
 
Name Position Organisation 
S C  Councillor – Chair of HR 
Committee  
Authority  2 
L H Chief Officer  of Human 
Resources 
Authority 3 
J R Head of Human Resources Authority 4 
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Follower Authorities 
 
Name Position Organisation 
B M Director of Customer and 
Workforce Services 
Authority 5 
R W Head of Human Resources Authority 6 
S R Head of Health and Safety Authority 7 
A D  Chief Human Resources 
Officer 
Authority 7 
S B Deputy Head of 
Employment Relations 
Authority 7 
 
 
Deviant Authorities 
 
Name Position Organisation 
G H  Corporate Director – 
People, Policy, and 
Communications 
Authority 8 
A B  Corporate Director of 
Personnel and 
Development 
Authority 9 
P R Head of Employment 
Strategy 
Authority 9 
 
 
 
 
Trade Unions 
 
Name Position Organisation 
S T Departmental Secretary  UNISON 
B H Departmental Secretary UNISON 
A W Regional Officer UNISON 
R S Regional Head of Local 
Government 
UNISON 
T J Regional Head of Local 
Government 
UNISON 
 
R M Regional Secretary UNISON 
A I Researcher UNISON 
A T Branch Secretary UNISON 
T R Regional Officer UNISON 
 
S H Section Shop Steward UNITE 
S F Branch Secretary UNITE 
H H Deputy Branch Secretary UNITE 
P A National Negotiator UNITE 
P J Head of Research UNITE 
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Employers’ Associations 
 
Name Position Organisation 
C W Regional Director   Local Government 
Association 
D H Regional Head of 
Employment  Relations 
Local Government  
Association 
S M Regional Head  of 
Employment Relations 
Local Government 
Association 
C N Retired Executive Director Local Government 
Employers 
P W Head of Negotiations  Local Government 
Employers 
H H Principal Negotiator Local Government 
Employers 
S B Chair Local Government 
Employers 
M M Conservative Councillor -
Member on the General 
Assembly  
Local Government 
Association 
 
 (* Detailed biographical profiles of the interviewees can be found within appendix 2)   
 
 
Justification of the selection of organisations  
and interview participants  
 
The selection of organisations and individuals is critical to the success of the research 
conducted: “As in hypothesis testing research, the concept of population is crucial, 
because the population defines a set of entities for which the research sample is to be 
drawn” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536). The selection of organisations and the initial 
approach of individuals within these organisations were to a large degree influenced 
by my professional background. As an employment relations manager with over 
twenty years’  experience in local government, I had an extensive network of 
colleagues both within the authority I had worked for, and associates who worked in 
other local authorities, the trade union movement, and the employers’ association at a 
regional and national level.  Through my contacts in the Trade Union Movement and 
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the Local Government Employers, I was able to identify individuals that had the 
necessary background and experience in local government employment relations that 
would give me the breadth and depth to my study.     
 
The choice of the benchmark authority was primarily driven by two factors: access 
and the nature of the local authority. I had been employed by the authority for nearly 
twenty years as an employment relations practitioner. In that time I had worked with 
many people across the management, trade union and political fields and through 
these relationships had developed a mutual trust and respect that I knew they would 
be frank and candid in their views, while they had sufficient trust in me that I would 
not abuse this discretion, as many of the interviewees had participated in earlier 
research that I had undertaken while doing research for my Master’s in industrial 
relations some fifteen years earlier. As an organisation, my authority was an 
appropriate choice as a benchmark because of its size and political control over the 
period that was examined (1979-2007).  The other authorities were chosen on: size 
(employing more than 2,000 workers); type (metropolitan (7) and shire (2)); 
geography (north (2), midlands (4), south west (1) and south east (2)); and status (are 
they part of the national collective bargaining framework or outside of it).   
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Table 5.3 Employment in Local Authorities’ Areas   
Leader Authorities Authority 1 
Midlands 
Authority 2 
South West 
Authority 3 
North 
Authority 4 
North 
   
 Population 1,028,700 433,100 787,700 483, 800   
Economically 
Active Working 
Population 
456,000 236,000 413,500 227,000   
Total numbers of 
jobs in all sectors 
of employment  in 
area (workplace 
based) 
484,000 231,000 417,600 306,700   
Total numbers of 
jobs in the Public 
Administration, 
Education  and 
Health Sector  
156,000 (32%) 66,600 (29%) 104,800 (25%) 90,100 (25%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Size of Authority 
Workforce 
48,000 24000 27,000 30,000     
 
 
 
 
 
Follower 
Authorities 
Authority 5 
Midlands 
Authority 6  
Midlands 
Authority 7 
Midlands 
Population 312,800 244,100 238,500 
Economically Active 
Working Population 
152,300 121,200 108,900 
Total numbers of jobs in 
all sectors of employment 
in area (workplace 
based) 
141,600 118,500 103,800 
Total numbers of jobs in 
Public Administration, 
Education, and Health 
Sector  
42,100 (30%) 34,200 (29%) 31,800 (31%) 
Size of Authority 
Workforce 
18,000 12,500 14,000 
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Deviant  
Authorities 
Authority 8 
South East 
Authority 9 
South East 
Population   
Economically Active Working 
Population 
494,700 1,411,100 
Total numbers of jobs in all sectors of 
employment in area (workplace 
based) 
207,200  717,000 
Total numbers of jobs in Public 
Administration, Education, and 
Health Sector 
48,300 (23%) 161,200 (11%) 
 
Size of Authority 
 
16,000 
 
20,000 
Source:  NOMIS–official labour market statistics (2009) Office of National Statistics and the Local         
Government Association  
  
The eight local authorities act as a valuable comparator with the benchmark authority 
as they all provide public services to large populations. By comparing them with the 
benchmark authority we can establish if there are any generalisable explanations for 
the continued survival of centralised national collective bargaining in English local 
government. The local authorities fall into three thematic types: Leader, Follower and 
Deviant.  
 
The leader authorities are characterised by operating in high density urban 
conurbations with population sizes of over half a million.  As leader authorities they 
have high political profiles within their regions, exerting influence amongst 
neighbouring authorities through both informal and formal networks that are 
supported through political affiliations and the Local Government Employers. The 
leader authorities’ political and organisational importance at a regional level makes 
them potentially valuable pillars in supporting the national collective bargaining 
framework, and in turn, they are integral to the maintenance and survival of the Local 
Government Employers’ as an employers association. The leader authorities are well 
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resourced, large complex organisations, employing more than 20000 workers, who 
under the Audit Commission’s assessment have attained the highest standards in best 
local government practice. They are the principal employers in their localities and are 
vital to the prosperity of their local communities that rely on the economic 
regeneration they bring from their activities. The leader authorities have large 
dedicated human resources and employment relations functions that are influential 
both internally within in their authorities and externally both at a regional and national 
level within the Local Government Employers. As regional leaders these authorities 
have, and are used by central government, to test new local government initiatives and 
consequently their political influence in shaping local government policy is felt at a 
national level. 
 
Follower authorities in many respects mimic leader authorities on a smaller scale. 
Like leader authorities, they are located in urban conurbations but their population 
size is smaller (normally about 250,000).  Follower authorities generally employ 
fewer than 20,000 workers. They have a presence at a regional level, but they operate 
in the wake of the leader authorities. As local government funding is calculated by 
population size, follower authorities’ resources are limited and this shapes the 
provision of their services. They do not have the large specialist human resources and 
employment relations functions that the leader authorities have, but nevertheless, 
operate scaled down versions that rely more upon the regional and national Local 
Government Employers for guidance and specialist advice in human resources and 
employment relations matters.  
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The Deviant authorities are county councils that cover large geographical areas with 
their populations (over half a million) being spread across both suburban and rural 
areas. They are socially, politically and economically shaped by their region, the 
South East. Like the leader authorities they have large budgets and are responsible for 
the provision of public services that are statutory based; however, as they have gone 
down the route of becoming ‘enablers,’ rather than ‘providers’ of public services, 
these authorities have contracted out many of their services and have become clients 
in which they monitor and regulate but are no longer direct providers of these 
services. The deviant authorities are outside of the local government national 
collective bargaining framework and have embraced a human resources approach that 
marginalises collective representation and in particular trade unions, in favour of 
focusing on the individual and emphasising the team nature of their organisations. 
Like Leader authorities they have well-resourced human resources and employment 
relations functions that act principally at a strategic level within their organisations, 
advising management but leaving the day to day human resources activities to line 
managers. The human resources policies within the deviant authorities are service 
delivery focused, emphasizing customer needs and expectations, and conditions of 
employment within these authorities are shaped by the budgetary infrastructure of the 
individual authorities and what they can afford to pay, rather than the national local 
government collective bargaining framework which set pay and conditions of service 
across authorities. 
 
National representatives from UNISON and UNITE were interviewed. Both are key 
trade unions within local government, attracting different occupational groups. 
UNISON, recruits predominantly from white collar professional and clerical workers 
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with a large female membership. UNITE (formerly the T&GWU) recruits primarily 
from blue collar manual and craft workers whose membership is mainly male. 
UNITE’s national membership comes from both the public and private sectors. 
Within each of the trade unions national, regional and local representatives were 
interviewed.  
 
Research Instrument – The Interviews 
The study relied on one - to - one interviews as the principal means of gathering 
empirical data. The interviews were semi-structured, lasted on average an hour and 
were taped. The first ten minutes dealt with introductions and outlined the research. 
The core of the interviews lasted forty minutes and dealt with thematic questions (see 
Appendix 3) that had been developed from the literature. Finally, a ‘wind down’ 
period gave the interviewees an opportunity to speak ‘off the record’. The semi-
structured format allows for probing of views and opinions where it also gives an 
opportunity for the interviewee to expand on their answers and redefine questions. 
With the interview structure being more fluid it allows the interview to take new 
pathways which add to the richness of the data collected. The interview, as an 
instrument of data collection is seen from, a qualitative perspective, as an ideal way of 
exploring how individuals see and interpret events (Saunders et al., 2000). The 
individuals who took part were quite willing to engage in the interview process. This, 
I think, can be attributed to the fact that the subject matter I was researching, the 
national collective bargaining framework in local government, was not perceived to 
be a contentious area either politically or organisationally. With my study examining 
the period from 1979 until 2007, it was viewed by the interviewees as an historical 
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piece of research which they felt comfortable talking about, as it allowed them to 
reflect on their employment relations experiences in local government.   
 
Investigator as Instrument 
In qualitative research, the investigator serves as a kind of “instrument” in the 
collection and analysis of data (Cassell, 1977; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Reeves 
Sanday, 1979). This metaphor is a useful one because it emphasises that the 
investigator cannot fulfil qualitative research objectives without using a broad range 
of their own experiences (Miles, 1979: 579). In the context of my own research, my 
background in local government employment relations proved invaluable. I had been 
an employment relations practitioner in local government for twenty years, in that 
time I had been actively involved in day-to-day employment relations issues both at 
an operational departmental level, working with local managers and shop stewards 
and corporately with policy makers and politicians looking at council wide 
employment relations issues. My blend of operational and corporate experience, I 
think, has been invaluable in enabling me to compare my experience, ideas and 
actions with those of the individuals I interviewed. However, as McCracken (1988) 
points out: “the investigator’s experience is merely a bundle of possibilities, pointers, 
and suggestions that can be used to plumb the remarks of a respondent. Even quite 
plausible matches require substantiation and confirmation from the remainder of the 
interview analysis. They must be confirmed over and over before they are admissible 
as evidence”. (McCracken, 1988: 20)   With this in mind, I was very aware 
throughout interviewing that I must not allow my personal experiences to overtake 
and consume the views and opinions that were expressed by those I interviewed.  
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Data Analysis 
The sectoral study is a productive process for collecting data, but with this comes the 
question of how should the data be analysed. In contrast to other methods, there is less 
experience and fewer developed strategies for analysing data: “Analysing data is the 
heart of building theory from case studies, but it is the most difficult and least codified 
part of the process” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 532). My study was built upon the twin pillars 
of the theoretical propositions which underpinned my subject matter and the process 
of explanation building, developing an argument why the national collective 
bargaining framework continued to survive in English local government.  
 
The interviews with the permission of the participants were tape recorded. The tapes 
were then   transcribed. The completed transcripts were then evaluated referring to the 
thematic questions that shaped the composition of the interviews. The transcripts were 
read several times which ensured a familiarity with contents of each interview. As 
elite policy actors, the interviewees were expressing not just their personal experience 
but equally they were expressing often a wider collective view that reflected the 
experiences of their workplace colleagues who carried out similar roles to themselves. 
The interviewees had a detailed understanding of local government employment 
relations across the sector and had worked at least at an authority level, while many 
had operated at a regional and national level. With the interviewees having this level 
of understanding and familiarity with my subject matter, I was able to build a 
contextual framework in which I could place what each interviewee, as a 
representative of their organisation, placed on the importance of the national 
collective bargaining framework.  
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The analysis of the data was incremental and organic; it did not form a discrete phrase 
of the research, but rather was a continuous process of reflection and re-evaluation 
that occurred through the ‘writing-up’ phase. Throughout my research I had archived 
material and exchanges between all those that had contributed to my research. 
Throughout my research I was able to discuss my research and my empirical findings 
with my supervisors and the wider academic community, which helped me refine my 
work to a greater degree and detail.                 
 
Problems Encountered    
The single most critical data collection issue experienced was the time taken to 
organise and see people. I did not have any problems in people agreeing to be 
interviewed; the problem was more a question of when they could be seen. As elite 
policy actors, they were predominantly in senior positions within their organisations, 
and therefore their time was at a premium. Fortunately, as a full-time researcher, I had 
the flexibility to fit in with their availability. Sometimes, this led to long waits for 
appointments but what was most encouraging, without exception, was that all the 
participants gave me their time freely once they were being interviewed  There was 
also some time delay when individuals I had originally chosen had moved on. In this 
case, despite this setback, I was still able to meet with individuals who had replaced 
the original people I had contacted.       
 
From an ethical position, I decided that in the interests of both the individuals and the 
organisations they represent I would not reveal their identities and they would remain 
anonymous. All interviewees were asked permission to record the interviews, and no 
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one declined this request. All participants were told that their interviews would be 
anonymous and they would not be identified in the thesis. 
 
Conclusion     
In this chapter I have shown the methodological approach I have adopted in 
examining my area of interest – the national collective bargaining framework of 
English local government. In the course of my fieldwork I have been able to obtain a 
rich seam of material built upon the personal experiences of elite policy actors and 
combined with the literature; this has enabled me to develop my hypothesis and 
ultimately my contribution to knowledge. My work has been heavily influenced by 
institutional theory, in that issues of context, institutional structures, and causality 
linked to the actors’ social meanings have been of central importance (Ackers, 2002). 
The sectoral study, adopting the ‘firm in sector’ methodology approach, has enabled 
me to explore the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and help to illuminate and explore the 
complex and inter-dependent relationship of the institutional actors, and why they do 
(or not) continue to support centralised national collective bargaining in English local 
government.   
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                                      Chapter Six 
                           The Benchmark Authority 
Introduction 
The benchmark authority examined in this chapter is a large metropolitan English 
authority that is characterised as a leader authority. It is located in an urban 
conurbation with strong historical ties to its commercial and industrial activities. As a 
metropolitan authority, it is a product of local government reform of the 1970s and 
1980s, but its political, social, and economic roots can be traced back to its beginnings 
as a large city municipal authority of the late nineteenth century.  In the last thirty 
years, the process of de-industrialisation has affected it, and in turn this has shaped 
and influenced its political, social, and economic outlook. The chapter examines: the 
historical background and political background of the authority; the impact of the 
Conservative governments’ (1979-1997) and the New Labour government’s (1997-
2007) reforms; and the role of the actors – trade unions, management and politicians 
within the benchmark authority. An analysis section using the Three Pillars 
framework is applied to each actor, which illustrates the degree of strength and 
support they show towards the national collective bargaining framework. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion that highlights the key issues that have been illuminated 
in the fieldwork within the benchmark authority and how this contributes to the wider 
discussion.  
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Historical Background  
 
The benchmark authority saw its city come to prominence with the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution. With an abundance of natural resources in its surrounding 
locality it became a large manufacturing and engineering centre, common with many 
cities in the nineteenth century it drew upon the population from the surrounding 
countryside, and this growth in population size necessitated a programme of urban 
development and the creation of civic amenities and services to meet the needs of 
these new city dwellers.  By the middle of the nineteenth century it had become one 
the largest cities outside of London. 
 
The benchmark authority was one of the founders of modern local government 
created in the 1860s and it was born out of the need to satisfy the social, economic, 
and political demands of its citizens and its political development reflects the struggle 
for the large provincial conurbations to be recognised by Westminster.  The city saw 
the rise of a new entrepreneurial manufacturing and merchant class who wished to 
promote their business interests and saw the development of local services and 
amenities through local government as a means of achieving these aims. Equally, by 
the middle of the nineteenth century, industrial workers had begun to get a political 
voice through the extension of voting rights, while their economic voice was being 
heard through the Trade Union Movement. The city played a pivotal role in 
promoting local government, helping it to gain a voice in national politics.  
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Political Leadership 
Since the local government re-organisation in 1974, the benchmark authority has been 
under both Conservative and Labour control, with Labour having the longest period in 
office from 1984 until 2004. From 2004, no party has had overall control and it has 
been governed through a Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition administration. 
The focus within this chapter will be on the Labour administration that governed 
during the 1984-2004 period, which marked the start of the public sector reforms, and 
saw the introduction of the marketisation process. Being in office for so long, the 
Labour administration had the opportunity to develop and establish a cadre of 
experienced Labour councillors who exhibited a high level of organisational 
competency in using the   committees’ structures within the council to their maximum 
political effect:   
“when I was working at the T&G [the interviewee was a full time regional officer at 
the TGWU], I had regular contact with councillors on various sub-committees. When 
we were looking at CCT, I was impressed by their knowledge and willingness to ‘get 
stuck in’ with the nitty gritty. On the sub-committees they didn’t just delegate their 
responsibilities to the management, but rather were actively involved in the decision 
making process, seeing through their political agenda.” (Labour Councillor)   
 
 
The Labour elected members within the benchmark authority have historically come 
from the industries that make up the local economy in the area. Manufacturing and 
engineering have been the backbone of the city. However, with de-industrialisation in 
the 1980s, the city has become a centre for financial and professional services and an 
international conference venue. Labour elected members have reflected this change, 
with many coming from white collar, professional backgrounds, many working in the 
not for profit/ voluntary sector:   
“In the last thirty years there has been a shift in the type of person coming forward 
[to be an elected member]. In the 1960s, the Labour members came, by and large, 
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from blue collar backgrounds, often skilled craft workers from the engineering and 
manufacturing industries that were the major employers in the city. The 1970s saw a 
new type of Labour councillor, drawn from the professions attracted to local politics. 
Many were drawn from the public sector as engineering and manufacturing went into 
decline in the city. By the 1980s a new type of member was emerging, no longer a 
part-time amateur, but a full-time professional, with a wish to actively participate in 
the management of the city.” (Labour Councillor) 
 
The Labour administrations in the benchmark authority have had close affiliations 
with the trade unions both at a formal and informal level. This relationship has been 
fostered over the years and was particularly pivotal during the 1980s and 1990s when 
the Council felt the full force of the Conservative governments’ local government 
reforms. Politically, the Labour administrations had to engage with the trade unions 
and enter into a partnership relationship. This relationship was based on promoting 
and supporting council services, both in how they were provided and how people 
were employed: 
“The Labour administrations over the years have had a constructive and productive 
relationship with the unions. I think with shared political beliefs and values, there has 
been a mutual understanding of where each is coming from, and this has created a 
good working relationship based on respect and trust.” (Labour Councillor)   
 
“Sure, we’ve had our differences and sometimes the bust ups were huge, but with a 
Labour council you always knew that despite these differences something could 
always be done to resolve them.  At the end of the day we’re cut from the same cloth”. 
(Branch Secretary – UNITE)   
 
The Labour leadership had taken an active organisational role in running the council. 
Through the sub-committees they defined the political objectives of how the council 
should be run, and services delivered. Elected members worked at a service level, 
making managers and trade unions come together to make in-house services viable 
and fight off outside competition: 
“There’s no doubt that the political will to defend services from outside competition 
was critical to the success of defending services. Certainly the services that were 
subject to CCT ultimately had the administration [Labour] to thank. There was a 
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determination by the Labour leadership that they would support and defend in-house 
services to the utmost without falling foul of the law.  At sub-committees [elected] 
members pressed the importance of co-operation between us [management] and the 
unions, and there is no doubt that there was a coming together as we all understood 
that we depended on each other for our future survival.” 
 (Retired Director – Waste Management)    
  
 
 
During this period (1984-2004) the Labour leadership in the benchmark authority was 
determined to defend council services from private, outside, commercial competition. 
They believed in the primacy of keeping services public and under their direct control. 
They saw a social obligation to maintain the services within the council, partly on 
ideological grounds in maintaining the Good Employer tradition, employing workers 
directly and adhering to equitable conditions of employment based on rights and 
obligations. However, they also supported in-house services on practical grounds, 
because the Labour leadership believed that direct control gave them greater control 
and in turn accountability with the local electorate: 
“The Labour leadership at the time saw a huge political benefit in supporting in-
house services. Not just on ideological grounds, in keeping public services public, but 
on practical grounds as well. [Elected] Members had direct access to managers and 
could get issues sorted quickly. This proved very useful when dealing with concerns 
raised by the public. Direct access to managers gave members a degree of control 
that could not be expected if services were put out.”  (Labour Councillor)  
 
The Labour administrations in the benchmark authority were staunch supporters of 
the national collective bargaining framework. They have always viewed the national 
collective bargaining framework as an important conduit for promoting good 
employment relations practice, based on recognising the legitimacy of the trade 
unions, and supporting joint regulation as a means of promoting constructive relations 
with their workforce: 
“The City [Council] has always dominated the local economy, and being one of the 
largest employers in the region, has played a key role in the prosperity of the City. 
During the 1980s and 1990s the Labour leadership was resolute in protecting 
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workers jobs and conditions of service. Fortunately for us [trade unions], they 
accepted our role in promoting good industrial relations. Despite the challenges we 
faced, we managed to get through a difficult period with the workforce remaining 
relatively intact which, I think, was a fantastic achievement.”  
(Branch Secretary UNITE)         
 
 
 
 
Philosophically, the Labour administrations viewed their role as being far more than 
agents for providing services to the public. They believed in being a socially 
responsible employer, promoting the equitable treatment of workers through an 
agreed national collective bargaining framework:   
“At the core the Labour leadership believed in their accountability to the electorate 
and the workers who delivered the Council’s services. Their support for national 
collective bargaining was based on a belief that it served the interests of the Council 
as an employer, and the council workers who delivered those services. National 
collective bargaining offered the best prospect for balancing the needs of employer 
and employee interests in a constructive manner that recognized the political, 
economic and social landscape in which local government finds itself.”   
 (Labour Councillor) 
 As a Council, under a Labour leadership, the benchmark authority promoted joint 
regulation adhering to the Whitley Model, giving trade unions an almost 
constitutional role within the city council’s employment relations architecture. The 
authority has historically promoted trade union membership and this is reflected in 
45% of workers belonging to a trade union. The benchmark authority has been at the 
heart of the city’s regeneration over the last twenty five years. Infrastructure 
investments within the residential and commercial property stock, has re-shaped the 
city, while corporate loans and grants to businesses have made the authority a key 
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economic facilitator attracting outside investment and the regeneration of the local 
economy.   
 
The Trade Unions 
Representatives from UNISON and UNITE were interviewed. Both are key trade 
unions within the authority, attracting different occupational groups. UNISON 
recruits predominantly from white collar professional and clerical workers with a 
large female membership. UNITE (formerly the T&GWU) recruits primarily from 
blue collar manual and craft workers whose membership is mainly male. UNITE’s 
national membership comes from both the public and private sectors. Within each of 
the trade unions branch and local representatives were interviewed to gain their 
respective views and perspectives. 
 
UNISON 
UNISON local representatives were very clear that the national collective bargaining 
framework had been integral to securing their membership’s continued interests and 
had been an important bulwark during the implementation of CCT under the 
Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s. Representatives who had been 
affected by outsourcing were acutely aware of the issues affecting the reform of 
public services and the pressures on service providers like the council to be 
competitive. Their experience of being outsourced and subsequently returning to the 
authority reinforced their view that national collective bargaining was integral to the 
promotion of joint regulation in local government and for the mutual benefit of all the 
actors within it. As one steward whose area had been contracted out under CCT put it: 
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“The Blue and Green Books [National Conditions of service for white and blue collar 
workers] were an important life line in ensuring that our conditions of service under 
our new employer were protected as they were used as the main reference point by 
the new contractor”.  (UNISON Departmental Steward) 
 
UNISON representatives, whether at branch or local level, were convinced of the 
importance of national collective bargaining as a means of securing rights and 
conditions of employment for all occupational groups within local government and, in 
particular, promoting better pay for low paid workers. UNISON over the period 2000-
2007 has challenged low pay through national industrial action and this has seen local 
government employers offer improved pay to low paid workers, giving pay rises of a 
thousand pounds rather than restricting it to a percentage increase. As a senior shop 
steward noted:  
“National collective bargaining has ensured that as a trade union we have been able 
to campaign and mobilise our membership to fight low pay and promote equality 
issues that are the bed rock of our organisational philosophy as the principal trade 
union in the public sector”. (Departmental Chair, UNISON) 
UNISON representatives were in no doubt that had there not been a national 
collective framework, CCT and Best Value would have had a more profound impact 
on conditions of service. Trade unions would not have had a national cornerstone for 
protecting a floor of rights that had been established and negotiated over a period of 
over fifty years under the national framework. They thought that, although the 
national collective bargaining framework had been challenged by public sector 
reforms over the last twenty five years it has survived because it has provided a 
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convenient mantle for the authority and the unions to conduct their business and 
promote their respective aims:   
“If you look at national conditions of service historically, they have been a foundation 
for developing employment rights that are based on sound social policy in a sense of 
equity towards how local authorities employ people.  It’s far more than an economic 
rationale. It goes to the core of local government in promoting pluralism that is at the 
heart of the political system. The benefit about working for local government is the 
national terms and conditions of service which set a minimum standard that local 
authorities can build on. The national conditions of service promote social equity 
within the local government workplace that acknowledges the pivotal role that 
workers play in delivering services to the public. Although the Good Employer 
tradition has been challenged in recent years I still think that through the promotion 
of national collective bargaining joint regulation is still seen as the heart of the 
employment relations framework in local government.  I know that for the majority of 
authorities if I go to work for them my conditions of service will be similar and this I 
think creates a security for workers, while for local authorities as employers they 
have the benefit of recruiting and retaining workers that match their organisational 
needs.” 
 (Area Organiser, UNISON)   
 
Within the authority, at both branch and local level, UNISON felt it was incumbent on 
them to defend the national collective bargaining framework because it was the best 
vehicle for promoting their organisational objectives. They had successfully 
campaigned for fairer pay and conditions for the poorest workers in local government 
and had focused particularly on female workers. Through mobilising their 
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membership nationally, they were able to achieve improved pay and conditions. This 
they saw as fundamental to their future success, as it represented their membership’s 
primary interests, while being a valuable conduit to recruiting new members which in 
turn strengthened UNISON’s position as the principal public sector trade union. 
Representatives recognised that UNISON’s role was as much about defending public 
services and having a political campaigning agenda that was focused not just on their 
membership’s interests, but those of the wider public. 
 
 
UNITE (T&GWU) 
UNITE, formerly T&GWU, have historically represented manual and craft workers 
within the authority. Its membership took the full brunt of the commercialisation 
process introduced into local government in the 1980s and have continued to 
challenge private encroachment. Its strategy within the authority has been to develop 
close working relationships with managers and local politicians. This mitigates the 
impact of commercialisation by offering greater productivity to the authority in return 
for its members having greater job security and pay.   
 
Both representatives at branch and shop floor level thought that national conditions of 
service offered a comprehensive foundation of employment benefits to local 
government workers. This was a valuable baseline from which local conditions of 
service could be added to which were applicable to particular services. Illustrative of 
this was the way in which individual services, like refuse collection, street cleansing 
and vehicle maintenance, had used national basic rates of pay and conditions of 
service as a starting point for local negotiations in which bonuses and rates of 
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overtime were developed over a period of time to reflect the local management’s and 
trade union’s objectives. The UNITE representatives saw the national and local 
negotiating machinery as being complementary to each other:   
“National conditions of service have been vital in giving the trade unions the 
necessary political power base from which to organize their membership and giving 
them legitimacy with employers. In the last ten years we can see the importance of the 
national framework when looking at the process of Single Status and the 
harmonization of conditions of employment between manual and non-manual 
workers. From 1997 through to it implementation in 2007 the T&G actively worked 
with local authorities across the country. The national expertise developed ensured 
that our membership’s interests were protected from the changes to remuneration 
structures. The T&G together with UNISON and GMB have campaigned on a 
national platform to improve the pay of low pay workers in local government and 
together have secured and improved national basic conditions of pay for the lowest 
paid workers.”  (UNITE Branch Secretary) 
 
It was acknowledged that manual services, like refuse collection, had felt the full 
onslaught of commercialisation with the threat of outsourcing to private contractors. 
Initially, under Conservative control, 1982 saw the introduction of competitive 
tendering followed by compulsory competitive tendering in 1988. The local stewards 
had to develop their negotiating skills very rapidly as management sought to improve 
productivity and slash costs in order to make in-house services competitive with 
outside bidders. One local steward recounted that when CCT was initially introduced, 
local stewards received little help from the full time trade union officers at the 
regional office. It was suggested that full time officers were not overly concerned if 
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contracts were lost to outsider bidders, as they thought that they would be able to 
negotiate terms with commercial contractors on the basis of being recognised by 
many of them. Despite the local stewards being ‘amateurs’, as one steward described 
himself and his colleagues, they managed to protect conditions of employment and 
pay through accepting structural changes in the composition of the workforce. Local 
stewards’ experience of CCT was that it was as much in the interests of in-house 
management to secure a working deal that made in-house bids viable as it was for the 
unions. Despite the difficulties that arose out of CCT and the challenges that local 
management and trade unions faced there was:    
“a mutual respect for each other’s abilities.  Sometimes they were trying to shaft us, 
now and again they got away with it, and now and again they didn’t.  There was a lot 
of give and take going on.” (Depot shop steward)   
 
 Equally, local politicians of all political persuasions had some self interest in keeping 
front line services within the Council; because they could use their political influence 
on in-house management to get things done more quickly to satisfy the local 
electorate and help them win votes. As one elected member put it: “Everyone has 
their bins emptied and soon complain if the service is not up to scratch!” (Labour 
Councillor) 
This mutual partnership between trade unions, management, and politicians created an 
environment that produced acceptable outcomes to all the parties. The trade unions 
consolidated and protected the pay and conditions of workers; the management 
achieved the productivity and cost savings that were necessary to make in-house 
services viable to outside competition; and the politicians ensured control and 
influence over services that were politically sensitive to electoral opinion.  
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The UNITE representatives recognised that the national collective bargaining 
framework in local government was integral to the general prosperity of local 
government workers as it protected basic pay and conditions. Despite the relative 
success of local bargaining for high profile services, like refuse collection, it was 
recognised that other local government services did not necessarily have the political 
muscle of refuse collectors and had to rely on the national framework to secure 
reasonable terms and conditions of employment:  
“In refuse collection we’ve always supported national and local strike action for low 
pay workers. We’ve been able to fight our own battles with the council because we’ve 
always had a certain amount of political clout. However, not everybody has this 
ability and so you have to show solidarity with those workers that don’t have the 
muscle we have.” 
 (Depot Shop Steward)    
 
 On a pessimistic note, local stewards made the observation that with the introduction 
of Single Status and the harmonisation of terms and conditions of employment 
between white and blue collar workers, the loss of the traditional bonus system, would 
potentially be problematic. Bonuses negotiated at a local level gave local management 
and trade unions discretionary powers to adjust wages, and with their loss it would be 
harder for local negotiations to broker deals that were outside the national framework. 
The loss of this discretion would be problematic in the view of local stewards for the 
future conduct of local employment relations within the Council:  
“The loss of bonus payments has put the mockers on local bargaining which has 
caused grief to both us and management as we don’t have as many cards to play. 
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Manual work within the council has always relied on bonuses and it has always been 
how stewards and management have hammered out deals that make the services 
work. Let’s be frank, if we take refuse collection, it’s literally a shitty job that men do 
for the high wages. Take away the bonus payments and you are looking at a major 
loss of income that has left refuse collectors out of pocket. With Single Status there’s 
no realistic means of them getting this money back.”  (Depot Shop Steward)   
Thus branch representatives thought that the national framework’s importance had 
been highlighted and reinforced with the introduction under the Blair administration 
of the Single Status process in 1997. The Transport and General Workers Union (as it 
was then) along with General Municipal Boilermakers formed a consortium to 
negotiate the process of Single Status at a national level. The national negotiations 
around the process of Single Status with local authority employers brought into 
context the continued relevance of a national bargaining framework.  
 
The UNITE representatives showed a particular visceral appreciation of the impact of 
commercialisation in the local government workplace. Their predominantly manual 
members who were employed in the traditional blue collar services had been targeted 
for outsourcing on the basis that manual workers in local government received better 
pay and conditions than many of their private sector counterparts. The representatives 
believed that the Conservative administration under Margaret Thatcher had sought to 
commercialise local government to help their business supporters: ‘gain access to the 
public purse’ (Branch Secretary). Low skilled labour services like roads maintenance 
and waste management were vulnerable to outsourcing. There was potential for 
outside contractors to make money by taking advantage of the wider labour market, 
while high skills services, like planning and public health, were not attractive because 
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the workforce came from a specialised labour market that was more difficult to 
recruit:  
“Let’s be blunt, manual services were targeted for outsourcing because the labour is 
low skilled and the services are profitable making them attractive to outside 
competitors. Contracting out has always been about lowering costs.”   
(UNITE Branch Secretary) 
 
Union representatives felt that to a degree management had used the spectre of CCT 
as a bogey man - the threat being that services could be outsourced. However, the 
T&GWU knew that in reality that outsourcing was as much a threat to in-house 
management. Politically, as a Labour controlled authority, there was a will to defend 
in-house services, which led T&GWU to take a robust but pragmatic stance that it 
was still in the interests of management and politicians to broker deals that satisfied 
all parties. Best Value took off the overt pressure of services being outsourced but, 
nevertheless, the UNITE representatives felt that the drive for quality and the 
continued practice of benchmarking with outside competition still hung over service 
areas. It was perceived that there had been a cooling of the working relationship with 
management. Yet it was still a constructive working relationship and was still 
influenced by the personal working relationships of shop stewards, managers, and 
politicians:  
“Best Value has not been the overt threat to services like CCT was. However, the 
pressure to reduce costs and in particular labour costs by mimicking outside 
commercial practices has challenged and tested our relationship with management.” 
(UNITE Branch Secretary).  
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In this way, the UNITE representatives still believed that the national collective 
bargaining machinery was an important conduit for promoting joint regulation and 
satisfying the aspirations of all the parties that were engaged with employment 
relations in local government. However, it was perceived that the freedom to negotiate 
with employers was becoming curtailed with the increased use of the law which was 
seeing both trade unions and employers looking more and more over their shoulders 
to see if there was any legal liability for their actions and therefore potentially limiting 
the freedom to bargain.     
 
The UNITE representatives within the authority focused on what they saw as the 
‘bread and butter’ issues of pay and conditions and job security. As a union, their 
membership had taken the brunt of the commercialisation process and the pressure on 
local government to outsource services. Branch and local representatives had first-
hand experience of defending in-house services and had become consummate 
negotiators when CCT was introduced. They had to adopt a pragmatic approach to 
representing their members’ interests which was referred by some shop stewards as, 
making a ‘Deal with the Devil’, with management and elected members. They had 
agreed to new working practices that involved labour flexibility both in the 
deployment and use of workers and a reduction in worker numbers; in return for 
protecting wages, and in particular bonuses, while giving departing workers enhanced 
severance packages.  The representatives saw this as a ‘necessary evil’ in maintaining 
the viability of in-house services. Pragmatically, they were supporters of the national 
collective bargaining framework and acknowledged its historical legacy in creating 
the employment relations landscape that they operated in. However, they also 
recognised that they had to be prepared for local government becoming more 
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localised in its bargaining arrangements and their experience in dealing with CCT had 
given them confidence in meeting this potential challenge if it ever arose:  
“We have had to adapt to the changing nature of delivering local government 
services and it has very much been as a matter of necessity that we have had to 
engage in local bargaining to protect our members’ interests. CCT saw affected 
services go down the road of local bargaining as management tried to raise 
productivity and make the labour force more financially competitive with outside 
contractors. Local bargaining became the norm within these services and the T&G 
was very much at the vanguard of actively engaging with local management to broker 
deals that were to the benefit of workers, while recognizing that workers future 
prospects were very much dependent on making the workforce adaptable to the 
working practices that were seen as necessary for the survival of in house services. 
There is no doubt that our experience under CCT has made local stewards adaptable 
and to an extent self-reliant which has proved useful in promoting and furthering the 
interests of our members.” 
 (UNITE Branch Secretary) 
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Table 6.1 TRADE UNIONS – Rationale and Strength of Support for 
National Collective Bargaining in the Benchmark Authority 
 
 UNISON UNITE 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
 
 
STRONG - it places a great 
deal of emphasis on the national 
conditions of service, and the 
procedural rules that govern 
how they are implemented and 
defined by the national 
framework. It is concerned with 
the formal protocols that shape 
employment relations in local 
government.    
MEDIUM – it recognizes that 
without national collective 
bargaining the very existence of 
collective bargaining in local 
government could be 
potentially undermined. Like 
UNISON it sees the national 
framework as an important 
conduit in maintaining a 
constructive and workable 
employment relations 
environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
STRONG – as a trade union it 
sees its role go beyond 
representing its membership. It 
is as much a campaigning 
organization for the promotion 
and defence of public services. 
It sees the national collective 
bargaining framework as 
integral to promoting the Good 
Employer tradition. National 
collective bargaining is a 
platform that promotes and 
maintains social obligation that 
is linked to expectations and 
appropriateness. Its legitimacy 
is based on a moral acceptance 
by UNISON that National 
Collective Bargaining 
framework offers the best 
means of representing workers 
and the public interest.     
MEDIUM – UNITE is 
concerned with the 
practicalities of bargaining 
which is based on expediency. 
What matters is that collective 
bargaining exists and the 
question of whether it is at a 
national or local level is a 
secondary issue. More of its 
members have been affected by 
the marketisation process of 
outsourcing and they see the 
national framework as an 
important bulwark in protecting 
and maintaining conditions of 
employment. . It does not have 
a high ideological belief in the 
national framework but sees it 
from a practical perspective as 
being the best vehicle currently 
for promoting its members 
interests. 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
STRONG – it sees national 
collective bargaining woven 
into the fabric of local 
government employment 
relations and it perceives that 
there is no other way of 
achieving its objectives. There 
is a belief that there is a natural 
logic to the national framework 
which should not be meddled 
with 
MEDIUM – UNITE, although 
it prefers National Collective 
Bargaining, recognizes that 
there are alternatives, and as a 
union have engaged in local 
bargaining in service areas that 
have been subject to 
outsourcing. 
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General Management 
There was a consensus of opinion amongst operational managers that local 
government relied on a national collective bargaining framework. With such a large 
workforce, there was an economic advantage to having national terms and conditions 
of employment to avoid undue economic competition between local government 
employers. However, managers did think that for larger authorities there might not be 
the flexibility to negotiate terms and conditions that reflect individual authority needs. 
Equally, with local authorities’ still being highly unionised and with negotiations 
being conducted centrally; it does potentially mean that when national disputes do 
arise, as in 2003 and 2006, individual authorities were at the mercy of national 
settlements. Even so, it was thought that the national framework acted as a safety 
blanket for the council to hide behind:   
“There’s no doubt that national conditions of service have been an important safety 
blanket for employers in local government. I think that the national framework has 
been a useful way for authorities to use it as a ‘get out clause’ with employees by 
saying that conditions must be abided by even though an authority might wish to do 
something different. National conditions of service act as a useful canvass for local 
authorities to define the way they engage with employees.”(Depot Manager)  
 
Operational Managers thought that sometimes the national framework was used by 
the council as ‘a get out clause’ with employees. They could hide behind national 
agreements which were beyond the control of the authority. It was also acknowledged 
by operational managers that CCT had had an effect upon national conditions of 
service, since the authority used the threat of outsourcing to dilute national conditions 
of service to give them a competitive edge. Operational managers who were affected 
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by CCT viewed the relationship between themselves and trade unions as cordial, with 
both sides realising that they depended on each other for the services remaining in-
house.  It was observed that with the renewal of contracts under CCT, the trade unions 
and workers had become more resistant to reducing labour, but still ultimately went 
along with the proposed changes in order to win contracts. By the time CCT was 
replaced with Best Value in 1997 as one manager recounted about his service it:  
“was not just lean it was anorexic as it had been cut to the bare bones.”  
(Head of Operations – Refuse Collection).  
 
Best Value became like a kite mark, which benchmarked internal services against 
outside services that the public could compare. However, with services having to 
satisfy so many different interest groups, Best Value has been interpreted in many 
different ways, so much so that as one manager put it, it’s like:  
“playing football in the fog while the goal posts are being moved. “ 
(Assistant Director). 
There was a view among operational managers that management, trade unions, and 
politicians had worked constructively under CCT when there was a real threat that the 
services could have been outsourced. To an extent this waned after the introduction of 
Best Value.  They thought that there had been an erosion of national conditions of 
service over the last twenty years, but they did not think that there had been a 
concerted effort to erode conditions. Rather it had been opportunistic on the part of 
the employer not to promote certain conditions of service, like overtime and holiday 
rates of pay. This erosion was ostensibly limited to services that had been subject to 
private sector competition. Operational managers voiced a concern that with the 
introduction of Single Status and the loss of bonuses, management would lose an 
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element of its managerial discretion and this would have a detrimental effect on local 
management, as one manager put it:  
“with the introduction of Single Status I see problems around the loss of the bonus 
structure for manual employees which management have used to shape its service 
provisions”. 
(Head of Waste Management).  
They thought that it was in the interest of central government to maintain a national 
pay framework in order to keep a tight rein on local government finances and exert 
some influence over local authorities through the national employers’ association 
(Local Government Employers). However, with local authorities having to finance 
more capital projects through third party investors, there might be a move on the part 
of local authorities to challenge this financial strait jacket. Therefore, if authorities 
were to get more financial autonomy, this might lead to changes in the way 
workforces are managed. However, they thought that there was still a convenience for 
local authorities to remain as they are.  This was summed up by one manager:  
“As I said earlier, I think it might be convenient for local authorities to hide behind a 
national framework. However, there is no doubt that with central government having 
tight reins on local government finances there still will be an incentive from central 
government’s point of view to maintain a national framework for pay. However, with 
local authorities having to finance more capital projects through third party investors 
there might be a move on the part of local authorities to challenge this financial strait 
jacket and therefore if authorities were to get more financial autonomy this might 
lead to changes in the way we manage  our workforce.  But at the present time I think 
it is convenient for local authorities to remain as they are”.  
(Depot Manager- Waste Management) 
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Managers within white collar professional occupations, like Environmental Health 
and Trading Standards, which had not been subject to CCT and the process of 
commercialisation, had quite different experiences. The local government reforms had 
to a great degree passed them by. Managers within these areas thought this was due to 
their statutory enforcement role that set legal standards for carrying out such work.  
Both Environmental Health and Trading Standards operate in a highly regulated 
labour market that limits the number of practitioners through their respective 
professional bodies.  There is a high demand among local authorities for this labour, 
which predominantly only operates within the public sector.  Managers within these 
areas were still keen to adhere to national conditions of service. They saw the national 
collective bargaining framework as the best way of avoiding direct competition with 
other authorities and to minimise the potential for pay to leap frog as local authorities 
competed for qualified practitioners. A Senior Environmental Health Officer put it 
very succinctly:  
“My biggest issue is hanging on to trainee EHOs once they’ve qualified. The demand 
for qualified EHOs is high and our neighbouring authorities are always keen to 
poach them, fortunately through our training and career development programme we 
have been successful in retaining them. If authorities could break away from national 
pay scales I could see a free for all which I think would be a disaster.”   
(Head of Environmental Health).  
Best Value had affected them from the point of view of being assessed and evaluated 
for their quality of work, but again there was no real threat to outsourcing. Local 
authorities could not realistically outsource these functions because of their statutory 
functions and status. 
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Hence, within the authority, management exhibited different attitudes to national 
collective bargaining according to the nature of their role. A number of operational 
managers in commercially active environments that were subject to outside 
competition, liked the idea of the authority breaking away from the national collective 
bargaining framework. They perceived this would increase the discretion of the 
authority as an employer. However, they equally recognised that the national 
framework had served local government well and that it had sufficient flexibility to 
give individual authorities the autonomy to carry out their local agenda under the 
umbrella of a national framework. Managers in professional services liked the 
national framework because they thought that it protected their interests, in what was 
perceived to be a highly competitive internal labour market where local authorities 
were in competition with each other for highly skilled workers. They appreciated a 
national framework that took pay and conditions out of the local workplace. From 
their different perspectives there was a realisation that the national collective 
bargaining framework had served the authority and local government in general well 
and its contribution to local government employment relations was still relevant 
today.     
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Table 6.2 GENERAL MANAGEMENT – Rationale and Strength of 
Support for National Collective Bargaining in the Benchmark 
Authority 
 
 
 
COMMERCIAL 
OPERATIONAL  
MANAGEMENT   
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
OPERATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
MEDIUM – There is a 
consensus of opinion amongst 
commercial operational 
managers that local government 
relies on a national collective 
bargaining framework, because 
with 400 local authorities and 
such a large workforce there is 
an economic advantage to 
having national terms and 
conditions of employment so 
that it does not provoke undue 
economic competition between 
local government employers. 
However, managers do think 
that for larger authorities there 
might not be the flexibility to 
negotiate terms and conditions 
that reflect individual authority 
needs.  
 
 
STRONG - Managers in 
professional services like the 
national framework because 
they think that it protects their 
interests in what is perceived to 
be a highly competitive internal 
labour market where local 
authorities are in competition 
with each other for highly 
skilled workers that work 
exclusively within the local 
government labour market. 
They appreciate a national 
framework that takes pay and 
conditions out of the local 
workplace. The national 
collective bargaining framework 
has served professional services 
functions well 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
MEDIUM – commercial 
operational managers have no 
strong social obligation to 
maintain and promote national 
collective bargaining. They are 
driven by what suits them here 
and now and this is primarily 
shaped by commercial 
considerations that are driven by 
outside competition. 
MEDIUM – professional 
services managers appreciate 
the national framework but do 
not necessarily have a high 
ideological belief in it. It is seen 
as an important means of 
securing conditions of 
employment to create a stable 
environment for recruiting and 
retaining highly skilled 
occupational groups. 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
WEAK – commercial 
operational managers given the 
opportunity may like to break 
away from the national 
framework. They see local 
bargaining offering them 
enhanced employment 
flexibility within their 
workplaces.   
MEDIUM – professional 
services managers think that 
national collective bargaining is 
a logical choice for their 
managerial circumstances but 
recognize that this does not 
necessarily suit other 
managerial groups within the 
authority.   
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Human Resource Management (HRM) 
Human Resource practitioners within the authority acknowledged the historical 
importance of national collective bargaining in local government in defining the 
process of joint regulation. However, a number of them questioned its continued 
importance in today’s employment relations climate.  However, it was still thought 
that there was a convenience for local authorities to remain in a national framework. 
Local government forms a distinct and unique labour market with specialised 
occupational groups. The HR function has overseen the implementation of collective 
agreements, but has not until recently actively shaped them. HR within the authority 
has typically been involved in policing the implementation of employment relations 
policies; but the drafting of them has been done at a national level by the Employers’ 
Association, with the corporate expertise concentrated at this level. Individual local 
authorities have never developed this type of expertise on the grounds of cost and to a 
degree as a consequence of custom and practice. A manager summed it up: 
“The role that we play in HR has certainly changed in the thirty years that I have 
worked here. When I started it was an administrative function which looked at what 
we used to call pay and rations – making sure employees were paid and that their 
welfare was taken care of. We implemented and oversaw employment policies that 
were drawn up nationally and were handed down through the council’s personnel 
circulars which were directed from corporate HR. Things began to change with the 
introduction of  CCT where HR officers at a departmental and service level began to 
get more involved in the operational decision making process. During this time 
corporate HR went into the background as departments took greater control of, and 
responsibility for their own HR matters. However, by ’97 and the abolition of CCT 
and the introduction of Best Value corporate HR came out of the shadows as service 
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indicators were promoted by central government and local authorities began to 
grapple with the thorny matter of single Status.”   
(HR Manager – Housing and Constituencies)     
 
The last twenty five years of local government reforms have reshaped HR practice 
and its role in the collective bargaining process. CCT saw HR practitioners becoming 
involved in local negotiations within service areas; a departure from its role as an 
administrative function. However, in service areas not subject to CCT the HR 
function remained primarily an administrative one. HR practitioners in areas subject 
to CCT developed more of a managerial role in formulating strategies that were 
complementary to local management’s business aims and   objectives, while closely 
working with local trade unions. The skills set that these HR practitioners developed 
were more closely aligned to practitioners in the private sector, who had to showcase 
the HR function by illustrating to management how they add value to the 
organisation. The CCT process and its impact on the local authority and the wider 
local government community are captured in this manager’s views:  
“I actually think it strengthened the relationship between the employer and the trade 
unions, one thing we all like is a common enemy and we hated the Conservative 
government, Maggie Thatcher generally, even a lot of Conservatives weren’t that 
keen on her.  There was a challenge there, one of the things about local authorities, 
not all and particularly down south; they tend to be quite protective of their service 
delivery that is that they believe they can provide services well ….  I still notice 
amongst the elected members even now a preference for directly provided services 
because it’s part of their relationship with the organisation, with the community.  So I 
think what happened through CCT was that because they had a common cause and 
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that cause was to keep services in- house by and large that it welded the units 
together. Now I happen to think lots of iffy things came out of CCT in many ways it 
protected and shielded bad practice.  It increased the rates for men and reduced the 
rates for women, it did all sorts of things that since have come back to bite us.  In 
terms of collective bargaining it was a very strengthening experience we actually 
achieved outcomes which I don’t see so much of these days.”  
(Director of Employment Relations) 
 
HR practitioners within the authority thought that the effects of CCT on local 
government could be differentiated between those services that were subject to it and 
those that were not. Service areas that were subject to CCT did move away from 
elements of the national bargaining framework. However, this really only entailed 
marginal changes to peripheral conditions of service like overtime and holiday 
entitlements. In many ways it was thought that it was more of a psychological break 
that was borne out of management’s perception to be more responsive to local service 
needs and to be seen to be responding to outside competition. HR practitioners 
generally viewed the introduction of Best Value as an extension and development of 
the CCT regulatory process, but rather than emphasising costs, it focused on quality 
and local accountability to the community. Best Value affected all service areas and 
saw the implementation of benchmarking with outside organisations. However, in 
practice the service areas that were subject to outside commercial competition and 
who had been previously affected by CCT were once again under the greatest 
scrutiny. A number of practitioners questioned the future of collective bargaining in 
local government with a sanguine assessment of the effect of legal intervention and 
how it has curtailed collective bargaining:  
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“I think that it has driven a huge wedge in the ability of the two sides involved in 
collective bargaining to reach collective conclusions.”  
(Principal Human Resource Adviser).  
 
It was argued that since 2000 there had been a growth in litigation brought through 
individual employees, challenging agreements that had been made between trade 
unions and employers.  The challenges were noticeable in equal pay claims where 
both employers and unions had been affected by legal action against themselves. It 
was considered that as an employer you were looking over your shoulder to see how 
an agreement might be challenged in the courts and this went for unions as well. 
There was a pessimistic assessment that the ability to enter into free collective 
bargaining was potentially under serious threat if legal intervention was not curtailed.    
 
Practitioners were in no doubt that the national collective bargaining framework had 
benefited the HR function in legitimising its role of ensuring that national conditions 
of service were being adhered to. However, the function had also developed as a 
consequence of commercialisation and the need for it to respond to the business needs 
of service areas. Today its position had been strengthened by the growth of 
employment legislation and management’s need to comply with it:  
“There’s no doubt particularly in the last ten years that with the growth of 
employment legislation we as practitioners have had to focus on employment law both 
in its interpretation and its application in the workplace. If we look at the growth of 
individual claims brought against the council the role of HR practitioners is fast 
becoming a legally centred one.”    (Director of Employment Relations)  
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There was a view amongst practitioners in the authority that it, like many other local 
authorities, sometimes liked to use the rhetoric that the national framework was a 
strait jacket on their activities. In reality the authority appreciated the security of 
hiding behind the mantle of a national framework, particularly when from an 
organisational and managerial perspective it had sufficient freedom and discretion 
within the national framework to do as it wished.  
 
Overall, HR practitioners had mixed views about the national collective bargaining 
framework. Their views were shaped by their professional experience in the HR roles 
they performed. Amongst those that worked with services that were subject to outside 
competitive pressures, there was a view that it might be potentially beneficial for the 
authority to be outside the national framework in order to improve competitiveness. 
This reflected a management view within services that were under severe financial 
pressure to reduce costs and reflect the outside practices of commercial organisations 
in lowering labour costs to be in line with this outside competition. These HR 
practitioners had moved from an administrative/policy role to an active management 
role. However, they still recognised that the reality was that as an organisation the 
authority was tied into a national framework that was shaped by political and social 
considerations that transcended their operational wishes.  
 
Corporate HR practitioners saw the national framework as integral to the local 
government employment relations architecture, because it represented a means by 
which the social, economic and political considerations could be addressed. On a 
practical level, it took pay and conditions out of the local workplace and allowed local 
authorities to focus on service delivery needs. Equally, there was recognition amongst 
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corporate practitioners that organisationally it was still in the authority’s interest to 
remain in the national framework. If the authority decided to leave the national 
framework it would have to create a negotiating infrastructure which would have to 
be resourced; and such expenditure could not be justified particularly when the 
bargaining outcomes from the national framework were still acceptable and the 
council had sufficient autonomy to shape its own human resources agenda. 
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Table 6.3 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT – Rationale and 
Strength of Support for National Collective Bargaining in the 
Benchmark Authority  
 
 OPERATIONAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
CORPORATE 
PRACTITIONERS 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
MEDIUM – operational 
practitioners see that there might 
be a potential benefit for the 
authority withdrawing from the 
national framework in order to 
improve its organizational 
competitiveness; however, they 
recognize that the authority is 
tied into a national framework 
that is shaped by political and 
social considerations that 
transcended their operational 
wishes. 
STRONG - corporate 
practitioners see the national 
framework as integral to the 
local government employment 
relations architecture. The 
nationally agreed conditions of 
employment are an important 
foundation stone on which local 
authorities can tailor their own 
individual needs while 
maintaining a national 
framework that takes account of 
the social, economic, and 
political dynamics that shape 
and define local government.  
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
 
MEDIUM - operational 
practitioners have an 
appreciation for the historical 
legacy of national collective 
bargaining but they do not feel 
any social obligation to continue 
to support it. They feel more 
pressure to focus on service 
delivery objectives that are 
linked to financial and local 
considerations 
MEDIUM – corporate 
practitioners appreciate the 
national framework but they do 
not necessarily have a high 
ideological belief in it. They see 
the national framework serving a 
practical purpose in promoting 
the individual and collective 
interests of the authorities that 
are in it.    
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEAK –operational 
practitioners have an 
appreciation for the alternatives 
to national collective bargaining 
and are prepared for a move 
away from national to local 
bargaining if the authority thinks 
that it is in its interest to do so. 
They acknowledge that there is 
still a logic for the authority to 
remain within the national 
framework. 
MEDIUM – corporate 
practitioners are aware of the 
alternatives to national collective 
bargaining but still argue that 
there is a strong organizational 
logic for the authority to 
continue to support national 
collective bargaining despite 
other authorities going over to 
local bargaining and 
withdrawing from the national 
framework.     
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Elected Members 
Labour elected members believed that the national collective bargaining framework 
was the cornerstone of joint regulation in local government and had served all the 
stakeholders well over the years. Their experience had made them form the opinion 
that national conditions of service had been a valuable template for conducting local 
negotiations. The national framework was a skeleton which local authorities along 
with unions could, build on. A senior Labour councillor voiced more practical reasons 
for adhering to a national framework: “I think there are a number of reasons for that 
one [why the national framework continues to exist] I think there is a fear within local 
authorities that if collective bargaining was to come down to a local level you would 
have such a variety of terms and conditions all over the country that there’s a fear 
that it could be a recipe for disaster and constant industrial action”.  
A number of Labour elected members had been involved in the CCT process and had 
first-hand experience of the local authority defending in-house services as the council 
at the time was under labour control:  
“I did not agree with the concept of compulsory competitive tendering it was a very 
blunt instrument to try and bring about improvements in the services in local 
government, in fact what we ended up doing quite often is getting the cheapest 
provider of services but at what cost to the services themselves, as a Labour 
controlled authority we vigorously defended in-house services because we felt that the 
quality of service could only be guaranteed through direct control.”  
(Labour Councillor – Former member of the Waste Management Sub-Committee) 
  
These politicians acknowledged that the pressures of commercialisation during this 
period did test the resolve of the authority to adhere and maintain the national 
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framework but despite marginal changes the national conditions were adhered to. In-
house services that were subject to CCT were defended by the ruling Labour group 
through a partnership approach that had developed with local management, and trade 
unions. This had secured conditions of employment that were satisfactory to workers, 
but also achieved the organisational and business objectives that local management 
were looking for in order to make the services competitive with outside contractors. 
Labour elected members felt that CCT had changed the mind set of managers and 
workers and this was followed through with the introduction of Best Value. 
Politically, there was an understanding that everyone in the authority knew that 
services were being evaluated against outside competition.  Therefore, management, 
trade unions, workers, and local politicians knew that their positions were dependent 
on satisfying the local community. A senior Labour member within the Council made 
the observation that despite the reforms in local government over the last twenty five 
years, the bulwark of a national framework had remained central to employment 
relations practice in local government. He thought that the framework was sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate organisational change, yet offered a continuity that was 
important to all parties that were involved in local government employment relations. 
He viewed this continuity as pivotal in delivering efficient local services.  
 
The Liberal Democrat elected members saw a practical utility in adhering to national 
conditions of service. It was thought by them to be a reliable framework for 
maintaining and developing HR practices that recognised the public service ethos of 
local government and, importantly, promoted equitable conditions of employment for 
the workforce. They felt a national framework was helpful to rely on particularly with 
the rise in legal challenges to employment practices.  There was a perceived benefit to 
 
 165 
adhering to a national structure that had the support of the majority of local authorities 
in the country. Although aware of the historical legacy of the national framework, 
they were not sentimental about it. They simply perceived it as the most appropriate 
vehicle for ensuring good employment relations within the authority:  
“Why tamper with a proven framework that takes account of the political dynamics 
that underpin the culture of local government.”  
(Liberal Democrat councillor – Human Resources Committee Member)  
 
The Conservative elected members as a group had an ambiguous position towards the 
national framework. A number saw it as an antiquated relic that had little relevance to 
modern local government:  
“it’s an outdated framework that restricts local authorities to be more autonomous in 
their ability to determine pay and conditions.” (Conservative councillor).  
Some also believed that it took away local discretion. However, there were equally a 
number who, like the Liberal Democrats, held no great affinity to its historical legacy 
yet recognised its usefulness as a convenient mechanism for: “getting the job done.” 
(Conservative Councillor).   
 
In conclusion, Labour local politicians supported the national collective bargaining 
framework on philosophical and ideological grounds. They saw it as a means of 
promoting equitable conditions of employment that served employers and workers 
well. They appreciated its historical importance and felt that its strength lay in that all 
the stakeholders knew the ‘rules of engagement’ and the framework reflected the 
political dynamic in which local government operated. The local Liberal Democrat 
politicians were supporters of the national framework, but this support was based on 
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practical rather than philosophical or ideological grounds. They saw the national 
framework serving a practical utility in promoting and securing the interests of the 
authority and the wider local government community. They thought that the national 
framework had facilitated good employment relations in local government and this 
had allowed the authorities to focus on their service delivery needs. They 
acknowledged that, in recent years, there had been some local authorities that had 
threatened to leave the national framework but in most cases these threats were no 
more than political rhetoric. The local Liberal Democrat politicians did not preclude 
leaving the national framework if the interests of the council could be furthered. They 
did not see this happening in the near future. However, the Conservative Councillors 
had a more ambiguous position. They felt frustrated with the national framework and 
in particular with some of the pay settlements that had been reached. They thought 
that the national framework had imposed arrangements that did take away the 
authority‘s organisational discretion. Yet they equally recognised that it was a proven 
mechanism that had served local authorities well. Like the Liberal Democrats, the 
Conservatives acknowledged the national framework encompassed and managed the 
political dynamic that local government operates in and so most did accept that it was 
expedient to maintain it.    
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Table 6.4 ELECTED MEMBERS – Rationale and Strength of 
Support for National Collective Bargaining in the Benchmark 
Authority 
 
 CONSERVATIVE LABOUR LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
MEDIUM – there is an 
acceptance that national 
collective bargaining has 
played its role in shaping 
local government 
employment relations but 
that it is beginning to be 
questioned as there is a call 
for greater local flexibility.     
STRONG – they see 
national collective 
bargaining as the 
foundation stone for 
setting conditions of 
service within local 
government. It  is an 
important vehicle for 
promoting an equitable 
employment 
environment within 
local government 
MEDIUM – they see 
national collective 
bargaining as an 
effective and efficient 
framework that has 
proven itself over 
time. It has served the 
interests of both 
employers and 
workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
 
MEDIUM– there is no 
particular ideological or 
social obligation to promote 
national collective 
bargaining. Conservative 
elected members are 
concerned with service 
delivery outcomes that are 
consumer driven. They 
think that national collective 
bargaining is too focused on 
employee interests rather 
than focusing on the 
affordability and 
competitiveness of pay 
settlements. 
STRONG – the 
Labour elected 
members have an 
appreciation for the 
historical legacy of 
national collective 
bargaining and its 
importance in 
promoting and 
maintaining its social 
obligation to workers 
in the authority. They 
think that local 
bargaining would be 
counterproductive to 
the interests of the 
authority as it focused 
too much on economic 
and financial outcomes. 
MEDIUM – while 
recognizing its 
historical legacy they 
see the promotion and 
maintenance of 
national collective 
bargaining in non-
ideological terms. It 
serves the interests of 
the authority and they 
see no reason to go 
down the local 
bargaining route at the 
moment. 
 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
WEAK – they are prepared 
to jettison national 
collective bargaining if they 
feel that it will be 
advantageous to the 
authority; however, they 
still see a practical utility in 
remaining within the 
national framework, 
because it is expedient both 
politically and 
economically. 
STRONG – they view 
national collective 
bargaining as being at 
the very heart of the 
local government 
employment relations 
architecture. 
MEDIUM - they 
support national 
collective bargaining 
and are satisfied with 
its outcomes. If 
circumstances 
changed they would 
consider local 
bargaining if it was 
thought to be in the 
interest of the 
authority. 
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Analysis 
All the stakeholders whether trade union representatives, managers, or elected 
members recognised, to some degree, the historical importance of the national 
collective bargaining framework. In the minds of most interviewees it still has a role 
to play in promoting joint regulation in local government and is still relevant today. 
The stakeholders share a view that it is expedient for them to maintain and promote 
the national framework of collective bargaining as it has served their respective 
positions well over the years. The trade union representatives see it as vital for 
maintaining their status with employers and central government. The trade unions 
perceive that they have greater bargaining leverage at a national level and their ability 
to mobilise their membership in national disputes gives them enhanced political 
power, which they perceive could be translated into securing better pay and terms and 
conditions of employment for their members.   
 
As a local authority employer, the benchmark authority still see the benefits of 
adhering to a national framework because, in key occupational group like Public 
Health, Trading Standards, and Planning, it takes  pay and conditions out of 
competition with other local authorities. It can be argued that local government has its 
own labour market with occupational groups that predominantly work exclusively 
within it. The national framework allows local authorities to control labour costs by 
fixing salary rates for occupational groups and avoid leap frogging between local 
authorities. Managers within the authority think that setting general pay and 
conditions nationally takes the pressure off them in conducting local negotiations with 
their trade union counterparts, in that it sets a floor of pay and conditions that can be 
built upon and enhanced on locally if necessary.   The elected members see a practical 
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utility in remaining within a nation framework, as it quite simply has served local 
politicians well over the years because there is a continuity of process and they think, 
‘why change something if it works’.   
 
The internal stakeholders acknowledged to different degrees that CCT had influenced 
the conduct of employment relations in the authority. From the trade unions’ 
perspective it had affected areas that were subject to CCT, and it did dilute conditions 
of employment in response to outside competition. Management had taken advantage 
of the threat to contract out services and had introduced productivity and labour cost 
savings. However, the trade unions had also secured enhanced rates of pay for 
workers on the back of the agreements they made with management to increase 
productivity and reduce labour through enhanced severance packages for departing 
workers. Trade unions, management, and elected members who took part in the 
implementation of CCT, all said that the process had created a productive working 
partnership between all  the parties as it was to their mutual interest and survival that 
they all pulled together to make the in- house   services viable with outside 
competition. 
 
Applying Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions: the regulative, normative and cognitive 
pillars, we can see how they can contribute to our understanding and analysis of 
collective bargaining in local government. The regulative pillar looks at regulatory 
processes like rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning of activities within the 
national collective bargaining framework of local government. The national collective 
bargaining framework is an historical by product of the Whitley Model, which is 
characterised by strong centralised and complex bargaining structures at a national 
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level; a diversity of bargaining groups and bargaining agents along sectoral and 
occupational lines and; the promotion of joint regulation between employers and trade 
unions.  
 
The internal stakeholders within the benchmark authority show different degrees of 
support for national collective bargaining as a regulative process, from strong 
(UNISON; professional services operational management; HR corporate practitioners; 
and Labour elected members) to medium (UNITE; commercial operations 
management; HR operational practitioners; and weak (Conservative elected members) 
where the stakeholders while recognising its historical legacy are open to moving to a 
local framework if circumstances are right and in their interest . The stakeholders still 
wish to conform to the national collective bargaining framework which defines the 
basis of order through its regulative rules. Their legitimacy is based on preserving an 
order that promotes behaving instrumentally and expediently out of self-interest and 
recognising the pluralistic nature of local government as primarily a political 
institution that is shaped by politics which gives its legitimacy to operate on behalf of 
the public for the public.  
 
The normative pillar shows how the national collective bargaining framework has 
influenced the internal stakeholders within the benchmark authority. The trade unions, 
managers, and politicians recognise their social obligations which are shaped by 
values and norms. However, we see that this social obligation ranges from strong 
through to weak. UNISON sees its role going beyond representing its membership 
and is as much a campaigning organisation for defending public services. It sees the 
national collective bargaining framework as integral to promoting the Model 
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Employer tradition. National collective bargaining is seen as a platform that promotes 
and maintains social obligation that is linked to expectations and appropriateness. Its 
legitimacy is based on a moral acceptance by UNISON that national collective 
bargaining offers the best means of representing workers and the public interest. 
Equally, the Labour elected members strongly support the national framework. Like 
UNISON, they see it as an important vehicle for promoting social obligation and they 
perceive local bargaining as counterproductive to the authority as it focuses too much 
on financial outcomes.  
 
Professional services managers, HR corporate practitioners, and Liberal Democrat 
elected members take the middle of the road position. While recognising the historical 
legacy of national collective bargaining they see the promotion and maintenance of 
national collective bargaining in non-ideological terms. It serves their respective 
interests, but they do not exclude considering and going down the path of local 
bargaining if they feel it would be to their benefit. UNITE, commercial operational 
managers, HR operational practitioners and the Conservative elected members show a 
medium normative tie. UNITE is concerned with the practicalities of bargaining 
which is based on expediency. What matters to them is that collective bargaining 
exists and the question of whether it is at a national or local level is a secondary issue. 
More of UNITE’s members have been affected by the marketisation process of 
outsourcing and therefore they see the national framework as an important bulwark in 
protecting and maintaining conditions of employment. UNITE does not have a 
particularly high ideological belief in the national framework, but it sees it from a 
practical perspective as the best current vehicle for promoting its members interests. 
Commercial operational managers have no strong social obligation to maintain and 
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support national collective bargaining. They are driven by what is expedient here and 
now and this is primarily shaped by commercial considerations that are driven by 
outside competition. The Conservative elected members show no ideological or social 
obligation to promote national collective bargaining, and are primarily concerned with 
service delivery outcomes that are consumer led. They think national collective 
bargaining is too focused on employee interests, rather than looking at the 
affordability and competitiveness of pay settlements which they believe have not 
reflected the local situation of the authority.  
 
Cognitively, both UNISON and Labour view national collective bargaining as being 
woven into the fabric of local government employment relations and they think that 
the national framework should not be meddled with. While UNITE, HR corporate 
practitioners, professional services operational managers and Liberal Democrat 
elected members are aware of the alternatives to national collective bargaining, they 
still see a strong organisational logic for the authority to continue to support the 
national framework. Finally, commercial operational managers, HR operational 
practitioners and Conservative elected members have a weak cognitive tie to national 
collective bargaining.  
 
UNITE, although preferring national collective bargaining recognises that there are 
alternatives. As a union they have acknowledged the pressure to engage in local 
bargaining in services areas that are subject to commercial external competition. 
Commercial operational managers, given the opportunity, may like to break away 
from the national framework. They see local bargaining potentially offering them 
enhanced employment flexibility within their workplaces. The Conservative elected 
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members are prepared to jettison national collective bargaining if they feel that it 
would be advantageous to the authority. However, they still see a practical utility in 
remaining within the national framework, because it is expedient both politically and 
economically. The cognitive pillar illustrates how the stakeholders to varying degrees 
take for granted and have a shared understanding of what national collective 
bargaining in local government means to them. Even where stakeholders are critical 
of the national framework, they still recognise a logic to remaining in it that in effect 
supports the status quo.               
         
One of the most interesting findings was that sections of both management and trade 
unions questioned the future of national collective bargaining. They had both been 
subject to legal action in challenging collective agreements that had been made, 
particularly in equal pay claims and they both feared that their ability to enter into free 
collective bargaining had been curtailed by the law. Both recognised that the law was 
becoming a new threat and more influential in shaping employment relations practice, 
as their discretionary powers were being reduced. From the HR function’s perspective 
the growth of legal intervention in employment relations had reaffirmed its 
organisational status.      
 
The differences were characterised by the perception of the stakeholders, and how 
they saw national collective bargaining affecting their areas of interest within the 
organisation. Operational practitioners, whether within the trade unions or 
management, thought that there might be an increased benefit to the organisation if 
the authority developed more of its pay and conditions of service, rather than relying 
on the national framework. Greater independence from the national framework might 
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allow the authority to develop business strategies that reflected better the economic 
and social circumstances of the authority. However, there was also recognition that 
breaking away from the national framework would create major organisational change 
that could have a de-stabilising impact on the authority and its workforce, which in 
turn could have a negative impact on delivering services to the local community.  All 
those who saw the potential in developing a local framework viewed it as a 
hypothetical possibility rather than an actuality or something that might work in the 
future. In this respect, there was a strong institutional lock-in to the national 
framework. However, in the spirit of soft path dependency theory, there were tell-tale 
signs of which stakeholders might precipitate a break-up of the system, should an 
external shock arrive.  
 
On the other side, the forces for stability were clear. Corporate practitioners within the 
trade unions and management were sceptical about the potential to develop a fully 
localised pay and conditions framework within the authority. Organisationally it 
would require a huge investment to put in the necessary infrastructure and the 
advantages to the authority it was perceived would be minimal. It was thought that the 
present national framework gave local authorities sufficient discretion to develop 
local pay and conditions of employment without necessitating a break from the 
national framework. Corporate trade union representatives and managers also thought 
that within the authority there were not the existing employees who had the necessary 
skills set to implement a local framework. To create a corporate group to oversee a 
local framework could not be warranted at present either financially or 
organisationally and therefore for the foreseeable future the national framework 
would remain the choice of the authority. 
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Conclusion           
The stakeholders within the benchmark authority - trade unions’ representatives, 
managers, and elected members – have explained the stakeholder pillars supporting 
the national collective bargaining framework. They were bound to different degrees 
by the historical legacy of the national framework which they saw as the foundation 
stone of joint regulation in local government. New institutional theory has allowed us 
to identify the processes that shape and define collective bargaining and offers 
explanations why national, centralised bargaining continues to survive in English 
local government.   The nature of local government being a political instrument of the 
local electorate has seen it develop an employment relations architecture which is 
pluralistic by nature. Local government management has historically been based on 
local political accountability, rather than the marketplace and links between 
management practice and public policy were considered legitimately compatible with 
good organisational governance. All of these factors have been inextricably linked to 
the national framework and therefore it has a powerful hold on the stakeholders 
within local government. This supports the contention that it is mutually expedient for 
the stakeholders within local government employment relations to continue to support 
and promote national centralised collective bargaining in local government, so long as 
it provides the forum for providing bargaining outcomes that are acceptable to the 
parties involved.   
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                                       Chapter Seven 
                        Leader and Follower Authorities 
Introduction 
The six authorities examined in this chapter are a representative cross section of large 
metropolitan English authorities. These authorities fall into two thematic types: 
Leaders and Followers. The six metropolitan local authorities are located in urban 
conurbations with strong historical ties to their commercial and industrial activities. 
The metropolitan authorities are products of local government reform of the 1970s 
and 1980s, but their political, social, and economic roots can be traced back to the 
large city municipal authorities of the late nineteenth century.  In the last thirty years, 
to different degrees, the process of de-industrialisation has affected these urban 
conurbations and in turn has shaped and influenced their political, social, and 
economic outlook.  
 
The chapter, as in the previous chapter, will follow a similar format defining the types 
of local authorities examined and in turn looks at: their historical backgrounds and 
political leadership; the impact of Conservative governments’ (1979-1997) and New 
Labour government’s (1997-2007) reforms; and the role of the actors – trade unions, 
management and politicians within the leader and follower authorities. An analysis 
section using the Three Pillars framework is applied to each actor, which illustrates 
the degree of strength and support they show towards the national collective 
bargaining framework. The chapter concludes with a discussion that highlights the 
key issues that have been illuminated in the fieldwork within the leader and follower 
authorities and how this contributes to the wider discussion.  
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Leader and Follower Authorities 
It is useful at the outset to define the two thematic authority types. The leader 
authorities are characterised by operating in high density urban conurbations with 
population sizes of over half a million.  As leader authorities they have high political 
profiles within their regions, exerting influence amongst neighbouring authorities 
through both informal and formal networks that are supported through political 
affiliations and the Local Government Employers. The leader authorities’ political 
and organisational importance at a regional level makes them valuable pillars in 
supporting the national collective bargaining framework, and in turn, they are integral 
to the maintenance and survival of the Local Government Employers as an 
employers’ association.  
 
The leader authorities are well resourced, large complex organisations, employing 
more than 20000 workers, who under the Audit Commission’s assessment have 
attained the highest standards in best local government practice. They are the 
principal employers in their localities and are vital to the prosperity of their local 
communities that rely on the economic regeneration they bring from their activities. 
The leader authorities have large dedicated human resources and employment 
relations functions that are influential both internally within their authorities and 
externally both at a regional and national level within the Local Government 
Employers. The leader authorities continue to support and promote joint regulation 
through the Whitley Model which recognises the continuing importance of collective 
representation through trade unions and their role in the local government 
employment relations system. As regional leaders these authorities have, and are used 
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by central government to test new local government initiatives and consequently their 
political influence in shaping local government policy is felt at a national level. 
 
Follower authorities in many respects mimic leader authorities on a smaller scale. 
Like leader authorities, they are located in urban conurbations but their population 
size is smaller (normally about 250,000).  Follower authorities generally employ no 
more than 15,000 workers. They have a presence at a regional level, but they operate 
in the wake of the leader authorities. As local government funding is calculated by 
population size, follower authorities’ resources are limited and this shapes the 
provision of their services. They do not have the large specialist human resources and 
employment relations functions that the leader authorities have, but nevertheless, 
operate scaled down versions that rely more upon the regional and national Local 
Government Employers for guidance and specialist advice in human resources and 
employment relations matters.  
 
The Leader Authorities  
 
Historical Background  
 
The three leader authorities: two, three and four, saw their cities come to prominence 
in the mid nineteenth century as they became important industrial and commercial 
centres for their localities. The cities benefited from an improved transportation 
infrastructure that saw their populations expand rapidly in the first half of the 
nineteenth century; two of the cities (three and four) had been relatively small 
provincial towns at the beginning of the century but by the mid eighteen fifties had 
become large metropolitan conurbations that had developed a sophisticated economic 
infrastructure to support the textile industry which depended on a large and varied 
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workforce. The third city, as an important port, had been a national and international 
commercial hub since the seventeenth century. In common with many cities in the 
nineteenth century they drew upon the population from the surrounding countryside, 
and this growth in population size necessitated a programme of urban development 
and the creation of civic amenities and services to meet the needs of these new city 
dwellers.   
 
The three leader local authorities, as with the benchmark authority, developed as large 
provincial cities. They became economic powerhouses, fueling regional and national 
economic growth. This prosperity was led by a new entrepreneurial manufacturing 
and merchant class who wished to promote their business interests through 
developing local politics, which would address local issues connected with rapid 
conurbation expansion and the demands placed on infrastructures and amenities to 
support the rising population. While at a national level, the cities wished to promote 
their political interests at Westminster. The creation of municipal authorities within 
these cities was seen as a means of demonstrating to Westminster a political maturity, 
that these cities could take responsibility for their own political and social affairs 
(Wilson and Game, 2002).    
 
Each of the councils has been seen as a beacon organisation within their region – 
promoting high standards of governance and best practice in both service delivery and 
employment practice. The three authorities are the closest in terms of size to the 
benchmark authority and all are situated in large urban conurbations.  Table 7.1 gives 
some useful local labour market data on each of the areas that are covered by the four 
councils.               
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Table 7.1 Employment in Leader Authorities Areas 
 
 
 
Benchmark 
Authority 
One 
Authority 
Two 
Authority 
Three 
Authority Four    
 Population 1,028,700 433,100 787,700 483, 800   
Economically 
Active Working 
Population 
456,000 236,000 413,500 227,000   
Total numbers 
of jobs in all 
sectors of 
employment  in 
area 
(workplace 
based) 
484,000 231,000 417,600 306,700   
Total numbers 
of jobs in the 
Public 
Administration, 
Education  and 
Health Sector  
156,000 
(32%) 
66,600 
(29%) 
104,800 
(25%) 
90,100 (25%)   
Source:  NOMIS – official labour market statistics (2009) Office of National 
Statistics 
 
Political Leadership  
Since the local government re-organisation in 1974 the three Leader councils have 
been predominantly Labour controlled: authority two, 1974 – 2005; authority three, 
1974 – 2004; and authority four, 1974- 2007. Within the authorities the ruling Labour 
administrations have been able to develop and mature their political hierarchy within 
the committees’ structures that are responsible for decision making both externally, in 
relation to the services they provide to the public, and internally, in the way in which 
they deploy their workforces: 
“When any administration is in office for a long time they develop a competency for 
the workings of the council which allows them to navigate the corporate structure that 
is responsible for turning their political objectives into attainable and deliverable 
outcomes. Like any organisation, personal working relationships are developed over 
time, managers and politicians learn what is achievable, but this relationship takes 
time to develop. There is no doubt that where an administration has been in office for 
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some time this is a distinct advantage to them because they have learnt to apply the 
levers of power.” 
 (Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)    
 
Like the benchmark authority, within each of the Labour administrations the elected 
members have tended to be individuals that have come from the industries that make 
up the local economies in their areas. Manufacturing in most cases had been the 
backbone of these cities and with de-industrialisation in the 1980s a new cadre of 
politicians entered local government politics.   These elected members were a new 
generation of civic politicians who as a consequence of redundancy and a lack of 
alternative employment opportunities applied themselves full time to local politics: 
“After the Miners’ Strike in ‘85 we saw many ex-miners becoming active and 
standing in local elections throughout the City.  They had the time and enthusiasm to 
throw themselves into the civic affairs of the City and those that were elected wanted 
to actively participate in the governance of the Council. Over time they developed 
competencies in all areas of public administration and employment relations was no 
exception.”  (Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three)  
 
 
A common feature in each of the Labour administrations was that they had close 
affiliations with the trade unions both at a formal and informal level. A number of 
elected members had held positions within the trade unions and used this relationship 
actively in resolving employment relations issues that arose: 
“A number of the Labour [elected] members have been reps and this has given them a 
natural rapport with our reps which has proved useful.”  
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three)  
 
The Labour leadership within each of these councils has taken an active 
organisational role in the running of their councils. Through their sub-committee 
structures they have not only been involved in defining the political objectives of how 
their councils should be run, but they have also worked at an operational/service level 
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in ensuring that managers and trade unions come together in partnership to make in-
house services viable propositions against outside private sector competition: 
“The Council’s leadership had the political will to make in-house services 
competitive with private sector providers. They took an active interest in the 
management of services through the sub committees where they brought together 
trade unions and management to deal with employment issues and hammer out 
solutions that were workable to all.”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)  
 
Underpinning the Labour leadership in these councils is the primacy of keeping 
services public and under their direct control. They see a social obligation to maintain 
the public ethos within their councils, not only on ideological grounds in maintaining 
the Good Employer tradition but also on practical grounds because they believe that 
direct control gives greater accountability which in turn allows for a better 
relationship with the electorate: 
“As a council we have defended in-house services both on ideological and practical 
grounds. Elected members have seen a practical utility in supporting in-house 
services because it gives them control of services that are politically sensitive and 
gives them greater discretion in dealing with issues that are raised by the electorate.” 
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)       
 
 
The Labour administrations in these councils have all been staunch supporters of the 
national collective bargaining framework. They are one of the largest employers in 
their areas (authority two– 20,000 employees; authority three– 25,000 employees; and 
authority four - 30,000 employees) and their economic influence is significant. The 
Labour administrations within these councils view the national collective bargaining 
framework as an important conduit for promoting good employment relations practice 
that is based on recognising the legitimacy of the trade unions and supporting joint 
regulation as a means of promoting constructive relations with their workforces: 
“Economically, the ruling Labour administration knows that its influence in the local 
economy is huge. The Council is one of the biggest employers in the region and it has 
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a pivotal social responsibility which this administration takes very seriously. We like 
to think that the Good Employer tradition is alive and well in [name of city].”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)    
 
Philosophically, these Labour administrations see the councils they run as being far 
more than agents for providing services to the public, but socially responsible 
institutions that set high standards in moral probity in how they treat their workers. 
They hold the belief that equitable treatment of workers creates a working 
environment that is beneficial to service outcomes:    
“The administration here is focused on political and social accountability. Good 
service and good employment practice go hand in hand and as a council we take the 
position that this can best be achieved by supporting and maintaining national 
conditions of service which understand the political, economic and legal dynamics in 
which local government operate in.”  
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three) 
However, despite this mandate, these Labour controlled councils have had to tailor 
their service and employment provisions to the legislative constraints of central 
government. As organisations they have promoted joint regulation of employment 
through adhering to the Whitley Model in giving trade unions an almost constitutional 
role within the employment relations architecture of their organisations, and within all 
three authorities they have trade union membership levels above forty per cent 
(authority two, 43%; authority three, 45%; and authority four, 47%). Each of the 
councils has played a significant role in their city’s regeneration in the last twenty 
years, with infrastructure investments and corporate loans and grants to businesses 
that have made them key economic facilitators within their areas.  
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The Economic Context – De-industrialisation and Regeneration 
These leader authorities were caught up in the de-industrialisation process that 
occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s.  The areas in which the leader authorities are 
based saw many of their industries like heavy engineering and textiles decline rapidly 
in the 1980s and the rise in unemployment meant that these local authorities were the 
last bastions for supporting large scale employment for both manual and white collar 
workers within their respective areas. Today, public sector employment makes up 
over twenty five per cent of employment in these metropolitan areas (see Table 7.1).  
 
With high levels of local unemployment (see table 7.2) these councils became the 
hubs of large scale employment in their areas. However, under the Conservative 
government, local authorities were subjected to reforms that challenged directly their 
autonomy in how they engaged labour and how they provided their services to the 
public. The 1980s saw these local authorities resist these central government reforms 
on local government both on economic and social grounds. Particularly on social 
grounds, promoting and sustaining employment was seen as vital in helping to 
support the local economy, as the private sector within these areas were struggling to 
survive as the UK saw a fundamental restructuring of its traditional manufacturing. 
The prosperity of these areas had generally depended on a few large private 
employers who in turn had supported an infrastructure of smaller businesses that had 
relied on them. However, the recession of the 1980s had undermined this economic 
network and in many cases the industries either went into terminal decline and did not 
come back after the recession or were radically re-structured and became much 
smaller employers. It is against this economic and social backdrop that the leader 
local authorities became vital conduits for the regeneration of their localities. 
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Table 7.2 Unemployment Rates (percentage of working age residents) 
for Benchmark Authority and other Leader Authorities 1979-2007 
Areas 
 
 
 
Benchmark 
Authority One 
Authority Two Authority 
Three 
Authority Four 
 Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
1979 6.4 7.0 6.8 7.2 
1980 7.9 8.0 8.4 8.0 
1981 15.8 13.5 13.8 14.2 
1982 21.9 12.0 12.3  12.5 
1983 22.6 11.7 12.5 11.9 
1984 21.4 12.5 13.0 12.3 
1985 21.6 11.0 11.7 12.6 
1986 22.2 12.0 12.6 12.8 
1987 20.5 10.5 11.0 11.5 
1988 17.4 11.8 12.5 13.2 
1989 13.1 10.3 11.2 11.0 
1990 11.4 10.0 10.3 10.5 
1991 14.0 11.0 11.5 12.6 
1992 17.5 10.5 12.6 13.3 
1993 18.9 10.7 11.8 14.0 
1994 17.3 9.4 9.7 12.8 
1995 15.0 8.2 8.0 11.6 
1996 14.1 7.2 7.8 10.5 
1997 10.9 4.7 6.7 8.3 
1998 9.5 3.9 7.8 7.0 
1999 9.0 3.8 5.2 6.2 
2000 5.9 3.0 3.2 5.1 
2001 5.2 2.6 2.9 4.7 
2002 5.0 2.4 2.9 4.6 
2003 5.1 2.3 2.6 4.6 
2004 4.8 2.0 2.4 3.6 
2005 5.2 2.0 2.5 3.5 
2006 5.6 2.3 2.8 3.7 
2007 5.3 1.9 2.4 3.4 
Source: Office of National Statistics/ Leader local authorities’ statistical data 
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From the mid-eighties the leader authorities in partnership with regional development 
agencies began a process of urban regeneration that focused on inward investment. 
Two of the councils, three and four, began to invest in their cities infrastructures, 
paying particular attention to industrial areas, where the predominant large employers 
had been in textile manufacturing and associated engineering. Their support for urban 
renewal projects saw the cities attract new capital investment which led to new 
employment sectors developing in the early 1990s. In authority three’s city, banking 
and the financial services became an important new employment sector, attracting 
businesses to relocate from London. Authority four’s city - saw professional services 
and the media sectors become the new areas of employment growth. Authority two’s 
city did not see to the same degree of industrial decline and unemployment, partly 
because its primary manufacturing areas were in aeronautics and the defence industry 
which remained buoyant in the recession of the nineteen eighties. However, with the 
move to containerisation in the ports industry there was a restructuring within the 
city’s port that saw a decline which particularly affected manual employment. 
Authority two, like the other two authorities, was able in conjunction with the 
regional development agency to support urban renewal projects that revitalised areas 
of the city and saw new employers from the professional services sector move in, as 
the city became a key location for the regional economy that saw new technology 
industries come into the area.  
 
All three authorities have been important catalysts for the economic regeneration 
within their localities. Employment has been of central importance to all three 
authorities, both in protecting employment within their own organisations and 
promoting and protecting employment within their areas. Economic regeneration has 
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seen white-collar skilled employment improve but low skilled manual work decline. 
All the leader authorities despite the effects of local government marketisation have 
continued to employ relatively large numbers of manual employees, which they have 
seen as being integral to their social responsibility as large employers to maintain and 
support a cross section of employment within their cities. It are these political, social 
and economic underpinnings that have shaped how these leader authorities have 
adapted and dealt with the local government reforms of the last thirty years. 
  
 
Local Government Reform under the Conservatives – 1979-1997 
 
The Conservative local government reforms introduced in the nineteen eighties were 
resisted by all three leader authorities. The initial introduction of competitive 
tendering in 1984 was not taken up by any of the three authorities. It was resisted on 
political, social and economic grounds. Politically, it was viewed as interfering with 
the self determination of local authorities and creating a marketplace for public 
services that was not in the interests of the public. Socially, as large employers in their 
areas, the councils did not want to outsource their workforces to private commercial 
contractors who they perceived would drive down pay in order to maximise profits, 
which would particularly  affect manual workers  whose services were primarily 
affected by this initial liberalisation of service delivery provisions: 
“The Labour administration here [authority three] saw contracting out as a dilution 
of their power to determine and control how services were delivered. From the outset, 
they resisted competitive tendering as they saw it as being incompatible with their 
social responsibility to look after both their employees and the public. The focus on 
driving down costs, it was thought by elected members, would have dire consequences 
on employees whose areas were subject to competitive tendering.”    
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three)   
  
Economically, the revenues potentially lost by contracting out services to private 
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sector providers would also have a detrimental effect on organisational finances as 
profits created in commercial activities were lost to private contractors rather than 
being re-invested with the organisations: 
“As an authority [authority four] at the time competitive tendering was introduced, 
the administration [Labour] was unhappy at the prospect of losing revenue generating 
services to outside contractors.  It was seen as giving public money to private 
enterprise rather than re-investing profits back into the City [council].”    
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)  
  
These factors underpinned the leader authorities’ resistance to opening up their 
organisations to private commercial contractors’ right up until 1990 and the 
introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, as a consequence of the Local 
Government Act 1988, which compelled local authorities to put their manual services 
out to tender.    
  
Compulsory Competitive Tendering  
The beginning of the 1990s saw Compulsory Competitive Tendering introduced 
across all local authorities in England. The leader authorities were now legally 
compelled to put their manual services out to tender, and this saw them having to 
resist competitive tendering within the statutory framework that had been imposed on 
them. Contracts for manual services were put out to tender in the 1990/1991 financial 
year which saw all three Labour administrations mount campaigns to defend in-house 
manual services.  The Labour administrations resisted the pressure to contract out 
their services by ensuring that in-house services had the necessary resources 
financially and administratively to draw up comprehensive bids that maximised their 
competitiveness and highlighted their quality as offering value for money to the rate 
payers. The three leader authorities during the period 1991-1997, managed to keep the 
majority of their blue collar services in-house: 
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“The ruling Labour Administration was determined to fight off the onslaught of CCT 
which they saw as a challenge to their mandate to oversee the interests of the citizens 
of [City’s name] who had elected them. However, they still had to legally comply with 
the legislation which required the contract bids to be transparent and open to outside 
bidders. The in-house bids I think were successful because they focused on quality 
rather than cost. Having said that, the in-house bids had to be price sensitive, as the 
tendering specifications were weighted heavily on cost.”    
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)   
 
However, there was a cost to keeping in-house services, as the authorities had to look 
to improving labour efficiencies both in terms of cost and numbers while adopting 
new working practices that promoted greater labour flexibility.  In all three 
authorities, the Labour administrations, through their service committee structures, 
supported local in-house services by promoting a constructive working dialogue with 
the trade unions and management:  
 
“At the time, CCT was a shock to the system, it was a regime that most of us were 
against, yet what came out of it was a resolve to survive it. We got through it and the 
relationship between unions and management was stronger for it”  
(Chair of Human Resources Committee, Authority Two).   
 
 The aim of the dialogue was to develop a strategy for making the in-house service 
bids as competitive as possible so as minimise the risk of the services being 
contracted out. Despite the administrations’ support for in-house services they could 
not overtly reject outside bids as all bids had to comply with defined service 
specifications that focused on: cost, service delivery provisions, and quality: 
“The authority knew that as a large, high profile, Labour controlled council, its 
actions were open to detailed scrutiny, and therefore the administration was at pains 
to ensure that it did not fall foul of the law.  The LGA [Local Government Act 1988] 
was comprehensive in its scope of what authorities could and could not do, in relation 
to CCT, and both politically and managerially, the authority sought legal advice to 
ensure that its actions complied with the legislation.”  
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three)  
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The defence of in-house services focused on service delivery provisions and quality, 
nevertheless, the authorities still had to address the criterion of cost. Within each of 
the authorities there were tripartite negotiations between elected members, local 
management, and trade unions. These negotiations were generally conducted at 
service sub-committee level and the agreements that came out of these negotiations 
brokered a position that allowed     new working practices that led to job losses and 
greater mechanization. While in return the reduced workforces received enhanced pay 
through revised bonus schemes that were based on productivity and attendance:    
“In roads maintenance and waste management the Council lost in seven years [1990-
1997] forty per cent of employees in these two service areas. These losses were 
accompanied with a growth in demand for these services. Waste generation grew 
while recycling legislation placed a greater burden on the Council to dispose of waste 
more efficiently, which impacted on waste management, in how they faced up to these 
demands with a smaller workforce. Highways had similar challenges, a reduced 
workforce and an ever increasing demand to keep the roads maintained with a 
smaller budget. Fortunately, there was a real team spirit which saw everybody, both 
management and employees, come together. I’m glad to say that this team spirit is 
still here today and I think that this is partly down to the challenges faced during 
CCT.”  
(Chief Officer Human Resources, Authority Three)  
 
  The agreement between elected members, trade unions and management looked to 
the national conditions of service for local government manual workers as the 
baseline from which to explore changes to conditions of service for employees who 
were affected by CCT. There was a view that where possible the national conditions 
should apply. Politically, the Labour administrations saw the national collective 
bargaining framework as an integral part of the local government employment 
relations architecture that had proved a useful organizational anchor: 
“Elected members were tied to national conditions of service as they viewed them as 
the gold standard. These conditions had been secured over a fifty year period and 
they had proven themselves at a social, economic and political level.”  
  (Head of Human Resources, Local Authority Four) 
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Some conditions were diluted but were judged to be acceptable by the trade unions 
that recognized that these were necessary in order to safeguard jobs. These changes 
occurred primarily around overtime payments, sick pay and holiday entitlements: 
“Sick pay was changed and the option of selling holiday entitlement was introduced, 
where employees could be paid rather than take their entitlement, although this was 
restricted to no more than fifty per cent of their entitlement. Also bank holidays were 
paid rather than taken to fit in with service delivery requirements.” 
 (Head of Human Resources, Authority Four) 
 
 
Local Government Reform under New Labour – 1997-2007 
The defence of in-house manual services from CCT had cemented a good working 
relationship between management and trade unions within these leader authorities. 
This relationship continued to be maintained with the introduction of Best Value 
under the new Labour government in 1997. The difference with Best Value was that 
the regime was extended to all services within local authorities which compelled them 
to benchmark and market test services. The discretionary powers that were extended 
to local authorities in how they tested services created sufficient latitude for 
interpretation which allowed the leader authorities to treat the process as an 
administrative exercise. This was succinctly illustrated:  
“When we were looking to implement a new payroll system we knew what we wanted 
and started with the answer and worked our way backwards. The process took us 
eighteen months to achieve but we adhered to the formalities of Best Value making 
sure that we complied with the evaluation process. The end result is we got what we 
wanted even if it took us eighteen months to get there!”  
 (Head of Human Resources, Authority Four) 
 
The efficiencies made during the eighteen years of the Conservative governments 
were carried through to the Labour government of 1997. The introduction of Best 
Value saw local authorities benchmarking their services to commercial best practice 
outside of their organisations. Those services that had been subject to CCT found the 
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transition to Best Value relatively unproblematic as they had endured the full force of 
commercialisation in the 1980s and 1990s and benchmarking was a better alternative 
than being compulsory tendered: 
“There is no doubt that Best Value was a welcomed alternative to CCT, at least it 
[Best Value] was focused on outcomes that emphasised  quality and best practice 
rather than being obsessed with bottom line costs, which was the main  emphasis of 
CCT. I think that all services that had been subject to CCT found Best Value a more 
accommodating regime to work with and the discretion it gave local authorities was a 
return to greater local autonomy in organisational decision making.” 
 (Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three)  
  
However, white collar services found the process of benchmarking a new experience 
which was seen as being a bureaucratic exercise: 
“Best Value was all about ticking the right boxes.”  
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three) 
 
“In all honesty Best Value started out as a bit of a bureaucratic nightmare. There 
were so many [performance] indicators to be evaluated that we had a corporate team 
set up to deal with it. Much of their work was liaising with the Audit Commission who 
oversaw Best Value. However, the government soon recognised that they had created 
a rod for themselves because the evaluation process was overwhelming the Audit 
Commission’s ability to function. It couldn’t cope with evaluating all the authorities 
and in the end they had to adopt a sampling process. The Audit Commission relied on 
local authorities to self-monitor their evaluations and so authorities had a high 
degree of discretion in how they went about complying with Best Value. I think in the 
end Best Value was probably politically a good idea but its implementation 
demonstrated its limitations in the real world.” 
 (Chair of the Human Resources Committee, Authority Two)  
 
Throughout the local government reforms that have taken place in the last thirty years 
the three leader authorities remained tied to the national collective bargaining 
framework. The national framework was integral to the political, social, and economic 
aspirations of these authorities. On an ideological level, the successive Labour 
administrations have viewed the national framework as a foundation stone for the 
employment relations architecture in local government. The national framework gave 
the authorities an established base from which to develop their own local terms and 
conditions of employment while relying on a national infrastructure that has evolved 
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over sixty years that has managed to address the social, political, economic, and legal 
contextual variables that shape how local government operates.  
 
On a practical level, being tied into a national framework allowed the leader 
authorities to network with other local authorities at both a regional and national level 
which in the past has proved useful in dealing with both contentious   and non-
contentious employment relations issues. For example, with the introduction of Single 
Status, the leader authorities consulted with the Local Government Employers who 
advised them on the use of job evaluation schemes.  Even in the case where Labour 
relinquished overall political control in authority two for a time (2005-2007), there 
was still tacit support by the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives for the national 
framework. Although not particularly ideologically tied to the national framework 
both parties continued to support it because it offered them continuity in managing 
human resource matters which served their particular interests: 
“Over the years the national framework has been an important bulwark for the 
council employment relations function. We do have a well-established corporate 
employment relations team that deals with the majority of issues that arise; however, 
we are still reliant on the national framework for pay and legal interpretations on 
local government legislation, which I am sure you are aware has grown in recent 
years. I think that here in [name of city]there is general agreement amongst the three 
parties that the national framework for pay and conditions is still relevant to us as an 
authority and that for the foreseeable future we will remain within it.”  
(Chair of the Human Resources Committee, Authority Two) 
 
 
 Marketisation had eroded at the periphery some terms and conditions of employment, 
which primarily affected manual workers in the services areas that were subject to 
outside commercial competition. But the majority of non-manual workers had 
managed to retain their conditions of service by the leader councils honouring and 
adhering to the national framework, ensuring that standards of employment had been 
maintained which reflected the public sector ethos of equity and transparency. As 
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employers, the leader authorities felt that the national framework was still integral to 
promoting a consensual approach to employment relations within local government 
and that it was still in their interests to continue to support it. 
 
The Trade Unions 
As in the benchmark authority and in common with many local authorities in 
England, the leader authorities, recognise the two principal trade unions in the public 
sector, UNISON and UNITE. Each of the unions having their particular constituent 
interests, UNISON, with predominantly non-manual workers and UNITE, 
representing manual and craft workers.   
 
UNISON 
UNISON within the three leader authorities has the largest numbers of members 
compared to UNITE. It bargains across all occupational groups, with its highest 
concentration of members in professional and clerical occupations. Regional 
representatives were unequivocal in their support for the national collective 
bargaining framework. Its success in promoting and securing improved conditions of 
service had proven itself during the  process of local government reform in the 1980s 
and 1990s and its historical legacy was appreciated as being integral to the 
development of the Whitley Model and the promotion of trade union recognition 
within local government and the wider public sector: 
“National collective bargaining is the bedrock of the industrial relations system in 
local government. We as a union [UNISON] have relied on it [national collective 
bargaining] as a means of promoting and securing our members interests. If I look 
back over the last twenty years it [national collective bargaining] has been central to 
our defence of conditions of service in local government that have been under 
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constant attack from central government and in particular under the Conservative 
governments.”  
(Regional Head of Local Government- UNISON)  
 
Reflecting the benchmark authority’s and UNISON’s national position, 
representatives were convinced of the importance of national collective bargaining as 
a means of defending rights and conditions of employment for all workers within 
local government and, in particular, promoting better pay for low paid workers. 
UNISON’s national campaign for low paid workers had relied on local 
representatives at an authority level to promote and coordinate action but ultimately 
its success was seen as being dependent on being fought on a national platform:      
“It would have been difficult to take on the low pay campaign at an individual 
authority level both in terms of organisation and resources. The national framework 
allowed us to mobilise members across the country in a co-ordinated way that gave us 
the necessary leverage with employers. The national framework gave us the means to 
bargain an acceptable outcome that gave low paid workers a living income.” 
(Regional Organiser - UNISON) 
 
The UNISON representatives within the three leader authorities reflected the national 
position of UNISON, that the national collective bargaining framework was an 
integral bulwark in protecting conditions of employment by ensuring that nationally, 
there were a floor of conditions of service that were guaranteed across local 
government. Despite the challenge to the national framework through the local 
government reform process it had managed to survive because there was still a 
practical utility for local authorities and the unions to conduct their business and 
promote their respective aims:   
“The national conditions of service have matured and developed out of Whitley and 
the notion of joint regulation in local government industrial relations. We have [the 
unions] been able to bargain with employers in a constructive manner that have 
secured progressive employment rights for local government workers that have not 
just focused on financial and economic outcomes but on social equity in how people 
are treated in the workplace which I think has been to the mutual advantage of us [the 
trade unions] and the employers.” (Researcher – UNISON) 
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It was felt that the national collective bargaining framework was the best vehicle for 
advancing their organisational objectives that were defined principally by their 
membership’s employment interests and the public interest in providing 
comprehensive public services. The promotion of social equity both in employment 
and the provision of public services were at the cornerstone of UNISON’s political 
agenda.   UNISON’s fight for equality in the workplace was seen as vital in helping 
their existing membership, while also its success in campaigning against low pay and 
for equal pay helped it in its recruiting efforts, bolstering its membership to make it 
the largest trade union in local government: 
“It’s fair to say that we [UNISON] as a public sector union, that has a strong local 
government base, are not just focused on our members interests as workers, but also 
the greater  interests of the public who use and rely on public services. Yes, we have a 
self interest in maintaining a strong public sector but I also believe that we as a union 
have over the last fifteen years actively promoted and defended public services and 
have been an important voice in highlighting the social and economic issues that 
affect the public as well as our members.”  
(Regional Head of Local Government – UNISON) 
 
  
UNITE (T&GWU)  
UNITE, formerly the T&GWU have a strong presence in the leader authorities and 
they have historically represented manual and craft workers within these councils. Its 
members felt the full impact of ‘marketisation’ in local government as financial 
pressures to ‘do more with less’ saw the commercialisation process affect manual and 
craft workers in frontline direct services. The T&GWU in response to these pressures 
had to engage in a pragmatic defence of their members’ interests that involved 
entering into a partnership with managers and local politicians within the three 
authorities.  Like the benchmark authority, the leader authorities had defended and 
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supported in-house direct services, both for ideological and pragmatic reasons.  
Within the leader authorities the T&GWU in the 1980s and 1990s, at the time of 
CCT, entered into a process of local bargaining with employers. Local bargaining was 
seen as a necessity if direct services affected by CCT were to remain ‘in-house’:  
“We knew across local authorities there had been some tough local bargaining in 
which our members paid a high price for keep their jobs in-house, but it was seen as a 
price worth paying to protect the long term future of our members. We knew that 
contracting out would lead to a rapid erosion of pay and conditions from our 
experience of representing members whose authorities had transferred them to 
private contractors, which despite TUPE[Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 1981]  had, nevertheless, seen a deterioration.”  
(National Chief Negotiator, Local Government, UNITE)     
 
In the leader authorities the UNITE position was that national collective bargaining 
was the preferred framework for engaging with employers over employment relations 
matters. Fifty years of refinement had made it adaptive and responsive to the political 
and economic dynamics that had shaped local government employment relations, and 
that as a national framework it supported a minimum standard of employment 
conditions that gave sufficient latitude and discretion to individual authorities to tailor 
their local conditions of service to their specific needs: 
 “The national collective bargaining framework has been integral to developing and 
propagating the organisational foundations of trade unions in local government. The 
national framework has enabled trade unions to engage constructively with employers 
that have seen bargaining outcomes that have been beneficial to all parties. We 
[UNITE] in conjunction with our colleagues in the GMB and UNISON have worked 
with local authorities to successfully navigate the contentious area of Single Status. 
This has only been possible because there has been a nationally co-ordinated 
response to this issue.” 
 (National Chief Negotiator, Local Government, UNITE)     
 
The T&GWU in the authorities had had to be adaptive to the marketisation process 
that saw CCT affect many of their members in the manual direct services. They began 
to enter into local negotiations with managers and this led to a number of departures 
from the national conditions of service that were driven by costs and productivity 
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issues around the numbers and deployment of workers. The T&GWU secured and 
maintained basic pay and bonuses for their members that stayed in employment, while 
those that left were given enhanced severance packages through voluntary 
redundancy, and early retirement. The political rhetoric from the councils was about 
protecting council workers’ employment but the ‘real politik’ was that without a 
reduction in worker numbers and the adoption of new working practices in direct 
service functions the services would be vulnerable to being contracted out as the in-
house bids would not be competitive under the CCT process.   The threat of losing 
contracts to outside competitors saw a partnership develop between the T&GWU, 
local management and councillors within the authorities that was founded on mutual 
survival and self- interest. Working arrangements had to recognise this political and 
organisational reality, and within the leader authorities that was achieved through 
challenging yet ultimately productive negotiation:   
“It was a win-win situation all round. We [T&GWU] had to make some pretty tough 
decisions around redundancy and new working arrangements that clearly were going 
to affect our members. However, we recognised that for the future prosperity of our 
members in direct service functions we would have to enter into some difficult 
bargaining that would require radical compromise on our part. In the past we had 
resisted redundancy but with CCT we recognised that to an extent this had been taken 
out of local authority hands. The tendering process gave little discretion for local 
authorities, and therefore we had to come together with local management in the 
authorities to make workable bids that kept our members in jobs and gave employers 
the flexibility they required.”  
(National Chief Negotiator, UNITE)      
 
UNITE’s members had experienced the full impact of commercialisation in the local 
government workplace. Their predominantly manual members who were employed in 
the traditional blue collar services had been targeted for outsourcing on the basis that 
manual workers in local government received better pay and conditions than many of 
their private sector counterparts. UNITE felt that to a degree management had used 
the introduction of CCT to promote new working practices, however, they knew that 
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they had to adapt if their members were to have long term futures working for the 
councils. Politically, as the three leader councils were Labour controlled, there was a 
political will to defend in-house services, which gave the T&GWU a certain amount 
of bargaining leverage which it applied in a measured way that ensured that its 
members secured the best employment and termination packages that were available.  
 
 UNITE within these three leader authorities focused on defending the pay and 
conditions and job security of their members in the direct services functions like 
refuse collection and street cleansing. Over time, UNITE representatives gained first-
hand experience of defending in-house services and became competent negotiators. 
Local bargaining became a pragmatic reality that the UNITE representatives had to 
engage, despite philosophically, being supporters of the national collective 
bargaining. However, they also recognised that they had to be prepared for local 
government becoming more localised in its bargaining arrangements and their 
experience in dealing with CCT had given them confidence in meeting this potential 
challenge if it ever arose:  
“The local government reforms of the last twenty five years have seen industrial 
relations change. Commercial pressures have pushed local authorities to search for 
increased productivity and greater organisational autonomy as budgets are stretched 
and the drive for more for less. Up until now these commercial pressures have been 
focused on direct service providers within councils that make up what we used to call 
the manual workforce. Local bargaining has been a reality in these service areas for 
the last twenty five years and as a union [UNITE] we have out of necessity had to go 
toe to toe with local management in securing conditions of employment that are 
acceptable to our members. If this localisation becomes more widespread in the 
future, where councils decide to opt out of the national collective bargaining 
framework, I have no doubt that as a trade union we will adapt and rise to the 
challenge of local authority based bargaining.”   
(National Chief Negotiator, UNITE)   
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Table 7.3 TRADE UNIONS – Rationale and Strength of Support for 
National Collective Bargaining in the Leader Authorities    
 
 UNISON UNITE 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
 
 
STRONG - Great 
emphasis on national 
conditions of service and 
procedural rules. 
Concerned with the formal 
protocols that shape 
employment relations in 
local government.    
MEDIUM – Without the 
national framework 
collective bargaining 
could be undermined. 
Important conduit for 
constructive employment 
relations environment 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
STRONG – Campaigning 
for the promotion and 
defence of public services. 
National bargaining is 
integral to the Good 
Employer tradition and 
best for workers and the 
public interest.     
MEDIUM – Less 
ideological and more 
concerned with the 
practicalities. What 
matters is collective 
bargaining, whether it is at 
a national or local level. 
More members affected by 
outsourcing. 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
STRONG – National 
bargaining is part of the 
fabric of local government 
employment. No other 
way of achieving its 
objectives. There is a 
natural logic to the 
national framework which 
should not be meddled 
with.     
MEDIUM – Prefers 
national bargaining, but 
recognizes that there are 
alternatives, and as a union 
has engaged in local 
bargaining in service areas 
that have been subject to 
outsourcing. 
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Management and Human Resource Management   
 
The three leader authorities in common with the benchmark authority saw that their 
authorities had come to rely on the national framework because it functioned as an 
economic and social glue for local government. They acknowledged the unique local 
government labour market that favoured national terms and conditions to avoid undue 
labour competition between local government employers for skilled, professional 
white collar workers, while supporting the national framework from a social 
perspective to defend low pay workers from external commercial competition. The 
three authorities had the organisational resources to break away from the national 
framework but saw no reason to do so, as the national framework provided enough 
flexibility to negotiate terms and conditions that reflected the individual needs of the 
authorities: 
“here at [name of authority] we have the [name of the city] Agreement 2008, which is 
a locally negotiated agreement which outlines the authority’s position on: Pay and 
Grading; the use of consultants and agency staff; Training; Minimum Wage; In-
House Service Provision; Local Strategic Partnership; and Good Employment 
Relations and Trade Union Consultation. It is a comprehensive agreement that allows 
us to formulate our own policies in conjunction with elected members and trade 
unions while still adhering to the overarching umbrella of the national framework 
which we see as very much a touchstone.”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)       
 
The national framework was viewed as a valuable safety valve that the leader 
authorities could rely on as a means of de-escalating local employment relations 
issues and promoting local agreement through abiding with the nationally negotiated 
settlements. This process is often seen as being politically expedient but not 
necessarily economically or commercially focused: 
“the nationally negotiated terms and conditions in some cases might not be 
particularly beneficial to us as an authority, but nevertheless, we still see them as 
overall being to our benefit. Some managers, particularly within our commercial 
services, do sometimes get frustrated with the national agreements, but as I remind 
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them they still do have a degree of discretion. In the end I think they just like to have a 
moan, as it’s something they can point the finger at.” 
(Chief Officer Human Resources, Authority Three)     
 
The marketisation process had seen managers whose areas were directly affected by it 
contemplate a move away from the national framework, on commercial and economic 
grounds, as a response to the external competition, but this was no more than a 
temporary response. As in-house services within the leader authorities were politically 
supported by their administrations, managers were able to broker agreements with 
their trade union counterparts that were mutually beneficial to both workers and the 
employer, that were to the success of in-house bids: 
“Yes, managers within the direct services felt the commercial pressure of outside 
competition. Yes, there was a temptation on their part to say blow the national 
framework lets go it alone, but ultimately they knew that this was never a realistic 
option given the political support this administration had given them.”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Four)   
 
Professional services managers within the leader authorities, like the benchmark 
authority, saw a practical utility in being supporters of the national framework. They 
saw national terms and conditions as a pragmatic way of dealing with the internal 
local government labour market, and the competition for scarce occupational groups 
like Environmental Health and Trading Standards Officers: 
“We have had on going issues with recruiting E.H.Os and T.SO.s [Environmental 
Health and Trading Standards Officers] which I think is reflected nationwide, as there 
has been a shortage of qualified practitioners. Like a number of large authorities, we 
have grown our own, through our own graduate trainee scheme. Nationally agreed 
conditions covering these groups have to an extent avoided poaching between 
authorities as pay differentials are limited between them, however, we are starting to 
see fringe employment benefits increase, where authorities do have a greater 
discretion, and this has been used by some authorities as a recruitment incentive.” 
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three)     
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There were some variations in attitude towards the national framework across 
management within the leader authorities which was shaped by their particular 
managerial role. Managers in commercially orientated services were not potentially 
averse to leaving the national framework if they thought they could get greater 
discretion in setting conditions of employment that satisfied their local position. 
While managers in professional services, particularly in technical areas that were 
statutory functions that the authorities were obliged to legally carry out, were strong 
advocates for the national framework, seeing it as a way of protecting their services 
from the highly competitive internal local government labour market, where 
authorities were in competition for these skilled workers. The national framework 
took pay and conditions out of the local workplace and allowed managers in these 
areas to focus on service delivery matters which they saw as a distinct advantage.      
 
Similarly, human resource practitioners in the leader authorities like management fell 
into two categories when it came to the support of national collective bargaining. 
Those that had experienced marketisation in commercially driven services were open 
to abandoning the national framework if it was perceived it would improve their 
service viability. However, this viewpoint was tempered with the real politik of their 
authorities, understanding that their authorities were tied to the national framework 
because it tied into the political and social dynamics that underpinned their 
organisations: 
“I’ve spoken to HR people who would love the authority to be far more devolved from 
national conditions. In most cases this is only because they are frustrated by a 
particular problem they are facing at a service level which is perceived to be the fault 
of national conditions. In the last few years there has been a lot of tension around the 
national pay settlements which in my involvement in the LGE [Local Government 
Employers] I know has been a talking point for some authorities to consider leaving 
the national framework. Certainly, in our case, there has never been a discussion at a 
political level to leave, and senior management is still supportive of it.”  
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(Chair of Human Resources Committee, Authority Two)   
 
In contrast, corporate HRM practitioners across the three leader authorities (in 
common with the benchmark authority) saw the national collective bargaining 
framework as an integral piece of the local government employment relations 
architecture  
“Politicians, trade unions, and managers I think appreciate the familiarity and 
predictability that the national framework brings and on a pragmatic level it has 
served the interests of all the parties well over the years with outcomes that have been 
acceptable and equally importantly have delivered services to the Public in a 
satisfactory manner.  Each of the parties from their different perspectives gains from 
having a national bargaining framework which I think helps to maintain its 
importance in local government employment relations. “ 
(Chief Officer of Human Resources, Authority Three) 
 
The view among corporate HRM practitioners was that there was no reason for the 
leader authorities to leave the national framework because it offered the best means of 
delivering the political, social, and economic outcomes that they required to run their 
organisations. Leaving the national framework could not be justified given the 
negotiating infrastructures that would be required and it was perceived that the loss of 
belonging to a national collective bargaining framework would not serve the best 
interests of the leader authorities as both employers and providers of public services: 
“the national collective bargaining framework is a cornerstone of local government 
employment relations. It acts as a social and economic glue between both large and 
small authorities, promoting good employment practice. The national framework is a 
product of a political and social consensus within local government and the majority 
of authorities rely on it as a touchstone for their own local agreements while 
remaining under the national umbrella for pay and conditions.”  
(Chair of Human Resources Committee, Authority Two)  
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Table 7.4 MANAGEMENT and HRM – Rationale and Strength of 
Support for National Collective Bargaining in the Leader Authorities 
 
 COMMERCIAL 
MANAGEMENT/OPERATIONAL 
HRM  
   
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES / 
CORPORATE HRM 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEDIUM – Economic advantage of 
national terms and conditions for 
such a large, complex workforce. 
Reduces undue labour competition. 
Larger authorities lack the flexibility 
to negotiate terms and conditions that 
reflect individual authority needs. 
 
STRONG - Authorities 
are in competition for 
highly skilled workers 
within the local 
government labour 
market. National 
framework that takes 
pay and conditions out 
of the local workplace. 
National bargaining has 
served professional 
services functions well.     
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
WEAK – No strong social obligation 
to national bargaining. Driven by 
what suits them here and now and 
commercial considerations of outside 
competition 
MEDIUM – No strong 
ideological belief in 
national bargaining. An 
important means of 
securing a stable 
environment for 
recruiting and retaining 
highly skilled 
occupational groups. 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
WEAK – Given the opportunity may 
like to break away from the national 
framework. See local bargaining 
offering them enhanced employment 
flexibility within their workplaces.   
MEDIUM – National 
collective bargaining is 
a logical choice for their 
managerial 
circumstances but 
recognize that this does 
not necessarily suit 
other managerial groups 
within the authority.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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Elected Members 
 
Within the leader authorities the elected members’ attitude towards national collective 
bargaining was consistent with what was found in the benchmark authority.  The three 
authorities had been under Labour control for the majority of the period examined and 
this had shaped the attitudes of all three principal political parties. Labour elected 
members on ideological grounds were strong supporters of national collective 
bargaining as it was seen as a legitimate institutional framework for promoting 
equality in conditions of employment within local government. The Liberal 
Democrats were far more pragmatic in their support for national collective bargaining, 
seeing it as a practical vehicle. They were not tied to the national framework from an 
ideological or philosophical perspective, but rather saw it as a means of facilitating 
good employment relations in local government. This position did not preclude the 
Liberal Democrats from considering the alternative of leaving the national framework 
if they thought that within their authority it might be to its benefit. Finally, the 
Conservatives were grudging supporters of national collective bargaining, seeing it as 
a process that limited individual authority discretion, but equally recognising that 
despite this, national collective bargaining had shown itself to be an important conduit 
to managing the political and economic dynamics that shape the way in which local 
government employs workers and in turn how services are delivered to the 
communities that local authorities serve.  
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Table 7.5 ELECTED MEMBERS – Rationale and Strength of 
Support for National Collective Bargaining in the Leader Authorities 
 
 CONSERVATIVE LABOUR LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
MEDIUM – Accept 
that national 
bargaining has 
played a role in 
shaping local 
government 
employment but 
beginning to 
question and call for 
greater local 
flexibility.     
STRONG – 
National bargaining 
as the foundation 
stone for conditions 
of service within 
local government. 
A vehicle for 
promoting an 
equitable 
employment. 
MEDIUM – 
National 
bargaining as an 
effective and 
efficient 
framework that 
has proven itself 
over time. It has 
served the interests 
of politicians, 
employers and 
workers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
 
 
WEAK – No 
particular 
ideological or social 
obligation to 
promote national 
bargaining. 
Concerned with 
service delivery 
outcomes that are 
consumer driven. 
National bargaining 
is too focused on 
employee interests 
rather than on the 
affordability. 
STRONG –
Appreciate the 
historical legacy of 
national bargaining 
and its importance 
in promoting and 
maintaining its 
social obligation to 
workers Think that 
local bargaining 
would be 
counterproductive 
as it focused too 
much on economic 
and financial 
outcomes. 
MEDIUM – 
While recognizing 
its historical 
legacy they see the 
promotion and 
maintenance of 
national collective 
bargaining in non-
ideological terms. 
It serves the 
interests of their 
authorities and 
they see no reason 
to go down the 
local bargaining 
route at the 
moment. 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
WEAK – Prepared 
to jettison national 
bargaining if 
advantageous to 
their authority. But 
still see practical 
utility in remaining 
within the national 
framework: 
expedient politically 
and economically. 
STRONG – they 
view national 
collective 
bargaining as being 
at the very heart of 
the local 
government 
employment 
relations 
architecture. 
MEDIUM - they 
support national 
collective 
bargaining and are 
satisfied with its 
outcomes. If 
circumstances 
changed they 
would consider 
local bargaining, 
pragmatically 
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The Follower Authorities 
Historical background 
The cities in which the three follower authorities are located share a similar industrial 
heritage that can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution. The cities’ economic 
development and growth were based on engineering and manufacturing and like the 
leader authorities’ cities relied on attracting the population from the surrounding 
countryside. Authority five’s city began in light engineering in the nineteenth century 
and by the twentieth century had moved into car manufacturing. In the last twenty 
five years as car manufacturing has declined it has moved into car design and has 
branched out into the wider engineering and technology sector. Authority six’s city in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century was renowned for its textile 
manufacturing but by the middle of it had become an important centre for the railway 
industry. The twentieth century saw the development of the aerospace industry and in 
the last twenty years it has seen the growth of small, high technology businesses, 
particularly in computer software design. Finally, authority seven is based in a city 
that was founded on the metals industries which up until the 1970s was the principal 
sector of employment. Over the last twenty years the local economy has become 
reliant on the services sector, with education, health, and local government being the 
largest employers in the city.   
 
The follower authorities, five, six, and seven, in many respects mimic the leader 
authorities on a smaller scale. The cities of the follower authorities are located in 
urban conurbations but their population size is smaller (normally about 350,000).  
Follower authorities generally employ no more than 15,000 workers. They have a 
presence at a regional level, but they operate in the wake of the leader authorities. As 
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local government funding is calculated by population size, follower authorities’ 
resources are limited compared with the leader authorities and this shapes the 
provision of their services. The table below gives some useful labour market data on 
each of the areas covered by the three local authorities. 
 
Table 7.6 Employment in the Follower Authorities Areas 
 Authority Five Authority Six  Authority Seven 
Population 312,800 244,100 238,500 
Economically 
Active Working 
Population 
152,300 121,200 108,900 
Total numbers of 
jobs in all sectors 
of employment in 
area (workplace 
based) 
141,600 118,500 103,800 
Total numbers of 
jobs in Public 
Administration, 
Education, and 
Health Sector  
42,100 (30%) 34,200 (29%) 31,800 (31%) 
Source: NOMIS – official labour market statistics (2009) Office of National 
Statistics 
 
 
Political Leadership 
Two of the follower authorities, five and seven, have been under a Labour 
administrations since 1974 (Authority Five, 1974-2004; and Authority Seven, 1974-
2007). Authority Six, during the period, 1974-2007, has been under the administration 
of all three principal political parties, and has been characterized as a ‘middle of the 
road’ authority, as the principal parties have never had large working majorities and 
have had to rely on the support of independent elected members.  
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The Economic Context  
The follower authorities, like the leader authorities, having traditional manufacturing 
and engineering industries were also caught up in the de-industrialisation process that 
occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Authorities five and seven’s areas in particular 
felt the full effects of industrial re-structuring that occurred in Britain in the 1980s. 
Authority five’s city saw the contraction of large scale car manufacturing, while 
authority seven’s city saw the metals industry that had been its largest employment 
sector go into terminal decline. Unemployment in these cities during this period was 
some of the highest on record at the time (see Table 7.7). The public sector in these 
cities became (and still are) the biggest employers and both authorities became vital 
for supporting large scale employment for both manual and white collar workers 
within their respective areas. Today, public sector employment makes up over twenty 
five per cent of employment in these metropolitan areas (see Table 7.6).  
 
In authority six’s city, although not immune to the recession of the1980s, its major 
industries were able to weather the economic storm. The aeronautics industry, trading 
in an international marketplace, managed to survive the down turn by exploring new 
markets that were developing in the Middle East where new airlines were being 
established. The railway industry, still in public ownership, remained a principal 
employer in the city and as a consequence authority six’s city’s unemployment levels 
were not as high as many other cities.  
 
Economic regeneration in authorities five’s and seven’s areas were dependent on 
regional development funding which helped in authority five’s case to re-align its car 
manufacturing base and  saw the promotion of research and design companies that 
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were connected with the car industry. In authority seven’s area, the decline of its 
metals industry has not seen any comparable regeneration despite regional 
development funding, and its local economy in the last twenty years has become 
primarily dependent on the public sector. Authority six’s area has had the most stable 
local economy of the three follower authority areas, and in the last twenty years has 
attracted international investment, with a large car manufacturer opening. Despite the 
privatisation of the railway industry in the 1990s it has remained a major employer in 
the city and the aerospace industry has equally continued to be a significant employer. 
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Table 7.7 Unemployment Rates (percentage of working age residents) 
for Follower Authorities Areas 1979- 2007  
 
        
 
Authority Five Authority Six Authority 
Seven 
 Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
1979 9.8 7.0 10.2 
1980 12.7 7.8 13.6 
1981 18.9 10.7 19.5 
1982 21.6 12.5 22.4  
1983 23.1 11.9 23.1 
1984 21.8 12.2 21.7 
1985 21.0 11.0 21.5 
1986 20.5 11.4 22.2 
1987 18.7 10.5 19.0 
1988 16.9 11.3 17.6 
1989 13.1 10.5 13.8 
1990 14.9 10.8 14.5 
1991 16.3 11.2 17.3 
1992 18.6 11.7 18.5 
1993 17.8 11.0 19.0 
1994 16.0 9.4 17.8 
1995 14.2 8.2 17.1 
1996 12.7 6.2 14.3 
1997 10.5  4.7 12.0 
1998 10.1 3.9 10.6 
1999 3.8 3.8 9.3 
2000 3.4 2.0 6.0 
2001 3.1 2.3 5.1 
2002 2.9 2.7 5.0 
2003 3.1 3.2 4.8 
2004 3.5 3.1 5.1 
2005 4.1 2.9 5.8 
2006 4.6 3.8 6.3 
2007 5.2 3.2 5.6 
Source: Office of National Statistics/ Follower local authorities’ statistical data 
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Local Government Reform under the Conservatives - 1979-1997 
From 1979 to 1997 during the Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations,  
Labour controlled follower authorities, five and seven, adopted a similar strategy to 
the large leader Labour controlled local authorities, resisting the local government 
reforms. In both cities the authorities were (are) one of the largest employers, and in 
the 1980s both cities saw a decline in their established industries. The Labour 
administrations within these cities saw it as a moral imperative on them to save jobs 
and defend public sector jobs from being outsourced to private, commercial 
contractors. Authorities five’s and seven’s responses to the local government reforms 
and marketisation mirrored the leader (Labour controlled) authorities. The elected 
members, trade unions and local management became partners in defending in-house 
services in the two authorities: 
“We were in it together; there was a political will to support in-house services and 
management and the unions got to grips with producing bids that were competitive. I 
remember at the time there was a lot of ‘argy bargy’ in the negotiations, it was a 
tough process that tested everyone but ultimately it was always in the back of people’s 
minds that unless we came up with something the services would go out. It certainly 
focused the mind!”   
 (Deputy Head of Employment Relations, Authority Seven) 
 
“Yes, we had our differences, the management had their agenda, and we had ours, 
but we both realised that our collective interests were mutually tied together. We had 
to come up with solutions that were acceptable and more importantly workable; 
otherwise we would be both in trouble.”  
(Branch Secretary – UNISON, Authority Seven) 
 
“There is no doubt that the close ties between Labour councillors  and ourselves as a 
trade union were instrumental in securing agreements that satisfied them, while 
equally satisfying the interests of  our members” 
 (Former T&GWU Regional Officer, referring to Authority Five)  
 
 
Authority Six, with no dominant party in political control did not have any political or 
social position to the reforms that were introduced by the Conservative governments 
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in their eighteen year period of office. Unlike the Labour administrations, which were 
predominant in the metropolitan authorities at the time, authority six having no large 
majorities, did not have the necessary political mandate to push through the 
ideological position of any of the three principal parties. As a consequence it had to 
take a politically inclusive approach that took account not only the views of the three 
principal parties, but also the views of independent elected members who were not 
aligned to them. This resulted in a collaborative political approach that saw the 
council adopt and develop organisational policy that was driven by trying to satisfy a 
cross-section of interest groups. 
 
When the Conservatives began their local government reforms, authority six, did not 
take a defensive position against the reforms on ideological grounds. It piloted a 
number of service areas that were put out to tender, out of the process a part of one of 
the service areas, parks maintenance, did go out to an outside contractor. Half the 
service area was overseen by the outside contractor, while half remained in-house. 
The results were mixed, although on paper the outside contractor was initially 
cheaper, a number of hidden costs came to the surface, which the contract 
specification did not take account of and this led to additional charges being levied 
against the council. At the end of the contract period the cost differentials between the 
two areas were similar. Although the in-house service appeared more expensive on 
paper, when it came to the running of the service there were no add on costs with the 
in-house service. Politicians also found that they preferred the inclusiveness of the in-
house service which they found more responsive to the day-to-day demands of 
running a service and dealing with service delivery issues: 
“I know talking to elected members who were on the committee at the time, that they 
found it rather frustrating that there was a   tariff for every service which was outside 
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the contract spec, and although the contractor delivered a good service it was costly 
when compared to the in-house service which absorbed additional day-to-day costs.” 
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Six)    
 
When Compulsory Competitive Tendering was introduced the authority did favour, 
in-house services, not on ideological but practical grounds. Authority six did not 
particularly feel that it had to defend in-house services on social grounds, protecting 
council workers interests. The city’s unemployment levels were not as problematic as 
in other metropolitan areas at the time, as the large employers, the railways and 
aerospace industries in the city, had managed to be resilient during the economic 
downturn and so there was not the social and political pressure to ‘save’ local 
government jobs. However, there was a local political consensus that good public 
services and ‘value for money’ should go hand in hand when looking at service 
provisions. During the CCT period the majority of authority six’s services remained 
in-house because the in-house services had put together strong and commercially 
competitive bids.  The difference between it and the other follower and leader 
authorities was that there was no overt political position about defending in-house 
services but there was a coming together between management and trade unions to for 
a partnership model similar to the other follower and leader authorities that did ensure 
that services did remain in-house: 
“The in-house bids were based on strong business cases that balanced commercial 
considerations with outside competition, while also recognising that they were 
providing public services. The in-house bids had to stand or fall on their own merits, 
and overall they did just that.”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Six)           
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Local Government Reform under New Labour – 1997-2007 
When the Labour Government came to power in 1997 and introduced Best Value, the 
two Labour controlled councils, five and seven, consolidated their gains that they had 
made from the partnership approach they took in dealing with CCT. The rapport 
between politicians, trade unions, and management remained cordial and constructive 
but with time divisions came to the fore as the Best Value regime combined with local 
authorities having to look for external financing for capital projects saw tensions 
develop between unions and management: 
“The council in 2000 looked to outsource its housing stock under an external 
partnership agreement. This was seen as a necessity, as the city did not have the 
capital finance necessary to maintain the housing stock. This process sparked a 
fundamental disagreement between the city and the unions; they couldn’t understand 
how a Labour council could contemplate, what they saw, as an abandonment of their 
social responsibility. From an employment point of view, we ensured that employees 
who were part of the council remained so; it was just that the management of the 
housing stock would pass to our new partner.”  
(Deputy Head of Employment Relations, Authority Seven)   
 
“I couldn’t believe that the city decided to transfer its housing stock, putting aside the 
question of our members’ position, we as a union, were against the transfer because it 
went, in our opinion, against the interests of residents who were in council housing. 
We fought against it but ultimately we were unsuccessful. We did manage to ensure 
that council employees who were involved in the transfer remained under council 
conditions of service, but I think that the process from a political and social 
perspective was a disaster that the people of [name of the city] will be paying for a 
long time.” 
 (Branch Secretary, UNISON, Authority Seven)   
 
 
In Authority Five, in order to raise capital for the re-generation of the city centre it 
had to enter into a private finance initiative (PFI) deal with a commercial developer. 
From an employment perspective it had a minimum impact on council workers, but 
psychologically it sowed the first seeds of uncertainty among white collar workers in 
the council that their areas of work were not immune to being potentially outsourced:   
“When we went into a partnership agreement to begin the re-development of the city 
centre, a number of workers from Planning and Architecture were seconded to work 
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on the project. This has seen them work with the developers and they have been 
integrated into their team. Fortunately, the employees that have gone over to work on 
the project have welcomed the challenge. I know this has sat uneasily with the unions 
who see this as one step towards outsourcing. The truth is that without getting private 
finance for the project it would never have left the drawing board. The council needed 
to find a private partner in order to tap into the government’s funding programme 
which requires councils to match the government’s funding with private funding.”  
(Director of Customer and Workforce Services, Authority Five)      
 
Local government finance has seen generally medium sized local authorities come out 
poorly from the rate support grant, which is funded by central government. Out of 
necessity these authorities have had to turn to private partners in order to finance 
capital projects. Since 2000 all three follower authorities have entered into 
relationships with outside organisations: 
“It’s an economic reality that in order to fund major projects we have to seek private 
finance and as funding is reduced from central government we have to explore ways 
of sustaining services through commercial partnership initiatives. At the present, we 
are looking at restructuring IT services through a private provider. I know in other 
authorities they have already gone down this route.” 
 (Director of Customer and Workforce Services, Authority Five)   
 
 “Here at [name of city] we have a partnership agreement for our IT services. We 
have a controlling stake, but it is run by [name of provider] and staff from here are 
seconded over.” 
 (Head of Human Resources, Authority Six)   
 
“I think as long as central funding is squeezed, as a council, we will have no choice 
but to go into more private partnership agreements. We have done this for housing 
and I think that it will only be a matter of time before we do the same with social care 
and health.”  
(Deputy Head of Employment Relations, Authority Seven) 
 
 
All three follower authorities during the New Labour administration under Tony Blair 
have had to adapt to a marketisation process shaped by capital funding. Whether for 
political, social or economic reasons all the follower authorities have continued to 
support their in-house workforce, but this support has been challenged and to a degree 
undermined by the need to pursue external funding.   
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Trade Unions  
The pattern of trade union organisation and representation in the follower authorities 
was similar to the leader authorities. UNISON was the principal trade union, while 
UNITE’s core membership was in the traditionally defined manual and craft 
occupational groups. All three follower authorities had over forty per cent trade union 
membership (Authority Five, 50%; Authority Six, 40%; Authority Seven, 45%).  
 
UNISON 
UNISON in all three follower authorities reflected the corporate view of the 
importance of the national collective bargaining framework in promoting their 
members interests:   
“The national framework is important in promoting our interests and those of our 
members. The [national] framework allows us to develop a national position on pay 
and conditions across the majority of local authorities. If we look back over the last 
fifty years it [the national framework] has secured improved conditions of employment 
to over two and half million workers in local government.”  
(Regional UNISON Organiser)  
 
UNISON representatives in the three authorities viewed the national collective 
bargaining framework as the cornerstone of local government employment relations, 
reinforcing UNISON’s corporate position that it was integral to pursuing their 
economic, political, and economic objectives: 
“our fight to defend members interests are not just focused with the authority as an 
employer, but with the wider employment situation within local government. Our 
campaigning success has been linked to national support for improving conditions of 
service across local government and mobilising national industrial action, if 
necessary, to achieve these ends.”  
(UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority Seven).     
 
UNISON’s position in the three follower authorities was that it depended on a strong, 
national framework, to ensure the protection of basic terms and conditions of 
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employment and it feared that the erosion of the national framework would undermine 
its position locally:    
“We depend on nationally agreed conditions of service to safeguard local government 
workers from the continued political and economic pressures that face local 
authorities to save on costs. Given that labour is the biggest cost within local 
authorities, there is always pressure to reduce these costs, and in no small way, the 
national conditions of service have acted as an important bulwark in protecting local 
government workers pay and conditions.”  
(UNISON Regional Officer) 
 
 
The national collective bargaining framework had survived marketisation and the 
effects of local government reform under the Conservative administrations. However, 
in the seven years from 2000 until 2007, under New Labour, it had been challenged in 
the follower authorities as a consequence of financial necessity for these authorities to 
enter into commercial partnership agreements with outside contractors. This reality 
had highlighted to local UNISON representatives the importance of national 
collective bargaining not from an abstract philosophical position, but a pragmatic 
matter of survival: 
“The move to form partnership agreements with private sector organisations has, in 
my opinion, underlined the importance of defending nationally set conditions of 
service. National agreements have been vital to ensuring that our members’ interests 
are protected. They have acted as a baseline for ensuring that a line is drawn to say 
these conditions are a minimum which workers can expect. Like with CCT, the 
national agreements have ensured that these new partnership [with private 
contractors] agreements are negotiated against a national backdrop which is most 
advantageous to council workers’ interests. Here at [name of authority] we have been 
able to protect workers conditions of service affected by the housing stock transfer. 
(UNISON Branch Secretary, Authority Seven) 
 
 
 In the follower authorities UNISON representatives saw the national framework as an 
essential part of the local government employment relations architecture that enabled 
them to represent their members at a local level. Although they politically, socially 
and economically had promoted and defended national collective bargaining, they 
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also had adapted to the political and economic reality that faced these follower 
authorities. The introduction of commercial partnerships with private commercial 
contractors had seen them enter into local bargaining at an authority level:  
“when [authority five] went down the road of entering into partnership agreements 
with private contractors, we [UNISON] were forced to recognize that we would have 
to enter into some form of local bargaining if we were to continue to represent our 
members.  Bargaining was conducted at an authority level and we secured a general 
agreement which was linked to the national conditions of service. Within the authority 
the majority of services are still governed through national agreements, and as a 
trade union we are absolutely committed to defending national collective bargaining 
in local government.”  
(Regional UNISON Organiser)    
 
UNISON representatives within the three follower authorities were no less committed 
to promoting and defending the national collective bargaining framework, but there 
was a growing acceptance that the financial changes in local government since 2000, 
in which structural capital funding was predicated on entering into commercial 
partnership ventures, had seen UNISON, out of necessity, begin to enter into limited 
forms of local bargaining at an authority level. UNISON’s representatives within the 
follower authorities acknowledged reluctantly, that the survival of public services 
within these authorities was dependent on joint ventures with commercial contractors 
and saw this arrangement as ‘the best of a bad job’ in that local authorities still had  
direct control of services and were still responsible for the workforces  that were 
responsible for providing these services. There was pragmatism in their assessment 
that if they wished to continue to be the principal trade union in local government 
they would have to adapt to this changing organizational environment which was 
becoming reflective of medium and small size authorities:  
“As a union we’re not fans of public/private ventures, but this is becoming the norm 
in many local authorities who are having to source finance from the commercial 
sector in order to continue to provide public services. I think it’s quite ironic that this 
development has happened under New Labour, nevertheless, we have to recognize 
this development is a new fact of local government life and we must adapt accordingly 
to represent our members. In many respects these joint ventures are the best of a bad 
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job, because at least local authorities still have nominal control over the workers who 
are employed in these joint ventures and from our point of view we still exert some 
influence with authorities as they remain the employers.”  
(UNISON Regional Organiser)    
 
UNITE (T&GWU) 
UNITE, in the three follower authorities adopted a contingency approach which 
adapted according to the political control of the authority. In authorities five and 
seven, which historically had been Labour controlled, they were able to develop a 
partnership approach with managers and politicians to defend in-house services from 
the ‘marketisation’ process, in the case of manual workers from Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering. UNITE representatives entered into local bargaining 
arrangements that saw them protect workers’ pay in return for increased labour 
flexibility both in terms of numbers and deployment. This reflected a similar approach 
to the leader authorities where from a philosophical position UNITE corporately 
endorsed and promoted the national collective bargaining framework as being the 
preferred means of employment relations engagement within local government, while 
at an authority/service level were adaptive to the marketisation process that faced their 
members and did participate in local bargaining: 
“As a trade union we recognise the importance of national collective bargaining in 
local government. It is the foundation for industrial relations and its importance in 
securing better conditions of service cannot be underestimated.  However, the reforms 
of the last twenty five years has seen the nature of local government change to 
become more commercially driven, particularly in manual direct services, which has 
resulted in a fracturing of bargaining structures that has resulted in local bargaining 
becoming a fact of life. In principle and philosophically The T&G and now UNITE 
have always stood by national collective bargaining as being the preferred option for 
setting pay and conditions, but equally as a union we have accepted that we must 
engage in the bargaining process at whatever the level. The most important thing is to 
defend our right to bargain for members.” 
 (UNITE Regional Representative)      
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The T&GWU continued to represent workers interests whose services were 
contracted out under CCT. In the case of authority six, the parks service were 
contracted out for a period of five years (1991-1995) and during this period the 
T&GWU entered  into direct negotiations with the private contractor who recognised 
them: 
“The T&G did have a presence with the contractor when the parks left the council. 
We were recognised by the contractor, who I think saw the benefit of recognising us. 
As a union we were experienced in working in the private sector and there was good 
back up to support the transition process. The stewards within parks were 
experienced and with our support at region we built up a working relationship with 
the contractor. The contractor found it convenient to ‘shadow’ the local government 
conditions of service and during the time of the contract some working practices were 
changed to improve productivity but at the same time we protected basic pay and 
bonuses.”  
(UNITE Regional Representative)   
 
During CCT, the T&GWU’s experience of representing manual workers interests in 
the follower authorities, whether in-house or as in the case of the parks service in 
authority six who were contracted out,   was that local bargaining centred around 
protecting workers pay in return for accepting new working practices that focused on 
improving productivity. The T&GWU applied a consistent approach whether 
bargaining within the private or public sector spheres; their primary objective was to 
protect members pay. The T&GWU out of necessity to their membership, who were 
primarily manual workers in service areas that were subject to outside commercial 
competition, responded and adapted to local bargaining, and recognised that its 
development was a consequence of the marketisation of public services. This position 
was carried on under New Labour’s local government reforms, as UNITE sought to 
represent its members as local authorities went into joint ventures with private sector 
organisations and local bargaining became an accepted working reality.   
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Table 7.8 TRADE UNIONS – Rationale and Strength of Support for 
National Collective Bargaining in the Follower Authorities 
 
 UNISON UNITE 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
 
 
STRONG - national 
conditions of service were 
viewed as pivotal in 
supporting procedural 
rules and ensuring the 
continuance of the 
employment relations 
architecture. It legitmised 
their position within the 
follower authorities.  
MEDIUM – they 
acknowledged that without 
a national collective 
bargaining framework 
their position would be 
undermined and that it 
remained integral to local 
government employment 
relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
STRONG – It was at the 
heart of UNISON’s 
promotion and defence of 
public services. National 
bargaining supports and 
promotes the Good 
Employer tradition that 
sustains equitable 
employment relations 
practice that acknowledges 
workers’ interests. The 
defence of national 
conditions of service was 
important for UNISON in 
mid-sized authorities like 
the follower authorities    
MEDIUM – their support 
was influenced less on 
ideological grounds, 
preferring to focus on the 
practicalities.  They 
preferred to emphasize the 
importance of defending 
collective bargaining. As 
many of their members 
were affected by 
marketisation they were 
more concerned at 
maintaining bargaining at 
whatever level that it took 
place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
STRONG – they believed 
that national bargaining 
was the most logical way 
of defending conditions of 
service in local 
government. This 
viewpoint was emphasised 
by representatives in the 
follower authorities who 
felt they would be 
vulnerable if there was a 
move away from national 
collective bargaining.     
MEDIUM – their 
preference was for 
national bargaining. 
However, the reality was 
that they recognized that 
there were alternatives, 
and as a union they had to 
adapt to local bargaining 
in service areas that had 
introduced it and where 
their members were based. 
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Management and Human Resource Management 
 
Two of the three followers, five and seven, Labour controlled authorities, had relied 
on the national collective bargaining framework and during the reforms under the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s had defended it as being integral to 
the organisational management of their workforces. Authority six, not having a 
dominant political party, did continue to support the national framework, but rather 
than from a philosophical position it supported it for pragmatic reasons centred on its 
size as an organisation and what they saw as sound economic reasons linked to their 
limited relatively small human resources function. Irrespective of political control all 
three authorities saw a utility with their white collar workforce being regulated 
through the national framework and as with leader authorities they saw the national 
framework as being a restraining force against competition between neighbouring 
authorities for skilled technical and professional workers: 
“National collective bargaining and sticking with national agreements around our 
APT&C employees [non manual workers] suits us as a council, particularly for our 
professional and, technical staff, in occupations like engineering and environmental 
health, where competition for qualified practitioners is fierce between local 
authorities both at a national and local level. National agreements save us a lot of 
effort as a human resources function because they set a good base line to work from 
while also being sufficiently flexible for us to develop and implement our own local 
agreements which are shaped by local political and organisational considerations.”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Six) 
 
The HR functions in all three follower authorities had continued to support national 
collective bargaining during the period that was examined (1979-2007) as it made 
organisational sense from an employment regulation point of view. The HR 
practitioners understood the historical legacy of national collective bargaining but 
their prime motivational reason for their continued support of it was far more 
concerned with the practical realities of running and delivering an HR service within 
 
 225 
their authorities. From a practitioner’s perspective they appreciated that the national 
framework was an effective way of containing and dealing with the political and 
economic dynamics that characterise local government employment relations. The 
national framework was seen as being a collective benefit to all local authorities as 
employers, with a shared employment relations reference point that local authorities 
could rely on to manage terms and conditions of employment. This had the benefit of 
not only satisfying individual local authorities as employers but also representing the 
national interests of local government as a large employment sector:     
“the national framework is very much the centre piece that defines how we conduct 
employment relations in this council. I have to say that in my experience as a 
practitioner having worked in several local authorities including one that is outside of 
the national framework, is that authorities view the national framework and the 
agreements that come out of it as very much a touchstone that they can rely on. The 
national agreements have a political consensus that is borne out of an exhaustive 
process of consultation and negotiation that engages employers and trade unions, 
which place a high value on coming to fair and transparent agreements that 
recognise the legitimacy of all the parties involved.”   
(Director of Customer and Workforce Services, Authority Five)    
 
However, amongst HR and general management there was recognition that the 
national framework was being challenged as a consequence of local government 
funding being put under pressure to seek commercial partners for capital investment 
projects: 
“Under the Conservatives we managed to retain services within the council but the 
financial pressures to deliver services at increasingly lower costs while re-investing 
in the council’s infrastructure saw us under the Labour government having to seek 
private sector partners. These joint ventures saw a move to local bargaining that the 
council on political grounds had always wanted to avoid but financial circumstances 
meant that they had become a reality. To a degree this process was rationalised, the 
council still retained control of employees and secured the necessary finances to keep 
services from going out fully to private contractors. Also the majority of employees 
were not affected by this process. Depending on your viewpoint this process has been 
seen as a necessary development to maintain public services by the council or as the 
trade unions see it, the thin end of the wedge, and privatisation by stealth.” 
 (Deputy Head of Employment Relations, Authority Seven)  
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Despite these financial pressures on the follower local authorities organisational 
structures, the national collective bargaining framework was still bearing up and seen 
as relevant to the process of employment regulation in these authorities. The national 
framework still delivered satisfactory political, economic and social outcomes to the 
follower authorities and from an HR and general management perspective there could 
be no organisational justification for leaving the national framework and creating their 
own framework:      
“We tend to see the national framework as a bit of a strait jacket and particularly 
around pay settlements local authorities can baulk at the decisions made nationally. 
At these times the rhetoric can become very vocal among authorities who threaten to 
leave the national framework. The reality is that the national framework serves local 
authorities well in that it ensures a consistency of approach to pay and conditions 
which has sufficient flexibility within it to allow individual councils to develop their 
own conditions of employment to suit their particular circumstances. Certainly in the 
case of [name of authority] it would not be practical to negotiate and develop pay 
settlements outside of the national framework because as an authority we would not 
be able to justify the expense of developing an authority based negotiating body that 
would require a specialised workforce and which we would find difficult to develop 
from our present workforce which is presently competency deficient in this area. 
National bargaining has been an important template for local authorities to develop 
their local conditions and so the national framework has been the skeleton on which 
the flesh of local conditions have been built. Despite the continual pressures brought 
to bear on national collective bargaining I believe that it will continue to survive 
because it still remains relevant to the practice of employment relations in local 
government.”  
(Head of Human Resources, Authority Six) 
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Table 7.9 MANAGEMENT and HRM – Rationale and Strength of 
Support for National Collective Bargaining in the Follower 
Authorities 
 
 COMMERCIAL 
MANAGEMENT/OPERATIONAL 
HRM  
 
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES / 
CORPORATE HRM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
 
 
MEDIUM – although acknowledging 
its continued use to set national terms 
and conditions within local 
government, it was nevertheless felt 
by these actors that it lacked the 
necessary flexibility. This was 
highlighted by managers that 
operated in services that were subject 
to outside, commercial competition, 
and felt that the national framework 
curtailed their managerial autonomy. 
Despite their reservations they still 
recognized that in the wider local 
government services the national 
framework was still an important 
political mechanism in local 
government employment relations.   
STRONG – these actors saw 
an inherent advantage to 
remaining within the national 
collective bargaining 
framework. Working in 
services that relied on 
recruiting highly skilled 
workers they saw it taking 
pay and conditions out of the 
local workplace. Corporate 
management in the follower 
authorities thought if there 
was a breakdown in national 
collective bargaining their 
authorities would suffer in 
recruiting and retaining 
professional and technical 
staff to larger, well 
financially resourced 
authorities.       
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
WEAK – No strong social obligation 
to national bargaining. Their position 
was influenced by commercial 
imperatives which were shaped by 
outside competition.  
MEDIUM – it was an 
important means of securing 
a stable environment for 
recruiting and retaining 
highly skilled occupational 
groups. However, the actors’ 
support was based on 
expediency rather than 
ideology.  
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
WEAK – would have been prepared 
to jettison the national framework if 
given the opportunity. They saw local 
bargaining as advantageous to their 
organisational circumstances.  
MEDIUM – there was a 
natural logic to the national 
collective bargaining 
framework which tied in with 
the actors managerial 
circumstances. However, 
they recognized that this did 
not necessarily suit other 
managerial groups.   
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Elected Members 
 
The elected members’ attitude towards national collective bargaining during the 
period over the time examined, 1979-2007, in the follower authorities did subtly 
change over time. As with the leader authorities that were Labour controlled, during 
the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, authorities five and seven, did 
strongly support the national framework on ideological grounds, seeing it as the 
legitimate means of promoting consensual employment relations amongst the 
institutional actors within local government. However, by 2000 and a New Labour 
government in power, there was a subtle change in this position among the Labour 
controlled follower authorities. Despite still espousing the benefits of the national 
framework, at a service level, the introduction of public/ private partnership, had seen 
a shift to moving away from the national framework in favour of local bargaining. 
Politically, the Labour controlled follower authorities justified this in terms of serving 
the public interest by raising private finance while keeping both services and 
workforces under their control, even if in reality this control was nominal because of 
the influence of the private sector on these joint ventures. The seven years between 
2000 and 2007 had seen the Labour controlled follower authorities’ shift 
pragmatically accepting local bargaining while the political rhetoric still extolled the 
virtues of the national framework. 
 
Within authority six, where over the thirty year period examined there was no overall 
political control by any one of the three major political parties and independent 
elected members exerted influence within the authority, the political and managerial 
decision making was influenced and shaped by pragmatic service delivery 
considerations rather than an ideological political position. The administrations over 
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this period did not have any ideological stance in defending or promoting the national 
framework, but rather there position was more prosaic - was it in their interest to 
continue to adhere to the national framework? The authority did put out services 
under competitive tendering and subsequently under CCT they brought them back 
under authority control because it was viewed as being both economically and 
political expedient to keep services in-house. Under New Labour, like the other 
follower authorities, authority six, entered into public/private ventures with a number 
of their services which resulted in them bargaining at a service level within these joint 
venture areas. The elected members in authority six still had tacit support for the 
national collective bargaining framework because it was organisationally convenient 
for them to belong to it.   
 
The three principal parties within the follower authorities adhered to the ideological 
positions of their political counterparts in the leader authorities and their support for 
national collective bargaining in local government. Labour councillors strongly 
supported the national framework as a vehicle for advancing joint regulation of 
employment relations. They viewed it as an established means of delivering 
economic, social, and political outcomes that benefited local authorities as employers 
while also recognising workers’ interests and the legitimacy of the trade unions. The 
Liberal Democrats though lacking a strong ideological commitment to national 
collective bargaining, nevertheless, saw a practical utility in its ability to provide a 
stable and established process for dealing with employment relations issues. They 
recognised that the national collective bargaining framework was not just a means for 
dealing with the economic exchange between employers and workers, but an 
important conduit for promoting political and social dialogue between the institutional 
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stakeholders in local government. Conservative councillors’ support for national 
collective bargaining was weak, in ideological terms; however, they did recognise its 
effectiveness in balancing and delivering workable outcomes that were both 
economically and politically acceptable.           
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Table 7.10 ELECTED MEMBERS – Rationale and Strength of 
Support for National Collective Bargaining in the Follower 
Authorities 
 CONSERVATIVE LABOUR LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
MEDIUM – 
Acknowledged the 
historical role of the 
national bargaining 
framework but 
questioned its role in 
today’s local government 
where individual 
councils operated as 
business units. Still 
recognised a practical 
political utility to 
maintaining it. 
STRONG – reflected 
the sentiment of 
Labour across local 
government that 
national bargaining 
was central to 
maintaining and 
promoting conditions 
of service and 
ensuring good 
employment relations   
MEDIUM – the 
national bargaining 
framework has proven 
itself over time and is 
seen as tried and tested 
by the Liberal 
Democrats. It is viewed 
as a reliable political 
and economic 
mechanism for 
delivering employment 
relations solutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
 
WEAK – felt no 
particular ideological or 
social obligation 
attachment to national 
bargaining. Principally 
focused on service 
delivery outcomes that 
are consumer driven. 
National bargaining 
emphasizes employee 
interests rather than on 
affordability which 
should be the primary 
concern of councils. 
STRONG – 
understand the 
historical 
significance of the 
national collective 
bargaining 
framework and its 
role in promoting and 
maintaining social 
obligation to 
workers. They think 
that local bargaining 
would fracture local 
government and be 
disastrous to the 
provision of public 
services with its   
focus on economic 
and financial 
outcomes. 
MEDIUM – they take 
a non-ideological 
position, recognising its 
historical legacy, and 
are still prepared to 
support and promote 
the national framework 
as it serves their 
political interests. They 
see no political or 
economic advantage to 
go down the local 
bargaining route.    
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
WEAK – would 
consider leaving the 
national framework if it 
was seen as being 
beneficial to the local 
authority. Presently, 
accepted the practical 
economic and political 
utility of remaining 
within the national 
framework. 
STRONG – national 
collective bargaining 
is the cornerstone of 
employment relations 
in local government 
employment relations 
and there is no 
suitable alternative 
that will balance 
worker and employer 
interests.   
MEDIUM – satisfied 
with the national 
bargaining framework, 
the Liberal Democrats 
have to date supported 
it. However, they 
would consider local 
bargaining if it suited 
their political 
circumstances in the 
future.  
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Analysis 
Within the leader and follower authorities examined the principal actors all 
acknowledged, to different degrees, the historical importance of the national 
collective bargaining framework. There was a general consensus among the actors 
that the national collective bargaining framework was still integral to promoting joint 
regulation in local government, despite some challenges to its legitimacy. The 
stakeholders thought that it was expedient for them to maintain and support the 
national collective bargaining framework as it had served their respective positions 
well over the last fifty years. However, there were marked variations across the 
different actors examined, both in terms of the strength of support for national 
collective bargaining and their particular reasons for supporting it. 
 
The trade union representatives saw it as vital for maintaining their status with 
employers and central government as it gave them an almost constitutional position 
within the local government employment relations framework. This position gave 
them an important bargaining leverage at a national level which was advantageous 
when it came to mobilising their membership in national disputes. The national 
framework gave them enhanced political power, which they perceived to help them in 
negotiating improved terms and conditions of employment for their members. There 
was equally an appreciation that the status quo of the national bargaining framework 
was under constant re-evaluation by the actors and in particular some employers who 
were exploring the alternatives. Local, authority based bargaining was being 
considered by some councils, but this in many ways was being used by employers to 
curtail recent pay settlements that had been perceived to be too high, even though the 
pay settlements of local authorities outside the national framework had been over the 
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last two pay settlements higher (Local Government Employers: 2009). However, 
particularly for some of the metropolitan authorities this had been more political 
rhetoric than reality, which had been articulated by some Conservative politicians but 
had not been supported by the wider political and managerial community within local 
government. The unions accepted that if the push for local bargaining at an authority 
level became a reality they would have to engage in the process accordingly. Their 
experience of local bargaining at a service level within certain areas of the six 
authorities had given them the requisite experience, but the co-ordination of union 
action and organisation would become more problematic if local bargaining became 
the preferred option.  
 
The six authorities had seen the commercialisation and marketisation of their manual 
direct services which had felt the full force of the reforming policies of central 
government. However, their white collar professional services had been relatively 
untouched by these reforms and as employers there were real organisational 
advantages to supporting national collective bargaining for white collar professional 
workers. Many of the professional occupational groups are unique to the public sector 
and even specifically to local government. It is arguable that local government has its 
own labour market as a consequence of these occupational groups and therefore there 
is an economic logic to supporting a national framework which allows local 
authorities to control labour costs by fixing salary rates for these occupational groups, 
which avoids the risk of leap frogging between local authorities. The management in 
these authorities who were responsible for white collar professional workers felt that 
nationally agreed terms and conditions of employment took these issues out of the 
local workplace and allowed them to focus on service delivery issues. The politicians 
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within these councils and specifically the ruling Labour groups were philosophically 
supporters of the national framework, but equally this support was as much based on a 
practical utility, as national collective bargaining had served local politicians well, 
because it had facilitated workable economic outcomes that satisfied all the actors and 
created an environment of continuity and stability within local government 
employment relations.      
 
The actors within the leader and follower authorities, like the benchmark authority, 
thought that to different degrees CCT had influenced the conduct of employment 
relations in their authorities. From the trade unions’ perspective it had affected areas 
that were subject to CCT, and it did dilute conditions of employment in response to 
outside competition. In common with the benchmark authority it was thought that 
local service area managers had taken advantage of the threat to contract out services 
and had introduced productivity and labour cost savings on the back of this threat. 
However, the trade unions had also secured enhanced rates of pay for workers on the 
back of the agreements they made with management to increase productivity and 
reduce labour through enhanced severance packages for departing workers. In the 
authorities there was a shared experience with the benchmark authority that CCT had 
created a partnership environment between local union representatives and 
management that had been successful in defending in-house services from outside 
competition.  
 
In terms of Scott’s framework, the institutional actors within the authorities showed 
different degrees of support for national collective bargaining as a regulative process. 
There was a similar pattern in all the authorities and this can be attributed to the 
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corporate positions of the individual unions, UNISON and UNITE, and the political 
control of the authorities. There was strong support for national collective bargaining 
as a regulative process by UNISON, Labour, and corporate management in each of 
the authorities, while UNITE and operational management gave medium support for 
the national framework. The Conservatives within the authorities could only give 
weak support to the national framework because while recognising the historical 
legacy of the national framework were nevertheless open to their authorities moving 
to a local framework if it was shown  to be beneficial to them. There was still support 
for national collective bargaining in all the authorities because it had up until now 
satisfactorily defined the regulative rules that had given order to the local government 
employment relations system. The authorities still saw the national collective 
bargaining framework as integral to maintaining order and stability within local 
government and the regulative rules that come out of the national framework are 
perceived to maintain and preserve the economic, social and political order. The rules 
that emanate from the national framework are given a legitimacy because they 
preserve an order that promotes behaving instrumentally and expediently out of self-
interest. This allows the actors within the authorities to pursue their individual 
objectives while recognising that they operate in a pluralistic environment which 
necessitates political compromise. 
 
The normative pillar revealed how the national collective bargaining framework had 
influenced the actors within the authorities. The trade unions, management, and 
politicians recognised how the national framework influences their social obligations 
which are shaped by their individual values and norms. However, the importance of 
social obligation varied between the actors. UNISON’s position within the leader and 
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follower authorities reflected a similar stance to the benchmark authority. UNISON’s 
role went beyond representing its membership and was as much a campaigning 
organisation for defending public services. It saw the national collective bargaining 
framework as a key way of employers maintaining the Good Employer tradition. 
National collective bargaining was seen as a bulwark for promoting and maintaining 
social obligations linked to the public sector ethos. Its legitimacy was based on a 
moral acceptance by UNISON that national collective bargaining offered the best 
means of representing workers and the public interest. Labour elected members 
strongly supported the national framework. Like UNISON, they saw it as an 
important vehicle for promoting social obligation and they perceived local bargaining 
as counterproductive to their authorities and local government in general as it was 
likely to focus too much on financial outcomes to the detriment of social policy and 
the provision of services which are at the heart of local government. However, in the 
Labour controlled follower authorities this idealism had been challenged by the need 
for external, private finance which has seen them engage with private enterprise that 
has resulted in service areas moving away from national collective bargaining and 
developing local bargaining in these areas.  
 
Authority six, HR and corporate management, along with UNITE and the Liberal 
Democrats took a middle of the road position. While recognising the historical legacy 
of national collective bargaining they saw the support and maintenance of national 
collective bargaining in non-ideological terms. It served their respective interests, but 
they did not exclude considering and going down the path of local bargaining if they 
felt it would be to their benefit. UNITE was concerned about maintaining collective 
bargaining, ideally at a national level, but were pragmatic enough to recognise that in 
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a changing political environment they had to be prepared to adapt to the employment 
relations landscape they faced. Authority six, an authority with a history of having no 
political party with a controlling majority, saw national collective bargaining 
primarily in functional terms in that it was a proven framework that had satisfied them 
politically and they did not see any need to change it.    
 
Operational managers and Conservative elected members showed a weak normative 
commitment to national collective bargaining.  Operational managers generally 
showed no strong social obligation to maintain and support national collective 
bargaining. Their primary focus was on commercial considerations, which were 
heavily influenced by the marketisation process that had affected their individual 
service areas. The Conservatives across the leader and follower authorities showed no 
ideological or social obligation to promote or support national collective bargaining, 
and were primarily concerned with service delivery outcomes that are consumer led. 
They thought national collective bargaining was too focused on employee interests, 
rather than looking at the affordability and competitiveness of pay settlements which 
they believe have not reflected the local situation of the authorities. They viewed the 
national framework as being too employee centred, at the expense of individual 
authorities and rate payers. 
 
Cognitively, both UNISON and the Labour elected members within the leader and 
follower authorities viewed national collective bargaining as being woven into the 
fabric of local government employment relations and they thought that the national 
framework should not be meddled with. While HR and corporate managers, UNITE, 
and Liberal Democrat elected members were aware of the alternatives to national 
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collective bargaining, they still saw a strong organisational logic for the authorities to 
continue to support and be in the national framework. Finally, operational managers, 
and Conservative elected members had a weak cognitive commitment to national 
collective bargaining. Operational managers, given the opportunity, may like to break 
away from the national framework in the future. They saw local bargaining 
potentially offering them enhanced employment flexibility within their workplaces. 
The general view amongst the Conservatives was that they were prepared to consider 
abandoning national collective bargaining if they secured majorities in their respective 
councils. The cognitive pillar illustrated how the actors to varying degrees took for 
granted and had a shared understanding of what national collective bargaining in local 
government meant to them. Even where the actors were critical of the national 
framework, they still recognised a logic to remaining in it that in effect supported the 
status quo.               
         
The actors’ views of national collective bargaining and its relevance to local 
government employment relations were thus coloured by their roles within their 
authorities. There were some shared views with the benchmark authority which went 
across the authorities.  Operational managers thought that there might be an increased 
benefit to their authority if it developed more of its pay and conditions of service, 
rather than relying on the national framework. Greater independence from the national 
framework might allow authorities to develop business strategies that better reflected 
the economic and social circumstances of their areas. However, this view was 
tempered with an acknowledgement that breaking away from the national framework 
would create major organisational change that could have a de-stabilising impact on 
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their authorities and workforce, and in turn could have a negative impact on service 
delivery.   
 
Developing a local framework in each of the authorities was seen as a hypothetical 
possibility rather than a reality, as there was at present no political will to do so. Even 
supporters of local bargaining accepted that the financial outlay of authorities 
breaking away from the national framework could not be justified.  In this respect, 
like the benchmark authority, all the leader and follower authorities demonstrated a 
strong institutional lock-in to the national framework. Applying soft path dependency 
theory to the authorities examined, there was evidence from the participants 
interviewed that the national bargaining framework was like a tectonic plate. It had a 
degree of movement and flexibility built into it but nevertheless, a force, whether 
internally from one of the actors or externally, could precipitate a break that could 
lead to the demise of national bargaining in English local government. There was a 
mutuality of common interest amongst the institutional actors to make national 
collective bargaining a stable platform for conducting employment relations in local 
government. There was sufficient scepticism amongst the actors within the authorities 
examined not to leave the national collective bargaining framework because of the 
costly infrastructure changes that would be necessary and the perception that the 
organisational advantages would be minimal. The national framework gave the local 
authorities sufficient discretion to develop local pay and conditions of employment 
without necessitating a break from the national framework, and therefore for the 
foreseeable future they would remain in it.  
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Conclusion           
This chapter has examined the stakeholders within the leader and follower 
metropolitan authorities - trade unions’ representatives, managers, and elected 
members – and how and to what extent these stakeholders support the national 
collective bargaining framework. They were bound to different degrees by the 
historical legacy of the national framework which they saw as the foundation stone of 
joint regulation in local government. The Leader authorities because of their size and 
financial status, with long serving Labour administrations, were able to take a strong 
ideological position that supported the national framework through the period which 
was examined (1979-2007). They viewed the national collective bargaining 
framework as the bedrock for promoting a consensual employment relations 
environment in local government. The national framework recognised the pluralistic 
nature of local government, which had to satisfy the institutional stakeholders not just 
economically but also had to address social and political concerns that transcended 
individual local authorities as employers and affected local government as a whole.  
 
The follower authorities by comparison, where politically controlled by Labour 
administrations, also strongly supported the national collective bargaining framework 
as a political, economic and social ideal; however, this ideological position was 
challenged. The Labour controlled authorities had resisted the marketisation of 
services under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, however, under 
a Labour government these follower authorities had started to move towards an 
acceptance of working with private enterprise. This move towards engaging and 
working with private enterprise can be attributed to the need for private finance. By 
2000, to fund structural investment within these follower authorities they had to enter 
 
 241 
into commercial arrangements with the private sector that saw a shift away from 
adhering to the national collective bargaining framework and developing local 
bargaining structures that integrated working practices around their private sector 
business partners. Across the three authorities, the service areas affected by these new 
arrangements were small, while the majority of workers remained covered by national 
collective bargaining arrangements.  
 
The experience of the leader and follower authorities illustrates vividly the changing 
environmental dynamics that are affecting national collective bargaining in local 
government. Institutional theory has allowed us to contextualise the processes that 
shape and define collective bargaining and offers explanations why national, 
centralised bargaining continues to survive in these authorities.  Despite the process of 
marketisation and its impact on the leader and follower authorities, there was still 
support for national collective bargaining. Whether out of political idealism or 
organisational expediency, national collective bargaining was viewed as providing 
continuity and stability to employment relations in the leader and follower authorities.  
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                                       Chapter Eight 
                                   Deviant Authorities 
Introduction 
The two authorities examined in this chapter are representative of the local authorities 
that decided to withdraw from the national collective bargaining framework in the late 
1980s.  They are large shire authorities that while delivering similar services to their 
metropolitan counterparts, are shaped by their geography which is both rural and 
suburban. The chapter will examine: what defines a deviant authority; the nature of 
their political leadership; their move to local bargaining; trade union representation; 
and management practice within these local authorities. By comparing and contrasting 
them with the local authorities that stayed within the national collective bargaining 
framework we can establish if there are any generalisable explanations for the 
continued survival of centralised national collective bargaining in English local 
government. 
 
Deviant Authorities 
It is useful at the outset to define what we mean by a deviant authority. These are 
Conservative led local authorities, based in the South East of England, who in the late 
1980s implemented the Conservative government’s policy of deregulation in the 
labour market and the marketisation of the public sector.  The two local authorities 
examined in this study are shire county councils that cover large geographical areas 
with their populations (over half a million) being spread across both suburban and 
rural areas. They are socially, politically and economically shaped by their region, the 
South East. Like the leader authorities they have large budgets and are responsible for 
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the provision of public services that are statutory based. However, as they have gone 
down the route of becoming ‘enablers’ rather than ‘providers’ of public services these 
authorities have contracted out many of their services and have become clients in 
which they monitor and regulate, but are no longer direct providers of these services.  
 
The deviant authorities are outside of the local government national collective 
bargaining framework and have embraced a human resources approach that 
marginalises collective representation and in particular trade unions, in favour of 
focusing on the individual and emphasising the team nature of their organisations. 
Like Leader authorities they have well-resourced human resources and employment 
relations functions that act principally at a strategic level within their organisations, 
advising management but leaving the day to day human resources activities to line 
managers. The human resources policies within the deviant authorities are service 
delivery focused, emphasizing customer needs and expectations. Conditions of 
employment within these authorities are shaped by the budgetary infrastructure of the 
individual authorities and what they can afford to pay rather than the national local 
government collective bargaining framework which set pay and conditions of service 
across authorities. 
 
The counties have varied economies that are dependent on agriculture and fishing 
while also having traditional craft manufacturing like furniture and boat making. Like 
the metropolitan authorities, in the last thirty years, these shires have also seen 
changing fortunes within their local economies. Many of their traditional trades and 
industries have declined and both counties have become dormitory shires within the 
heavily populated South East of England as land and property prices have spiralled 
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upwards within the region and work has concentrated in London and the greater 
London area.  
 
Political Leadership 
Since the local government re-organisation of 1974 both authorities have been 
predominantly controlled by the Conservatives (authority nine for a short period being 
controlled by the Liberal Democrats [1991-1992]). Within both authorities they have 
fully adopted the Conservatives public sector reforms, changing their organisational 
focus from being ‘providers’ to ‘enablers’, which has seen them outsource services 
where possible on the grounds of economy and efficiency: 
“Here at [authority eight] we have pursued a business strategy in providing public 
services in the most cost effective way we can. This means that where external 
providers can offer services that meet our quality standards in a more economical 
way than we can deliver in-house, we have outsourced services. This has been our 
approach since the introduction of tendering of services back in the eighties.”  
(Director –People, Policy, and Strategy, Authority Eight)  
 
This approach to public service delivery is not only shaped by national Conservative 
Party ideology, but equally is reflected in the composition of the Conservative 
councillors that operate in both authorities: 
“Many of the Conservative elected members have a business approach to running the 
council which I think is reflected in their career backgrounds, as many of them are 
from business backgrounds where they run and are business owners. I think this 
insight tempers their approach to dealing with council affairs.”  
(Director- People, Policy, and Strategy, Authority Eight)        
 
 “The Conservative members tend to have professional backgrounds, particularly in 
the business world.”   
(Head of Employment Strategy, Authority Nine)     
 
As enabling authorities their direct employed workforces are relatively small (16,000, 
Authority 8, and 20,000 Authority Nine), given their geographical areas and the 
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populations they are responsible for (see table 8.1). The direct workforce is largely 
made up of white collar workers, principally in administrative, technical and 
managerial roles that are either responsible for providing statutory based professional 
functions like Environmental Health and Trading Standards, or client functions that 
oversee contract compliance for services that have been outsourced like roads 
maintenance. Both authorities have been rated as high performing councils by the 
Audit Commission. The table below gives some useful local labour market data on 
each of the areas that are covered by the two councils.  
 
Table 8.1 Employment in Deviant Authorities     
          
 Authority Eight Authority Nine 
Population   
Economically Active 
Working Population 
494,700 1,411,100 
Total numbers of jobs in 
all sectors of employment 
in area (workplace based) 
207,200  717,000 
Total numbers of jobs in 
Public Administration, 
Education, and Health 
Sector 
48,300 (23%) 161,200 (11%) 
Source: NOMIS – official labour market statistics (2009) Office of National 
Statistics 
 
 
 
The Marketisation of the Deviant Authorities 
The Conservative government’s public sector reform agenda after its 1979 election 
victory was fully supported by the two deviant authorities who were Conservative 
controlled. With the introduction of competitive tendering in the mid-eighties the two 
authorities put out to tender all direct manual services. Unlike Labour controlled 
authorities there was no political will to defend in-house services. The Conservative 
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controlled councils wished to introduce business regimes that made services subject to 
outside competition. The primary objective was to bring down costs and run the 
authorities as ‘low cost’ councils which they thought would appeal to the local 
electorate. Their buoyant local labour markets and the low unemployment levels (see 
Table 8.2) meant that there was not the political pressure to defend jobs in the same 
way as the metropolitan authorities whose areas in the nineteen eighties were affected 
by industrial and commercial decline. By the time of the introduction of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering to all local authorities in 1990, the deviant authorities had 
effectively contracted out all their direct manual services: 
“Early on we had started to look at competitive tendering as a way of driving down 
council service costs. We put out to tender: parks, and road maintenance in 1984. The 
success of the tendering process in providing a good standard of service while 
reducing council costs meant that as a council we were sold on the benefits. The 
positive experience we had I think was instrumental in central government rolling out 
CCT to all authorities.”  
(Head of Employment Strategy, Authority Nine)  
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Table 8.2 Unemployment Rates (percentage of working age residents) 
for Deviant Authorities 1979-2007 
 
 Authority Eight Authority Nine 
 Unemployment Rate (%)  Unemployment Rate (%) 
1979 2.3 3.2 
1980 2.5 3.8 
1981 3.1 5.5 
1982 4.0 4.1 
1983 4.3 4.7 
1984 4.8 5.1 
1985 4.2 4.6 
1986 3.8 4.9 
1987 3.6 5.3 
1988 3.4 5.2 
1989 3.9 5.0 
1990 4.0 4.2 
1991 4.1 4.8 
1992 4.6 5.2 
1993 5.1 6.5 
1994 4.2 5.3 
1995 3.5 4.6 
1996 2.9 3.3 
1997 1.7 2.1 
1998 1.3 1.7 
1999 1.3 1.9 
2000 1.0 1.3 
2001 0.9 1.0 
2002 1.1 1.2 
2003 1.4 1.5 
2004 1.3 1.6 
2005 1.1 1.8 
2006 1.2 2.3 
2007 1.0 2.5 
Source: Office of National Statistics/ Deviant local authorities’ statistical data 
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White collar professional occupation groups within the deviant authorities, like other 
local authorities across England, were not affected by the first wave of local 
government reform in the 1980s. The piloting of White Collar competitive tendering 
in 1990 was not followed through like the manual services were. Unlike the Labour 
controlled councils, the deviant authorities did not have any objections to its 
implementation on ideological or political grounds, but simply it had a limited 
application within their organisations. Both councils in the late 1980s experienced 
recruitment and retention difficulties with technical and professional occupational 
groups, which was a common experience with local authorities across the country. 
However, this situation was exacerbated further for the two councils by the South East 
labour market, which was putting a higher premium on skilled labour as the demand 
for it in London grew. This was compounded by supply and demand pressures for 
certain technical and professional occupational groups that predominantly operate in 
local government like Environmental Health, Trading Standards, and Planning, where 
there was an internal labour market between local authorities that were competing to 
recruit and retain workers in these professional white collar groups. Commercially, 
the private sector did not find these professional groups an attractive proposition 
because they could not cut labour costs as the supply for these workers were restricted 
and controlled by professional associations and as a consequence white collar 
competitive tendering stalled: 
“White collar CCT was a bit of a non-starter with us because there weren’t the 
external organisations that could provide the professional and technical services that 
could take on these services. Equally, there were legal ramifications about putting out 
statutory functions like environmental health, trading standards and planning. 
Legally, it was questionable whether the council could delegate these responsibilities 
to third parties when as an authority it was answerable before the law for the 
enforcement and protection in these areas.”  
(Head of Employment Strategy, Authority Nine)  
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The introduction of local government reforms under the New Labour government saw 
the deviant authorities continue to pursue a business model approach to running 
council services which despite the demise of CCT saw them outsource direct manual 
services through partnership agreements with commercial contractors. In common 
with other authorities, the deviant councils found the Best Value regime an 
administrative inconvenience. However, like other authorities they complied with the 
process because it still allowed them as councils to pursue their own organisational 
agendas set by their political and managerial leadership: 
“Best Value was a bit of an administrative nightmare. In compliance terms we didn’t 
have any problems as we had already established a performance management regime 
using indicators and benchmarking, which was similar to Best Value. The effort was 
satisfying the Audit Commission, jumping through hoops to satisfy them that we knew 
our business. We had proven ourselves as a high performing council and it just felt 
that Best Value was no more than political flannel to show that the New Labour 
government were in control of public spending.”  
(Director – People, Policy, and strategy, Authority Eight)              
 
The Move to Local Bargaining – The Historical Context 
Authorities eight’s and nine’s decision to move away from the national bargaining 
framework was driven by the perception that the national agreements did not give 
them the flexibility they needed to respond to the recruitment and retention problems 
they were both facing in their local labour markets in the late 1980s.    Both 
authorities were experiencing severe difficulties in recruiting certain white collar 
occupational groups like engineering, information technology and surveying where it 
was not unusual to have large numbers of vacancies: 
“I can remember as a junior officer in the late 1980s we were finding it difficult to 
recruit key staff, particularly in the newly emerging technology areas like IT. We just 
couldn’t compete with the expanding London labour market that appeared to have an 
insatiable appetite for white collar, technology orientated professionals. The rigidity 
of the national pay structure did not seem to offer the flexibility that we perceived we 
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needed to attract new talent to work for us, while also retaining and rewarding 
existing employees who might be tempted to leave. Even with offering additional 
increments and recruitment incentives that included subsidised lease cars and 
relocation packages that paid up to £10,000, we still had vacancies. From both a 
political and managerial perspective this was a crisis that needed a radical solution. 
Independence from the national conditions of service was seen as the way forward.” 
 (Head of Employment Strategy Authority Nine) 
 
National pay awards in local government have historically been bottom loaded, 
focusing on raising pay and conditions of low paid workers.  In the case of authorities 
eight and nine, this did not reflect their concerns with remuneration policy at the time. 
In the late 1980s both authorities were competing in a tight south eastern labour 
market for highly skilled white collar workers. However, they did not face the same 
problem recruiting blue collar workers. The rise of house prices in the South East 
compounded this situation as it became difficult to recruit from outside the region.  
 
In the 1980s while both authorities were still operating within the national framework 
they sought to improve their recruitment and retention difficulties by offering local 
enhancements to the existing terms and conditions offered by the national framework. 
However, this created a situation where existing employees were disgruntled at new 
starters pay and conditions which led to re-grading appeals as they tried to catch up 
with new starters: 
“We had new starters appointed on the mid - scale point of grades that immediately 
put them at odds with existing employees who had had to start at the bottom of the 
spinal column point of the grade. It created a tension amongst existing employees that 
saw a rise in grading appeals as this was seen as the only means of ensuring that they 
did not lag behind in the pay stakes.”  
(Head of Employment Strategy Authority Nine)   
 
The situation deteriorated further because both authorities were departing to such a 
degree from the national conditions of service that pressure was being brought to bear 
on them by the Local Authorities’ Conditions of Service Advisory Board [LACSAB] 
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to comply with national agreements.  A number of local authorities, including eight 
and nine, felt that their recruitment and retention difficulties could only be solved by a 
fundamental re-appraisal of their remuneration strategies which could only happen 
outside the national framework: 
“LACSAB [The Local Authorities’ Conditions of Service Advisory Board] was not 
happy that we were riding coach and horses through the national agreements that 
was de-stabilising national unity amongst employers who viewed our actions as 
undermining the national negotiating position. While we [name of authority] saw the 
changes as marginal and at best a temporary solution to an ever growing problem 
with employees’ remuneration. Leaving national bargaining was seen by both the 
politicians and management in [name of authority] as the only realistic and practical 
way of developing compensation packages that could be competitive in the dynamic 
labour market we were operating in. “ 
(Head of Employment Strategy Authority Nine) 
 
 
In the mid-1980s local authorities in the South East explored the option of moving to 
regional pay bargaining. The South Eastern Provincial Council looked at three 
bargaining options. Firstly, they could remain in the national framework and a policy 
of no change. Secondly, they could combine with neighbouring authorities to 
undertake bargaining on a regional basis. Finally, they could opt for local bargaining 
at an authority level. No consensus was reached, the regional option fell by the 
wayside and local authorities either stayed or left the national framework: 
“At the time we [LACSAB] tried to satisfy local authorities in the South East by 
looking at regional pay bargaining. This was in recognition of the perceived local 
pressures these councils were facing, particularly in relation to recruitment and 
retention difficulties they were experiencing. Despite our best efforts to explore 
various options nothing came of the exercise. During the discussions it was apparent 
to me that a number of the authorities were intent on leaving the national framework 
and had no intention of going down the regional bargaining route.”   
(Retired Director of Local Government Employers)  
 
As authorities eight and nine were at the forefront in moving towards an enabling 
model which placed a greater emphasis on devolving services from internal in-house 
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services to external service providers. Those services that remained in-house had to 
embrace a new performance culture that focused on customer care initiatives and 
moved away from the traditional bureaucratic model of local government to a more 
responsive business model. The argument for local bargaining was that: 
“Pay rates and practices which are set nationally may help to solve the problems and 
address the needs of local authorities elsewhere. But they are increasingly irrelevant 
to [Name of authority] needs; and the ethos of automatic incremental progression, 
with slow movement through salary grades, has been an obstacle to the change to a 
‘performance culture’ which [Name of authority] management style required.” 
(Griffiths, 1990: 104)  
The move to break away from the national framework in both authorities was 
politically led by the ruling Conservative Groups who saw independence from the 
national framework giving them greater organisational autonomy. It cannot be 
underestimated that these authorities were following the wishes of the Conservative 
central government for local authorities to opt for local bargaining which was viewed 
as part of the reforming process in the public sector (Jackson et al. 1993). The 
Conservative political philosophy of greater managerial autonomy to individual 
authorities was promoted on the back of individual local authority difficulties and 
many Conservative councils in the 1980s used their particular organisational 
difficulties to argue for a change to local bargaining: 
“I have no doubt in my mind that the recruitment and retention difficulties that a 
number of authorities used as a reason for departing from national collective 
bargaining were a convenient excuse. We [LACSAB] argued that there was sufficient 
flexibility in the national agreements to deal with their specific problems. The 
councils that left the national framework did so for ideological reasons. They were 
shaped by the Conservatives belief in a local government reforming agenda that 
favoured greater organisational and managerial discretion at an authority level.  
Nick Ridley felt that the national framework promoted a cosy relationship between us 
[LACSAB] and the trade unions and he favoured a break-up of the national 
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collective bargaining machinery because he saw it as an impediment to change and 
reform in local government management practice.”  
(Retired Director of Local Government Employers)  
 
 
Trade Unions 
When authorities eight and nine withdrew from the national framework in the late 
1980s the principal local government trade union, NALGO, vehemently resisted the 
move for social, political and economic reasons. NALGO viewed the departure from 
the national framework as a prelude to de-recognition and the end of collective 
bargaining and joint regulation of employment relations, which in both cases would 
undermine their position. NALGO advised the branches in both authorities not to 
engage in local bargaining. This tactic played into the hands of both employers who 
did not move to de-recognise NALGO but rather took the opportunity to develop 
employment policies that were developed without any participation from the union: 
“When we decided to go it alone and break with the national conditions of service 
NALGO refused to co-operate. They took the view that local bargaining would 
undermine the national agreements on pay and conditions and upset the local 
government employment relations apple cart. We saw it as an opportunity to improve 
pay and conditions locally and enhance how we managed our workforce. NALGO 
missed getting in on the ground floor and engaging in developing the new 
employment policies at [name of the authority]. “ 
(Head of Employment Strategy Authority Nine) 
 
 
When UNISON was established in 1993 it faced a dilemma dealing with the two 
authorities and the others that had left the national collective bargaining framework. 
Politically, it endorsed the approach that NALGO had taken, in that national 
collective bargaining was still the bedrock of local government employment relations 
and that the majority of its membership in over 90% of other local authorities in 
England remained in the Whitley Model. However, it still had a membership in the 
authorities that had left the national framework and how was it going to represent 
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their interests? In authorities eight and nine, UNISON although recognised did not 
play a role in setting pay and conditions and was marginalised to representing 
members on an individual rather than collective basis (Trade union Membership 
levels: 18% Authority Eight and 30% Authority Nine). Both authorities through their 
management structures consulted directly with employees about pay and conditions 
but in effect senior management and elected members determined what was 
appropriate by referring to local labour market conditions and affordability which was 
calculated on budgetary conditions of both authorities. This position remained until 
consultation legislation (as a consequence of a European Union Directive 
[Information and Consultation Directive 2004]) introduced under New Labour gave a 
renewed vigour to UNISON’s participation in both of the authorities: 
“In the 1990s UNISON was very much out of the loop with a number of authorities in 
the South East, particularly the two authorities you are interested in, which had taken 
a hard line position that they were going to side-line us as much as possible in their 
organisational decision making. NALGO’s position that they were not going to 
engage in local bargaining was a position that we took on [UNISON], and in many 
respects we paid a high price for this decision, certainly from a regional point of 
view, where over a period of ten years we lost a third of our members, as our role was 
restricted to representing individual members and being frozen out of pay and 
conditions negotiations. The introduction of statutory consultation provisions under 
New Labour saw a thawing out between ourselves and the councils that have seen us 
engage to a limited degree in the decision making process and re-establish a foothold 
corporately within these councils.”    
(Head of Local Government- South Eastern Region UNISON)  
 
T&GWU and subsequently UNITE have had a limited membership in both 
authorities, and more widely in the South Eastern local authorities as a whole. 
Historically representing manual workers’ interests in local government, the 
marketisation process has seen both authorities contract out work initially under 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering and more recently continue with outsourcing 
manual services through partnership agreements with commercial contractors. As a 
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consequence UNITE and T&GWU have had minimal involvement with the two 
authorities directly: 
“The T&GWU did not have a strong presence in the councils in the South East. With 
the privatisation of direct services the union had working relationships with a number 
of the contractors. The opportunity to enter into any meaningful kind of bargaining 
was restricted by the contract specifications that the contractors had to satisfy under 
the tender agreements and the union couldn’t approach councils directly under these 
arrangements.”  
(Director of Research - UNITE). 
 
 
Management and Human Resource Management 
 
In both authorities the dominant management view was that national collective 
bargaining in local government had become out dated and was no longer relevant to 
their organisational needs: 
“National agreements on pay and conditions have failed to reflect the needs of 
councils and more specifically the budgetary constraints that are placed on them. 
‘The one size fits all’ approach is no longer good enough, and councils are looking 
for greater discretion in how they manage their affairs. Having worked in both 
councils that are still in the national framework and for my present employer who is 
not, I can only say that the managerial and organisational freedom I have here in 
developing employment strategies without having to comply with national agreements 
allows me to implement policies that cater specifically for the needs of this council 
both as an employer and as a council that serves its local community.”  
(Director – People, Policy and Strategy, Authority Eight)  
 
“I started a few years before we left the national framework and I can remember the 
employment circulars that came from LACSAB which inundated us with guidance 
notes on policies that had been agreed nationally. They always seemed a bit abstract 
and remote and I often questioned there relevance to what we were experiencing on 
the ground as a council. We dutifully filed them away and had an extensive archive 
which we rarely referred to.  As the eighties drew to a close we just felt that the 
national agreements no longer reflected our interests as a council and we felt that it 
was a logical step to leave the national framework and develop our own employment 
policies that reflected our local situation.”  
(Head of Employment Strategy, Authority Nine)   
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The human resource functions in the deviant authorities have fully embraced HR 
theories and have implemented employment policies that are tailored to the business 
needs of their authorities. This business focus has seen both authorities develop 
grading structures that have discontinued with automatic incremental progression 
within grades; introduced performance management linked to organisational targets; 
and performance related pay to profit centred services areas. The HR functions within 
the deviant authorities are similar to the HR direct service functions in the leader 
metropolitan authorities that are responsible for commercial services. They have taken 
on an overt management role that is predicated on giving ‘added value’ to the 
management in services across their organisations: 
“The HR function here is business focused on helping managers deliver the best 
public services to the community. We have to give the managers the necessary HR 
tools and support to allow them to get on with their primary service delivery roles. 
The HR function is integral to the organisational success of this council and we have 
established credibility with both managers and elected members in giving ‘added 
value.’ “(Director – People, Policy, and Strategy, Authority Eight)         
 
“There is no doubt that the HR function here has changed significantly since we left 
the national framework. We are very much business partners with the service areas 
that we support, being part of their management teams. Service managers are looking 
for us to provide solutions to the HR issues they encounter both operationally and 
corporately. Our role has moved away from being an administrative one to one which 
is more advisory based and we see ourselves as an internal consultancy which 
provides HR solutions that are tailored made to the council’s organisational needs.” 
(Head of Employment Strategy, Authority Nine)   
 
The recruitment and retention difficulties that local authorities eight and nine faced in 
the 1980s were a catalyst to both authorities leaving the national bargaining 
framework.  However, this factor alone cannot adequately explain why they left. At 
the heart of their decision to leave the national framework was a political ideological 
position that believed that reform could best be achieved through independence that 
could promote managerial and organisational autonomy. Authorities eight and nine 
wanted to introduce performance management systems that focused on business 
 
 257 
strategies that would allow them to become ‘enabler’ rather than ‘provider’ 
authorities. Both authorities questioned the logic of continuing to belong to the 
national framework as they perceived it to be incompatible with their local needs. 
With the marketisation process of local government through Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering and the emphasis of lowering service costs to rate payers, authorities eight 
and nine perceived that the way forward was through opting out of the national 
framework. 
 
Authorities eight and nine under their Conservative leadership promoted human 
resource management strategies that sought to marginalise the influence of collective 
representation through the trade unions. Initially, consultations over pay and 
conditions with the trade unions were withdrawn when the principal trade union, 
NALGO, refused to engage in any form of local bargaining, Instead both authorities 
established direct communications with their employees that bypassed the trade 
unions. Both authorities up until the statutory consultation legislation was introduced 
by the New Labour government bypassed the trade unions as they felt that they could 
manage and run smoothly their authorities without the need for trade unions: 
“We had in place [during the period 1990-1997] an employment relations system that 
while recognising the rights of individual employees did not promote trade unions 
participating in organisational decision making. We still engaged with them on 
individual employee issues like dealing with disciplinaries and grievances, but pay 
and conditions of service were very much employer led with management and the 
political leadership deciding how they wanted to develop HR and employment 
relations practice in the authority.  We spoke directly to employees and trade unions 
seemed less relevant as employees from the chief executive downwards, were working 
to provide the best services to the public, who after all were our ultimate boss.”  
(Head of Employment Strategy, Authority Nine)        
 
 
 
 
 258 
Analysis 
The actors in the two deviant authorities can be characterised as having polarised 
views on the importance of national collective bargaining in English local 
government. On the one hand, management (including HR) and local councillors in 
both authorities showed little support for national collective bargaining and described 
it as a ‘relic’ of a past age. This attitude is probably a reflection of both authorities 
being out of the national framework for over twenty years. These actors felt strongly 
that the national framework had been an impediment to their authorities’ 
organisational and political autonomy in allowing them to decide how their 
workforces should be employed and rewarded. They believed the national framework 
had stifled their ability to recruit and retain key workers and that the national pay and 
conditions had not reflected the reality of what they were facing locally. This 
argument around recruitment and retention acted as a convenient catalyst for the local 
Conservative administrations in these deviant authorities to leave the national 
framework. Their departure in 1990 coincides with the second phase of the 
marketisation process in local government, when the Conservative government 
introduced Compulsory Competitive Tendering across all local authorities in England.  
Examining their actions through the lens of soft path dependency, we see that the 
deviant authorities have been allowed to change and re-adjust through the ‘mindful 
action’ of the political actors in these authorities and have not felt the ‘institutional 
lock-in’ that the Benchmark, Leader and Follower local authorities in this study have.   
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The principal union in both authorities, UNISON, and before 1993, NALGO, adopted 
their union’s national position that the national collective bargaining framework in 
local government is and has been integral to promoting the interests of its members. 
National collective bargaining is the cornerstone of joint regulation in local 
government employment relations and it has given the trade unions a legitimacy in the 
negotiating process which has secured and improved pay and conditions. From 1990 
through 2000 NALGO/ UNISON had struggled in both authorities as their initial 
withdrawal saw NALGO lose its collective bargaining position as it refused to engage 
in local bargaining. This resulted in both employers going down an employer 
regulation route, unilaterally deciding pay and conditions, while still recognising 
NALGO/UNISON. Over a ten year period NALGO/UNISON were reduced to being a 
side player in employment relations in both authorities. The New Labour government 
redressed the position to a degree with the consultation legislation, which re-
invigorated UNISON’s collective representative role, but both authorities continued to 
maintain a predominantly employer led position in setting pay and conditions within 
their authorities. UNISON has continued to champion national collective bargaining 
in local government but this has been at the expense of losing members at both 
councils where membership had fallen ( in the South East region NALGO/UNISON 
reportedly lost a third of its members between 1990 and 2000). Regionally, UNISON 
representatives in the South East have tentatively considered negotiating at a local 
level with councils, but the reality is that those that are outside of the national 
framework have not felt inclined to enter into local bargaining because they have not 
felt the need to do so.  
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The fundamental difference between the deviant and metropolitan authorities has been 
their approach to local government reform and the process of marketisation and how 
as employers they have faced up to these challenges. The deviant authorities 
embraced the reforms from the outset, introducing and developing a business model 
approach to running council services that saw the contracting out of direct manual 
services through competitive tendering in the mid-eighties, leading on to compulsory 
competitive tendering in the early nineties until 1997. Both of the deviant authorities 
did not defend in-house services from outside competition as it ran contrary to their 
ideological position as Conservative controlled authorities who were in relatively 
affluent areas (low levels of unemployment see Table 8.2) where the protection of 
public services and jobs was not perceived as high on the local electorate’s   agenda.   
Tight financial management and budgetary control were seen as priorities in running 
council services that gave ‘value for money’, and the manner in which these services 
were delivered and by whom were less important.   The authorities became ‘enabling’ 
councils organising and overseeing services and their compliance, but not necessarily 
providing services directly as a council. As employers, the deviant authorities’ 
adoption of human resources practices saw them develop performance management 
cultures that focused primarily on service delivery outcomes which moulded 
conditions of employment and the nature of who worked directly for them and those 
that did not.  
 
The low skilled manual workforces in each of the authorities were outsourced to 
private commercial contractors while white collar, technical and professional workers 
remained employed within the councils. This difference in treatment can be distilled 
down to the labour market supply and demand for the occupational groups.  Both 
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local authorities, in common with other local authorities across the country,   could 
not effectively outsource their white collar workers because there was not sufficient 
external capacity to provide services, that in many cases relied on specialist 
knowledge and training that was exclusive to specific local government professional 
occupational groups that did not ordinarily operate in the wider external labour 
market. The deviant authorities therefore became white collar dominated 
organisations as manual services that relied on unskilled labour were contracted out to 
private sector contractors who could employ workers from the wider labour market 
and drive labour costs down in the pursuit of reduced service costs, making them low 
cost councils.    
 
Table 8.3 Rationale and Strength of Support for National Collective 
Bargaining in the Deviant Authorities  
 
 
 
REGULATIVE 
 
WEAK – The management and 
politicians in both authorities see the 
national framework as out dated and not 
relevant to their political and 
organisational needs.   
 
 
 
NORMATIVE 
 
 
WEAK – The management and 
politicians in both authorities do not see 
any social obligation to support the 
national framework which they have 
abandoned in favour of their own local 
framework. They no longer see national 
collective bargaining as the legitimate 
means of employment regulation in their 
authorities.   
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE 
 
 
WEAK – The management and 
politicians in both authorities have weak 
ties to the national collective bargaining 
framework as they have broken away 
from it to create their own individual pay 
and conditions that they believe reflect 
their own individual needs. They see a 
logic to being outside of the national 
framework and view it as an impediment 
to their political and economic autonomy.    
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Conclusion           
This chapter has examined the deviant local authorities, looking at how being outside 
of the national collective bargaining framework shapes their employment relations 
practice. Politically and managerially these local authorities reject the national 
collective bargaining as a ‘relic’ of a bygone age that no longer reflect their needs, 
acting as an impediment to their authorities’ organisational and political autonomy in 
allowing them to decide how their workforces should be employed and rewarded. 
They believe the national framework has stifled their ability to recruit and retain key 
workers and that the national pay and conditions no longer reflect the reality of what 
they face locally. 
 
The fundamental difference between the deviant and metropolitan authorities has been 
their approach to local government reform and the process of marketisation and how 
as employers they have faced up to these challenges. The deviant authorities 
embraced the reforms from the outset, introducing and developing a business model 
approach to running council services that saw the contracting out of direct manual 
services through competitive tendering in the mid-eighties, leading on to compulsory 
competitive tendering in the early nineties until 1997. Tight financial management 
and budgetary control were seen as priorities in running council services that gave 
‘value for money’, and the manner in which these services were delivered and by 
whom were less important.    
 
The authorities became ‘enabling’ councils organising and overseeing services and 
their compliance, but not necessarily providing services directly as a council. As 
employers, the deviant authorities’ adoption of human resources practices saw them 
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develop performance management cultures that focused primarily on service delivery 
outcomes which moulded conditions of employment and the nature of who worked 
directly for them and those that did not. The low skilled manual workforces in each of 
the authorities were outsourced to private commercial contractors while white collar, 
technical and professional workers have remained employed within the councils. This 
difference in treatment can be distilled down to the labour market supply and demand 
for the occupational groups.   
 
Both local authorities, in common with other local authorities across the country,   
could not effectively outsource their white collar workers because there was not 
sufficient external capacity to provide services, that in many cases relied on specialist 
knowledge and training that was exclusive to specific local government professional 
occupational groups that did not ordinarily operate in the wider external labour 
market. The deviant authorities therefore have become white collar dominated 
organisations as manual services that rely on unskilled labour were contracted out to 
private sector contractors who could employ workers from the wider labour market 
and drive labour costs down in the pursuit of reduced service costs, making them ‘low 
cost’ councils.    
 
The deviant authorities examined in this study have been shaped by the dominance of 
their Conservative leaderships. Over a twenty year period, these Conservative 
controlled councils, have gone in the opposite direction to the metropolitan Labour 
controlled councils, contracting out services where possible and fully implementing 
marketisation to make them enabler rather than provider authorities. However, these 
deviant authorities have still ‘shadowed’ the pay and conditions formulated through 
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the national collective bargaining framework.  Their conditions of employment, 
despite the rhetoric and the organisational reforms they have introduced, remain 
essentially similar to local authorities that have remained in the national framework. 
The distinction is that the deviant authorities have sought to contract out their in-
house workforce where possible, but those that remain, primarily skilled, professional 
and technical workers, have in essence been employed on similar terms to those of 
their occupational counterparts in the wider local government sector.     
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                                       Chapter Nine 
                                     
                                        Conclusions  
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will draw together the different strands explored in the thesis. In doing 
so, I will highlight a number of key features that have contributed to the survival of 
centralised national collective bargaining in English local government.    Most 
academic research on employment relations in local government and the wider public 
sector has focused on ‘change’, with an over schematic emphasis on ‘neo-liberalism’ 
which potentially has obscured the complex political and employment relations 
processes that have taken place. In this work I have examined the roots of ‘continuity’ 
and resilience. My research focus has not been on why and how has local government 
employment relations changed – which it undoubtedly has – but rather why the 
principal means of joint employment regulation – centralised, national collective 
bargaining - has stayed the same to a surprisingly degree. 
 
It is useful to provide a brief recap of the previous chapters.  Chapter two traces the 
development of the UK public sector over the period from 1979 until 2007. The 
chapter examines the structural reforms within the sector and how these impacted on 
public sector employment relations. Chapter three provides an overview of the 
historical development of local government focusing on the post 1979 period which 
saw a major transformation through a reforming process initially implemented by the 
Thatcher governments of the 1980s and followed through by the Labour government 
under Tony Blair in 1997. The chapter assesses the nature of these changes and how 
the Conservative and Labour administrations shaped them for their own political 
objectives. The chapter provides a foundation for understanding the local government 
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employment relations landscape and how this was shaped by the reforms that 
permeated every level of local government. 
 
Chapter four examines the theoretical underpinning of the thesis and how 
institutional/path dependency theories offers an analytical reference point that helps to 
offer some potential explanations of why the national collective bargaining 
framework continues to survive in English local government. The chapter divides into 
three sections. The first looks at institutional theory and the concept of path 
dependency and their application to employment relations research, more specifically 
Scott’s analytical framework of Three Institutional Pillars is examined. The second 
section looks at the use of institutional theory in employment relations research, 
examining how academics have used institutional theory in their research. The final 
section shows how institutional theory fits into my research.    
 
In chapter five I have shown the methodological approach I have adopted in 
examining my area of interest – the national collective bargaining framework of 
English local government. In the course of my fieldwork I have been able to obtain a 
rich seam of material built upon the personal experiences of elite policy actors and 
combined with the literature; this has enabled me to develop my hypothesis and 
ultimately my contribution to knowledge. My work has been heavily influenced by 
institutional theory, in that issues of context, institutional structures, and causality 
have been of central importance (Ackers, 2002). The sectoral study, adopting the 
‘firm in sector’ methodology approach, has enabled me to explore the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions and help to illuminate and explore the complex and inter-dependent 
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relationship of the institutional actors, and why they do (or not) continue to support 
centralised national collective bargaining in English local government.   
 
The empirical chapters examine: The benchmark authority (chapter six); the leader 
and follower authorities (chapter seven); and the deviant authorities (chapter eight). 
Each chapter starts with an outline defining the type of organisations examined and in 
turn examines: Historical background and their political leadership; the impact of the 
Conservative governments’ (1979- 1997) and the New Labour government’s (1997-
2007) reforms; and the role of the actors – trade unions, management and politicians 
within these organisations. In the analysis section the Three Pillars framework is 
applied to each of the actors which illustrate the degree of strength and support they 
show towards the national collective bargaining framework. Each empirical chapter 
concludes with a discussion that highlights the key issues that have been illuminated 
by the fieldwork and how this contributes to the wider discussion and issues that are 
linked to the other empirical chapters in the thesis. 
 
The Findings of the Research 
At its core my study reveals that the principal stakeholders within English local 
government – trade unions, management, and politicians – over the thirty years 
examined (1979-2007), continued to support national collective bargaining. This 
support by the stakeholders was to different degrees, and was highlighted by the 
application of new institutional theory and in particular Scott’s Three Pillars and the 
concept of path dependency (see Table 9.1).     
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New institutional theory has illuminated the regulative, normative and cognitive 
dimensions that have shaped the views and positions of the stakeholders and the 
degree of support or non-support they have shown towards the national collective 
bargaining framework. The level of support on one level can be viewed as strong, 
with stakeholders like Labour and UNISON strongly supporting the national 
framework for both practical and philosophical reasons, while Conservative 
politicians and management in local authorities outside of the national framework 
have equally rejected it for what they consider both practical and philosophical 
reasons. Between these two positions stakeholders, particularly in the follower 
authorities, have shown how they have had to constantly refine and re-evaluate their 
support for the national collective bargaining in the light of the political and economic 
realities that face them as individual actors and the authorities they operate in.    
 
The study has shown that national collective bargaining has been a vital cornerstone 
in English local government employment relations. It has promoted joint regulation 
which recognises the legitimacy of trade unions in shaping the employment relations 
agenda in local government. The leader and follower local authorities examined 
vividly demonstrate the inter-relationship between the actors and how the national 
framework fulfils the role of managing the political and managerial processes, and 
how ‘best practice’ flows out from certain authorities, as in the case of the leader 
authorities influencing the follower authorities.   The study shows that despite the 
reforms and marketisation processes that have brought about change in local 
government, the national collective bargaining framework has managed to survive 
and still remain relevant to local government employment relations.  
 
 
 269 
This resilience and continuity can be attributed to the national framework being 
adaptable to the changing political and economic environment while at its core 
remaining faithful to its origins in the ‘Model Employer’ tradition promoting 
industrial pluralism in the workplace. The national framework manages to 
accommodate the various political, economic and social interests of the stakeholders. 
New institutional theory through Scott’s Three Pillars analytical framework has 
shown that through looking at the regulative, normative and cognitive dimensions in 
the context of   the support for the national framework of each of the stakeholders, a 
picture unfolds that despite differing degrees of support between the stakeholders 
there is still a common tie to the national collective bargaining framework that can be 
described as a passive consensus. This passive consensus is based on a mutual 
recognition between the stakeholders that the collective bargaining framework 
continues to promote their individual interests while also being a pragmatic means of 
providing collective solutions to employment relations issues. However, this support 
is contingent as we have seen from the study, on the stakeholders continuing to find it 
relevant to the changing economic, political and social environment that local 
government finds itself in.   
 
In the wider political and constitutional setting, the national collective bargaining 
framework’s resilience and survival is entwined in the nature of English local 
government. The historical relationship between central and local government have 
seen national collective bargaining take on a prominence in employment relations 
because it has been an effective constraining and controlling mechanism. In the period 
examined (1979-2007) both the Conservatives and Labour administrations had sought 
to tightly control public expenditure which had become supply rather than demand 
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led. It is in this context that the centralised national collective bargaining framework 
in local government has given central government a degree of control over the wage 
bill. This has been a critical controlling element given that local authorities are the 
largest public sector employer (2.5 million workers) in a sector employing just under 
six million workers that spends about 20% of GDP (Travers, 2005).  
 
My research has highlighted the importance of local government political 
accountability and transparency in shaping and influencing the development of 
national collective bargaining in English local government. It has been nurtured by an 
underlying philosophy within the majority of local authorities, which view the 
continued support and maintenance of a centralised national collective bargaining 
framework not just on the grounds of efficiency or effectiveness in service delivery 
terms, but rather as a means of maintaining legitimacy and status of the stakeholders 
and therefore conforming to the institutional norms that emanate from the collective 
bargaining arrangements, local government becomes optimal, if not efficient in the 
way it maintains its viability as a public service institution. 
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Table 9.1 Strength of Support for National Collective Bargaining 
across the Local   Authorities in the Sectoral Study 
 
 REGULATIVE NORMATIVE COGNITIVE 
BENCHMARK  
AUTHORITY 
   
TRADE UNIONS    
UNISON STRONG STRONG STRONG 
UNITE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT 
   
OPERATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT  
MEDIUM MEDIUM WEAK 
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES 
MANAGEMENT 
STRONG MEDIUM MEDIUM 
 
HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
   
 
OPERATIONAL   MEDIUM MEDIUM WEAK 
CORPORATE  STRONG MEDIUM MEDIUM 
 
ELECTED MEMBERS     
CONSERVATIVE MEDIUM MEDIUM WEAK 
LABOUR STRONG STRONG STRONG 
LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
    
LEADER 
AUTHORITIES 
   
TRADE UNIONS    
UNISON STRONG STRONG STRONG 
UNITE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT  
   
OPERATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 
MEDIUM WEAK WEAK 
 
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES 
MANAGEMENT 
STRONG MEDIUM MEDIUM 
HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGMENT 
   
OPERATIONAL  MEDIUM WEAK WEAK 
CORPORATE  STRONG MEDIUM MEDIUM 
ELECTED MEMBERS    
CONSERVATIVES MEDIUM WEAK WEAK 
LABOUR STRONG STRONG STRONG 
LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
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 REGULATIVE NORMATIVE  COGNITIVE 
FOLLOWER 
AUTHORITIES 
   
TRADE UNIONS    
UNISON STRONG STRONG STRONG 
UNITE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT 
   
OPERATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 
MEDIUM WEAK WEAK 
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES 
MANAGEMENT 
STRONG MEDIUM MEDIUM 
HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
   
OPERATIONAL  MEDIUM WEAK WEAK 
CORPORATE  STRONG MEDIUM MEDIUM 
ELECTED MEMBERS    
CONSERVATIVE MEDIUM WEAK WEAK 
LABOUR STRONG STRONG STRONG 
LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
    
DEVIANT 
AUTHORITIES 
WEAK WEAK WEAK 
 
 
 
 
All Change in the Public Sector – the Rhetoric and Reality of Reform  
 
After 1979, when Conservative governments began the process of public sector 
reform, it was widely anticipated that national collective bargaining would be eroded 
by the creation of quasi markets that would see a widespread move to local bargaining 
(Thornley, 1994; Sinclair et al., 1995; Kessler and Purcell, 1996; and White, 1997).  
Thirty years on in English local government, this framework not only survives, but 
remains at the forefront of employment relations.  
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Clearly there is considerable truth in this broad-brush public sector reform story of 
marketisation and new public management - under Conservatives and then Labour. 
Multi-level business units were shaped initially by Conservative financial strategy, 
but Labour linked them to consumer service expectations (Cutler and Waine, 2000). 
Both Conservative and Labour sought greater control of resource allocation and 
employment policy decisions (Bach and Winchester, 2003) and to improve national 
competitiveness (Giddens, 2000). But beneath the smooth surface narrative lie many 
differences, tensions and contradictions. On the one hand, Labour took a more 
interventionist regulatory approach to managing public services reform (Bach, 2002, 
Timmins, 2001). On the other, real outcomes did not match public policy rhetoric. 
Labour pushed for localised and variable pay (Colling, 2001, Kessler et al 2000, 
Dawson and Dargie 2002 and Morris and Farrell 2007), but such changes occurred at 
variable speeds across the public sector and any ‘convergence with the private sector’ 
has been ‘more apparent than real’ (Duncan, 2001: 32).   
 
The public sector employment relations literature has neglected the dynamics of 
national collective bargaining frameworks. I have had to turn to the wider literature on 
collective bargaining and in particular, two studies by Korczynski (1997) and Gospel 
and Druker (1998), whose work have highlighted the importance of the state and 
unions in the political process of establishing bargaining levels; and the survival of 
national bargaining as a consequence of sectoral and industrial characteristics. They 
have shown that where a centralised trade union and employer environment exist, it 
has been a conduit to national collective bargaining, and have shown how it has been 
sustained by specific historical and ideological legacies. Both studies drill down 
within the industrial sectors they examine to illuminate why in these particular 
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industries a national framework survives, when in the wider UK labour market 
collective bargaining has become decentralised. Similar research in the public sector 
has not been undertaken. Following in their footsteps I have sought to contextualise 
and analyse within English local government why the national collective bargaining 
framework has continued to survive. I believe that within the public sector 
employment relations literature emphasizing ‘change’ it may have obscured the 
complex political and employment relations processes that continue to anchor the 
existing system. So my focus has not been on  why and how local government 
employment relations has changed but rather what accounts for the resilience and 
continuity and the survival of an employment relations framework. 
    
Passive Consensus – the Continuity and Resilience of National 
Collective Bargaining in English Local Government    
 
The national collective bargaining framework continues to survive and remain 
relevant because it has created a passive consensus between the main institutional 
stakeholders. By passive consensus, I mean that the institutional stakeholders 
although having quite often different and opposing organisational objectives, 
nevertheless, see a utility in supporting the national collective bargaining framework. 
The strength of this support varies considerably between the institutional stakeholders 
and reflects political, social and economic interests. With the application of neo-
institutional theory in my sectoral study, I have managed to lift the veil of political 
rhetoric which prevails within national politics. Instead, I tap into a world of 
pragmatic policy practice. By policy practice, I mean decisions that actively involved 
participants – trade unions’ representatives, managers, and politicians - at a national, 
regional, and authority level, who are experienced practitioners and have an in-depth 
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understanding over many years of the conduct of employment relations in local 
government.        
 
The national collective bargaining framework, using an anatomical metaphor, exhibits 
a capacity to be both a skeleton and exoskeleton. As a skeleton all the internal 
stakeholders within local government – trade unions, management and local 
politicians are attached to it, giving form and function to the process of employment 
relations. Each of the internal stakeholders is part of this supporting structure. 
Stakeholders often counteract each other, but remain attached to national collective 
bargaining. By sticking to ‘the rules of the game’ these countervailing forces can be 
harnessed through the national collective bargaining framework to create stability and 
co-ordinated movement.  The exoskeleton metaphor dramatizes how the external 
force of the state reinforces national collective bargaining.  
 
There is no doubt that national economic and service delivery imperatives have had 
an impact on local government and how these services are delivered. Central 
government of all political parties has tacitly supported the national framework as a 
means of controlling spending. Its role as economic regulator and legislator puts it in 
a unique position of defining and setting out public service provisions as both an 
organ of the state and an employer. As paymaster, central government has always 
focused on the cost of funding local government provisions and the processes of 
managing these costs have always been dealt with centrally. The funding of local 
government is overseen centrally and through the use of regulatory bodies like the 
Audit Commission. This has ensured that local government complies with centralised 
prescribed processes that shape the employment relations practice nationally within 
 
 276 
local government (Roper, Higgins, and James, 2007).  At the heart of central 
government’s wish to maintain a national collective bargaining framework is its 
desire to contain local government expenditure which is crucial to any government’s 
political and economic survival.  
 
 
The Management Anchor - National Collective Bargaining 
Corporate and human resource management (HRM) have played an influential role in 
developing and maintaining a national bargaining framework. The human resources 
(HR) function expanded in the 1970s in local government, and as a consequence of a 
major re-organisation of local government in 1974 led to the establishment of 
personnel departments at an authority level. Despite this rise in the profile of 
personnel work, most specialists focused on the ‘implementation of policy rather than 
creating it, and the provision of administrative services and procedural advice’ 
(Lupton and Shaw, 2001: 25).  Local authorities have relied upon the employers’ 
association to oversee the bargaining process as it has been seen to be advantageous to 
negotiate collectively at a national level. As a consequence individual local authorities 
have not had the local expertise or resources to negotiate comprehensive and all-
embracing collective agreements.  
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw the centralised approach to HRM challenged with the 
restructuring of local government services as a consequence of marketisation. This 
restructuring saw the creation of ‘business units’ that sought to dilute large, integrated 
and unified service providers (Winchester and Bach, 1999). However, the human 
resources function has resisted the dilution of the national collective bargaining 
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framework as its higher or corporate role has been dependent on the implementation 
of standardised rules and policies that are integral to its importance organisationally 
(Bach, 1999; Lupton and Shaw, 2001). It is in the role of gatekeeper of employment 
policy administration that the human resources function has relied on for its survival. 
The process of local managerial self-autonomy has been a potential threat to human 
resource practice in local government as line management have circumvented the 
human resources function as they have become directly responsible for their own 
workforce. However, at an authority level, the process of functional self-autonomy 
has reinforced the need for a national regulatory framework. It has been advantageous 
for the human resources function to support and promote the national bargaining 
framework as a means of resisting the erosion of its organisational influence and 
power.     
 
Local Government – A Unique Institutional Context 
To date, one of the public sector employment relations literature’s weaknesses is, that 
it has not sufficiently differentiated between the institutions and the sub-sectors that 
make up the public sector. There is a tendency to see the public sector as 
homogenous, and although there is discussion of what makes the public sector 
distinctive (Bach, 2010; Corby and Symon, 2011), there is little discussion of the 
distinctive nature of the institutions within it. This tendency within the public sector 
employment relations literature to geneneralise across the sector, sometimes neglects 
to fully acknowledge the differences that are within the employment institutions that 
make up the sector and these differences have grown with marketisation i.e. the 
uneven development within the public sector and the decline of the Whitley Model. 
Collective bargaining arrangements have remained the dominant form of pay 
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determination - it is present in around 83 per cent of public sector workplaces and 
covers around 82 per cent of public sector workers(2004 WERS: 181).  However, 
there is evidence of a shift to decentralised bargaining within the Civil Service, 
abolishing national pay negotiations with the delegation of pay bargaining to over 150 
individual departments and agencies which have become autonomous and 
independently financed bodies (Kessler et al., 2006). While the NHS has introduced 
autonomous Trusts and made some attempt to introduce a system of two tier 
bargaining whereby national pay awards are topped up by individual trusts (Corby et 
al., 2003).    
 
The analysis, discussion and debate within the public sector employment relations 
literature typically takes place at the supra level. In my work I have sought to explore 
English local government specifically, identifying the political dimension and central-
local relations which shape its employment relations, and how the national collective 
bargaining framework is still integral to the conduct of employment relations, 
precisely because it delivers the political, social and economic objectives of the 
institutional actors.  My study also makes a contribution to the field of employment 
relations, because it casts light on what makes English local government different 
from other parts of the public sector and what we can learn from this difference.  
 
Local government’s political accountability at an authority level places it in a unique 
position within the public sector, because the control of  local authorities are governed 
by elected local leaderships, that have direct responsibility of the executive and the 
provision of local services. Unlike the Civil Service and the National Health Service, 
the public through local elections can shape the way councils provide services. It is 
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this local political accountability that shapes the institutional governance of local 
government and this is seen in the conduct of employment relations. The national 
collective bargaining framework offers the institutional actors within local 
government a conduit for producing not only economic outcomes in relation to setting 
pay, but equally importantly ensuring political acceptability in creating and 
maintaining pay and condition of employment that are perceived to be legitimate and 
transparent to all the actors within the local government employment relations rubric.  
 
The experience of the local authorities examined in the study illustrates the 
importance of the framework being a foundation stone for equitable pay and 
conditions that reflect the social, economic and political realities of local government 
as an institution. The national framework allows local actors within individual local 
authorities to enter into an integrative process of local bargaining that takes into 
account the umbrella of national pay and conditions while having a degree of 
discretion to bargaining over local issues. ‘Taking pay out of the local workplace’ for 
white collar workers is seen as being mutually beneficial to both management and 
unions. It allows managers and unions to focus on service delivery issues that are 
shaped locally and to create a constructive dialogue that recognises differing 
perspectives; while equally acknowledging the importance of securing bargaining 
outcomes that are both deliverable and sustainable and are in the collective interest of 
individual authorities.   
 
While manual blue collar workers have felt the full force of marketisation in local 
government, we can see from the local authorities that have remained within the 
national collective bargaining framework, that it has acted as a vital social and 
 
 280 
economic glue, contributing to the survival of in-house services. One of the 
unintended consequences of CCT was that its harsh regime created an environment 
within local authorities that brought trade unions, management and politicians 
together.  To protect in-house services a partnership relationship developed between 
trade unions, management and politicians that was based on an understanding that 
there was a mutual dependency on each other for their survival.   
 
In all these cases, where in-house services were defended by local authorities, it was 
the local politicians in Labour controlled councils that enabled this defence. This 
political defence of services highlights an important distinguishing feature of local 
government compared to the Civil Service and NHS. Local authorities still have a 
degree of political autonomy that enables them to take a stance against central 
government.  This autonomy is enshrined in local political accountability to the local 
electorate, which gives a mandate to carry through public policy shaped and 
developed at a local level. Central government through its legislative programme can 
curtail local government, but there has historically always been an understanding that 
local government’s political autonomy and discretion should be maintained as a 
natural counter balance to central government power. This has been accepted by all 
three principal political parties, and we can see that despite the widespread reforms 
that have impacted on local government, local authorities have, through their political 
leadership, been able to navigate with a degree of success through the constraints set 
by central government.                          
 
Across the local authorities studied, Labour politicians and trade unions support the 
national framework on philosophical and ideological grounds. This is a reflection of 
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the national positions taken by both the Labour Party and UNISON. In contrast, 
Liberal Democrats and corporate / human resource managers within the benchmark, 
leader and follower authorities support it on practical grounds, seeing an 
organisational logic that is reflected in the cognitive dimension of Scott’s Three 
Pillars of Institutions analytical framework. Finally, while the Conservatives and 
operational managers within the benchmark, leader, and follower authorities, feel a 
degree of frustration with the national framework, they still recognise it as a proven 
and reliable mechanism that has, to date, served local government interests. 
 
At a political level, across seven of the nine local authorities examined, there was 
recognition from an organisational perspective, that the national collective bargaining 
framework was clearly advantageous to local politicians across all three principal 
parties. Meanwhile central governments over the last seventy years have supported it 
as a means of keeping tight control over local authorities’ labour expenditure, which 
has historically accounted for three quarters of all local government costs (Travers, 
2005). The national framework coordinates pay and conditions, which creates stability 
within local authorities and ensures equitable treatment of workers. As a framework it 
is also sustainable because local government has a tight labour market that is reliant 
on specialised, professional and technical workers. While subject to funding pressures 
from central government, it has experienced the ‘market’ like the private sector, 
which has had to adapt to commercial pressures brought on by changing product 
markets both domestically and internationally.  
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Developing New Institutional Theory as  
a Tool of Employment Relations Analysis  
 
The academic public sector employment relations literature has emphasized the nature 
and rate of institutional change. As a consequence, little attention has been given to 
the question of continuity and the resilience of structures like a national collective 
bargaining framework. Neo-Institutional and Path Dependency theories - and the twin 
themes of homogeneity and stability - offer some potential explanations for why the 
national framework continues to survive in English local government. Neo-
Institutional theory sees institutions as defined by and shaped by structured rules and 
shared meanings that have a regulative effect (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2008). It 
provides a means of looking at the local authorities’ employment relations behaviour, 
and seeing how this is embedded in wider institutional environments. Institutional 
theory shows how local authorities are shaped by customs and practices that are either 
direct reflections of, or responses to, rules and structures built into larger 
environments (Powell, 1998). Institutional theory has allowed me to examine how the 
behaviour of local authorities is shaped by social, political and economic pressures, 
both formally and informally, from the institutional actors and regulatory agencies.  
 
Employment relations scholars normally focus on the regulative and normative pillars 
within institutional theory that fits in with old institutionalism. In my study I have 
looked at a third cognitive pillar, used in new institutionalism which looks at: 
meaning, symbols, routine, and ways of doing. The cognitive dimension has allowed 
me to go beyond examining rule making and values and look at common beliefs and 
the shared logic of action amongst institutional actors within local government. We 
see through the cognitive dimension that the national collective bargaining framework 
creates an environment that the institutional actors within local government see a 
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shared understanding that is based on the primacy of public service and the Model 
Employer tradition. This perspective focuses on social equity in both the provision of 
public services and the way in which workers are employed to deliver these services. 
National collective bargaining is seen as a natural choice for the institutional actors 
within local government because it allows them to channel common beliefs and 
shared logics of action that support both their individual and collective interests. 
Reflecting on the experiences of the local authorities examined and their responses to 
CCT and Best Value, we see that the national collective bargaining framework was an 
important conduit for trade unions, managers, and politicians in shaping their 
negotiating dialogue and facilitating the defence of in-house services from being 
‘contracted out’. The leader and follower local authorities illustrated that the actors 
within them all acknowledged the ‘organisational logic’ of their authorities belonging 
to the national framework. This acceptance ranged from weak, in the case of 
commercially orientated operational managers and some Conservative elected 
members, who did perceive the national collective bargaining framework to be a 
constraining influence on some aspects of local decision making, yet accepted it as a 
rational political and economic choice.  
 
In contrast, UNISON and Labour politicians showed strong support for the national 
collective bargaining framework on both philosophical and practical grounds. 
Philosophically, because it acted as a means of promoting socially equitable 
conditions of employment across local government, while practically it strengthened 
UNISON bargaining position and Labour politicians saw it as a constraining influence 
on ‘leap frogging’ of pay and conditions between local authorities, particularly for 
skilled, technical workers that were in high demand like environmental health 
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officers. Between these two positions there were actors, UNITE, Liberal Democrat 
politicians and corporate management, who were neither strong nor weak supporters 
of the national collective bargaining framework. UNITE as a union preferred a 
national framework but their primary objective was to maintain collective bargaining 
at whatever level that it took place. Corporate managers and Liberal Democrat 
politicians supported the national framework not particularly on ideological grounds, 
but rather from the position that it ‘made sense’ and was a rational choice for local 
government. This rationality was bound in achieving acceptable outcomes that 
acknowledged the political, social and economic landscape that shaped local 
government and the actors that operated within it. 
 
Applying path dependency to my study has helped me to develop a line of enquiry 
around the custom and practice of establishing the means by which terms and 
conditions of employment are set through collective bargaining and how the principal 
institutional actors in local government – the state, employers/management (including 
human resource management), trade unions, and politicians (nationally and locally) – 
shape the outcomes of this process.  
 
Isomorphism as a constraining process has shaped the institutional actors within local 
government to resemble each other as they face similar political and economic 
challenges (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). We see how the coercive isomorphic 
mechanisms, primarily employment legislation and central government as the 
executive function of the State shape local government employment relations policy. 
While trade unions and management, are shaped intrinsically by the national and local 
political environment they operate in. The mimetic mechanisms within local 
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government are illustrated in how local authorities deal with external economic, legal 
and political questions. As shown in my research, local authorities with a similar 
political leadership, tend to mimic each other in tackling issues that are common to 
them. Illustrative of this is the similarity of approach between the leader authorities 
and their responses to Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Best Value.  
 
Normative mechanisms focus on the relationship between management policies and 
the background of employees in terms of education, work experience, and 
occupational group. Within local government many of the occupational groups are 
unique to the sector, and within the professional, white collar occupations have 
established networks linked through the professional institutions which regulate the 
conduct of members. Illustrative of this are the Chartered Institute of Environmental 
Health Officers and the Trade Standards Institute, who regulate practitioners, 
overseeing professional conduct while acting as a voice for their profession. These 
professional occupational groups have been identified as a source of isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), often taken for granted as important in developing 
organisational norms. In a similar manner the formal and informal networks with the 
trade unions and political parties that operate in local government have an equal effect 
on creating and defining organisational norms within the local government rubric. 
This was evident in the benchmark authority where we see the formal and informal 
relationships that developed between all types of management: operational, corporate 
and human resources; the trade unions; and politicians that facilitated the dialogue 
process within the authority.  
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The application of neo-institutional theory illuminates the underlying processes that 
shape the process of joint regulation in local government and helped us to understand 
the internal and external contextual factors that continue to make the national 
collective bargaining framework relevant to local government employment relations. 
My study, by using neo-institutional theory and in particular Scott’s third cognitive 
pillar, makes a contribution to the wider employment relations literature by extending 
the range of traditional employment relations analysis to explain path dependency  
and institutional continuity and resilience within an employment sector. My work has 
highlighted in addition to the established coercive and normative strategies, the 
importance of mimetic influences and organizational isomorphism in shaping 
employment regulation in the workplace.  
 
End of the Road - The Future of National Collective Bargaining in 
Local Government?     
  
There is no doubt, given the UK’s current economic position; there will be continuing 
pressure on local government to deliver ‘more with less. ’   As the Standard Spending 
Assessment (SSA) for local government is potentially tightened further by central 
government, local authorities will inevitably have to re-assess their  financial 
positions, and in turn how they deliver services to the public. Potentially, a threat to 
national collective bargaining is if local government loses it exclusive rights as a 
provider of particular services. The present Coalition government has been promoting 
the voluntary sector under ‘The Big Society’ mantle to take up and provide public 
services; this has been focused on the social welfare function (Cunningham, 2011). 
Currently, there are a number of local authorities that are entering into partnership 
arrangements with NHS trusts, providing social health and welfare services to their 
communities. Workers are being deployed from the NHS and local government to 
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provide an integrated service that breaks down the functional barriers between the two 
institutions. With this melding process it is arguable that the institutional model for 
these services will seek to create a new employment framework which potentially will 
break away from both the NHS and local government. If this new institutional model 
is rolled out across England it has the potential to have a detrimental effect on the 
national collective bargaining framework, as the social welfare function has a large 
workforce, which if taken out of local government could have a profound impact.    
 
Local government as a statutory based institution is a product of Parliament. As we 
have seen in the reform programmes of the last thirty years, governments can 
introduce statutory provisions that affect how public services are provided and 
delivered. It is within Parliament’s remit to takes services away, as in 1993 when the 
waste disposal function was taken out of local government. It is therefore possible that 
any service or function has the potential to be taken away from local government 
control. For a number of years it has been speculated that the Environmental Health 
and Trading Standards functions could be taken away from local government and set 
up as national agencies. The precedent has already been set with the creation of the 
Environment Agency in 1996, a consequence of the 1995 Environment Act, which 
saw air pollution and waste regulation taken away from local government.  However, 
it is the very fact that many of the services that local government provides are 
statutory based that provides a degree of security. Statutory responsibilities are 
extremely onerous, as being legally defined both in terms of provision and liability. 
They create a high benchmark in terms of accountability which historically has been 
seen as the state’s role. In the foreseeable future, despite the economic and political 
pressures, local government will continue to be a key provider of public services. 
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However, as an institution it will have to continue to adapt to the economic, political, 
social, and legal environment it faces.  
 
A number of Conservative and Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition controlled 
local authorities since 2010 have voiced their concern to the Local Government 
Employers about the national pay settlements and their affordability. The largest, 
Birmingham City Council, questioned with increasing pressure to cut budgets, 
whether they could continue to be party to the national settlements. Yet, the local 
authorities outside the national collective bargaining framework, in the South East, 
where pay is high, continue to shadow the national pay settlements, and in some cases 
like Kent pay above it. It is important to note, that the discussion around withdrawing 
from the national framework has been used by local authorities as a pressure tactic 
within the Local Government Employers forum to curb pay settlements. In the future, 
the national collective bargaining framework will continue to be questioned as to its 
appropriateness and fitness for purpose. As my work has shown its survival and 
relevance to local government will be dependent on its ability to deliver economic, 
political and social outcomes that are acceptable to the individual and collective 
interests of the institutional actors that operate within it.   
 
For the majority of councils examined in this study, who were a cross section of 
English local authorities, the stakeholders - trade unions, management and politicians 
that operated within them, there is a passive consensus that the national collective 
bargaining framework is still mutually beneficial and expedient to the individual and 
collective interests of all the stakeholders, and the local authorities themselves, in 
effectively managing the socio-economic outcomes that are linked to the delivery of 
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public services. However, despite the strong institutional lock-in, in the spirit of soft 
path dependency, there was recognition that the national collective bargaining could 
break up. This break up could reflect what happened with the deviant authorities, 
where it was perceived that the national framework did not adequately reflect the 
organisational needs of individual authorities, primarily around addressing local 
labour market conditions. However, as already discussed, the deviant authorities 
withdrawal from the national framework was as much about making a political 
statement on ideological grounds as it was about the management and control of the 
local authorities concerned.  
 
The Coalition government through the Treasury has recently been proposing the 
introduction of local pay bargaining in the public sector. The initial focus has been on 
the Civil Service and National Health Service. This has been in response to the 
widening pay gap between public and private sector workers. It has been argued by 
the think tank, Policy Exchange, that public sector pay is stifling private sector growth 
as private sector employers are finding it difficult to compete with public sector pay, 
particularly in economically depressed areas. Within local government, the Local 
Government Association, has been guarded about its introduction, seeing it as 
potentially being de-stabilising, and questioning its benefit both financially and 
managerially.   
 
The national collective bargaining framework is still the foundation stone for joint 
regulation and the promotion of equitable employment practice in local government. 
Over the last thirty years its demise has been predicted, yet it has continued to survive 
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and remain relevant. There is no reason that provided that it can continue to deliver 
these benefits to the institutional stakeholders it will continue to survive in the future.  
 
Future Research 
Considerable scope for further research in national collective bargaining in English 
local government remains. The following may prove interesting avenues to examine: 
Longitudinal studies – this study has offered a snapshot of the state of collective 
bargaining in English local government. It would be interesting to conduct further 
studies over time which captures its evolvement, which might highlight and 
illuminate different pressures and tensions. There is already evidence of this 
occurring with: the impact of the financial and economic crisis (Shaoul, 2011); 
the election of a coalition government in 2010 marking a watershed, where: 
“economically there was a change from an age of expansion in the role of the 
state to an age of retrenchment with repercussions for the public sector” (Corby 
and Symon, 2011: 16); and the potential for further fragmentation of 
organisational structures in the public sector (Ibid, 231). These external counter-
veiling forces might have a consequential impact on local government collective 
bargaining, and therefore would make it ripe for further future research. 
Comparative Sectoral Studies - this study has focused on national collective 
bargaining in local government, which has provided a valuable contribution, 
given the size of English local government within the context of the overall 
public sector. Further research might be extended, with detailed and separate 
examinations of the NHS and Civil Service.  These further studies would 
naturally complement the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys and would 
be a valuable addition to the public sector employment relations literature.         
 
 291 
References 
 
Ackers, P. and Wilkinson, A. (2003) Understanding work and employment: industrial 
relations in transition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
   
Ackers, P. and Wilkinson, A. (2008) Industrial Relations and the Social Sciences’, in 
Blyton, P., Bacon, N., Heery, E. and Fiorito, J.(eds) The Sage Book of Industrial 
Relations. Sage 
 
Alexopoulos, M. and Cohen, J. (2003) ‘Centralised wage bargaining and structural 
change in Sweden’. European Review of Economic History, 7: 331-63. 
 
Arrowsmith, J. (2010) Industrial Relations in the Private Sector. In Bach, S and 
Kessler, I. (eds.) Industrial Relations – Theory and Practice, 3rd edition, John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd, 178-206. 
 
Atkinson, H. and Wilks-Heeg, S. (2000) Local Government from Thatcher to Blair – 
The Politics of Creative Autonomy. Polity Press 
 
Bach,S. (2002) ‘Public-sector  Employment Relations Reform under Labour: 
Muddling Through on Modernization?’ British Journal of Industrial Relations 40:2 
June 2002 0007-1080 pp.319-339.   
 
Bach, S. (2010) Public Sector Industrial Relations: The Challenge of Modernization. 
In Colling, T. and Terry, M. (eds.) Industrial Relations – Theory and Practice, 3rd 
edition, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 151-177.  
 
Bach, S. and Della Rocca, G. (2000) ‘The Management Strategies of Public Service 
Employers in Europe’, Industrial Relations Journal, 31(2): 82-96.  
 
Bach, S. and Givan, R.K. (2011) Varieties of new public management? The reform of 
public service employment relations in the UK and USA, The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 22: 11, 2349 – 2366.  
 
Bach, S. and Kessler, I. (2007) ‘HRM and the New Public Management’, in Boxall, 
P., Purcell, J., and Wright, P. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Human Resource 
Management, Oxford: OUP.   
 
Bach, S. and Kessler, I. (2012) The Modernisation of the Public Services and 
Employment Relations – Targeted Change. Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Bach, S. and Winchester, D. (2003) ‘Industrial Relations in the Public Sector’, in 
Edwards (ed.), Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice, 2
nd
 edition, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 285-312. 
 
Batstone, E., Ferner, A., Terry, M. (1984) Consent and Efficiency: Labour Relations 
and Management Strategy in State Enterprises, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Beaumont, P. (1992) Public Sector Industrial Relations, London: Routledge.  
 
 292 
 
Blair, T. (1998) Leading the Way: a New Vision for Local Government. London: IPPR   
 
Blair, T. (2002) The Courage of Our Convictions: Why Reform of the Public Services 
Is the Route to Social Justice, London: Fabian Society. 
 
Bouvaird, T. and Martin, S. (2003) ‘Evaluating Public Management Reform: 
Designing a ‘Joined Up’ Approach to Researching the Local Government 
Modernisation Agenda. Local Government Studies. Vol. 29, Issue 4, 17-30.  
 
Birmingham City Council (2007) Personnel and Equalities Sub-Committee Report.  
  
Broadbent,J. and Laughlin, R. (2002) ‘Public Sector Professionals and New Public 
Management: Control of the Professions in the Public Services’ In McLaughlin, K., 
Osborne, S. and Ferlie, E. (eds.) The New Public Management: Current Trends and 
Future Prospects, pp95-108.    
 
Brown, W. and Wright, M. (1994) ‘The empirical tradition in workplace bargaining 
research,’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32 (2), 153-164.  
 
Bryman, A. (2004) Social Research Methods, 2
nd
 Edition, Oxford University Press 
 
Bullpitt, J. (1989) Walking back to happiness? Conservative Party governments and 
elected local authorities in the 1980s. In C. Crouch and D. Marquand (eds.), The New 
Centralism: Britain out of step in Europe? Cambridge: Blackwell.   
 
Butcher, H., Law, I., Leach, R. and Mullard, M. (1990) Local Government and 
Thatcherism. London: Routledge. 
 
Cabinet Office (1998) Next Steps Report 1997, Cm 3889, London: HMSO. 
 
Cabinet Office (1999) Modernising Government, Cm 4310, London: The Stationery 
Office.   
 
Cabinet Office (2005) Transformational Government, London: Cabinet Office. 
 
Cabinet Office (2006) The UK Government’s Approach to Public Service Reform, 
London: Cabinet Office. 
 
Cabinet Office (2008) Excellence and Fairness: Achieving World Class Public 
Services, London: Cabinet Office. 
 
Cabinet Office (2010) Building the Big Society, May, London: Cabinet Office. 
 
Cassell, J. (1977) “The relationship of observer to observed in peer group research.” 
Human Organization 36 (4): 412-416.  
  
Clegg, H.A. (1979) The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. 
Basil Blackwell Oxford 
 
 293 
 
Chomsky, N. (1999) Profit over People: Neoliberalism and the Global Order. New 
York: Seven Stories Press.  
 
Cmd 3818 (1997) Your Right to Know, London: HMSO. 
 
Colling, T. (1999) Tendering and outsourcing: working in the contract state? In 
Corby, S. and White, G. (eds.) Employment Relations in the Public Services – Themes 
and issues. Routledge   
 
Colling, T. (2001) ‘Human Resources in the Public Sector’, in Beardwell, I. and 
Holden, L. (eds.) Human Resource Management: A Contemporary Perspective, 3rd 
edn London: Pitman pp598-627.     
 
Copus, C. (2006) British local government: a case for a new constitutional settlement, 
Public Policy and Administration, 21 (2), pp. 4-21. 
 
Corby, S. (1992) ‘Prospects for industrial relations in NHS trusts’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, 22: 3, 170-180. 
 
Corby, S and Symon, G. (2011) From New Labour to a New Era? In Corby, S. and 
Symon, G. (eds.) Working for the State – Employment Relations in the Public 
Services. Palgrave Macmillan 
  
Corby, S. and White, G. (1999) From the New Right to New Labour. In Corby, S. and 
White, G. (eds.) Employment Relations in the Public Services – Themes and issues. 
Routledge  
 
Cochrane, A. (2000) ‘Local Government: Managerialism and Modernisation’. In 
Clark, J.,Gewirtz, S., and McLaughlin, E. (eds.) New Managerialism, New Welfare? 
London: Macmillan.    
 
Crotty, M. (1998) The foundations of Social Research – Meaning and Perspective in 
the Research Process. Sage Publications Ltd 
 
Crouch, C. and Farrell, H. (2004) ‘Breaking the path of institutional development? 
Alternatives to the new determinism’. Rationality and Society. 16 (1): 5-43.    
Cutler, T. and Waine, B. (2000) ‘Managerialism Reformed? ‘New Labour and Public 
Sector Management’, Social Policy and Administration, 34, 318-332.  
 
Cunningham, I. (2011) The Third Sector’s Provision of Public Services: Implications 
for Mission and Employment Relations. In Corby, S. and Symon, G (eds.) Working 
for the State – Employment Relations in the Public Services. Palgrave Macmillan  
 
D’Art, D. and Turner, T. (2002). ‘An attitudinal revolution in Irish industrial 
relations: The end of them and us?.  In D. D’Art and T. Turner (eds.), Irish 
Employment Relations in the New Economy. Dublin: Blackhall Publishing, pp. 79-94.    
 
 
 294 
Dacin, T., Goodstein, J. and Scott, W.R. (2002) ‘Institutional theory and institutional 
change: Introduction to the special research forum.’ Academy of Management Journal 
45: 45-46.   
 
Davis, H., Downe, J., and Martin, S.J. (2001) External Inspection of Local 
Government: Driving Improvement or Drowning in Detail?  York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation.    
 
Davis, H., Downe, J., and Martin, S.J. (2004) The Changing Role of the Audit 
Commission Inspection of Local Government? York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.  
 
Dawson, S.  and Dargie, C. (2002) ‘New Public Management: A Discussion with 
Special Reference to UK Health’, in Mclaughlin, K., Osborne, S.P., and Ferlie, E. 
(eds), New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects. London: 
Routledge, pp. 34-55.     
 
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), (1998) Modern 
Local Government: in Touch with the People. London: The Stationary Office.    
 
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), (1999) Local 
Government Act 1999: Part 1 Best Value, Circular 10/99, London: Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions.  
 
Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions (DETR) (1998) 
Modernising Local Government: Improving Services through Best Value, London: 
Stationary Office. 
 
DiMaggio, P., Powell, W.W. (1983) ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationalities in organizational fields’. American 
Sociological Review 48 147-160. 
 
Department of Health (1997) The New NHS, Cm.3807. London: HMSO, for 
Department of Health.   
 
Downe, J. and Martin, S. (2006) Joined up policy in practice? The coherence and 
impacts of the local government modernisation agenda. Local Government Studies. 
Vol. 32, Issue 4, 465-488.  
 
Duffield, C. (2000) ‘Red Book Reviews’, Local Government Chronicle, 15 
December, p.12  
 
Duffy, K. (2005). The Explosion in Labour Legislation, Presentation to the Industrial 
Relations News Conference, Shaping the Future, 25 February.    
 
Duncan, C. (2001) ‘The Impact of Two Decades of Reform of British Public Sector 
Industrial Relations’, Public Money and Management, January-March, 27-34.  
 
 
 295 
Duncan, S. and Goodwin, M. (1988) Removing local government autonomy: political 
centralisation and financial control. Local Government Studies, November/December 
1988, 49-63. 
 
Dunleavy, P. and Hood, C. (1994) ‘From old public administration to new public 
management’ Public Money and Management 14 (3): 34-43. 
 
Dunleavy, P. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (1990) ‘Core Executive Studies in Britain,’ Public 
Administration, 68 (1), 3-28. 
 
Dunlop, J. (1958) Industrial Relations Systems, New York: Holt.  
 
Ebbinghaus, B. (2005) Can Path Dependency Explain Institutional Change: Two 
Approaches to Welfare State, MPifG Discussion Paper 05/2, Cologne: Max Planck 
Institute 
 
Efficiency Unit (1988) Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps (the 
Ibbs report), London: HMSO. 
 
Edwards, P.K. (2005) The challenging but promising future of industrial relations: 
developing theory and method in context-sensitive research. Industrial Relations 
Journal, 36 (4), 264-282.   
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’, The 
Academy of Management Review, 14 (4), 532-550. 
 
Eliassen, K. and Sitter, N. (2008) Understanding Public Management, London: Sage. 
 
Elcock, H. (1994) Local Government – Policy and Management in local authorities. 
Routledge 
 
Entwistle, T. (2002) ‘Explaining the Birth of the Local Government Association’, 
Local Government Studies, 28 (1): 91-102.    
 
Entwistle, T. and Martin, S.  (2005) ‘From Competition to Collaboration in Public 
Service Delivery: A New Agenda for Research’, Public Administration, 83 (1): 233-
42.    
 
Farnham, D. and Horton, S. (1996) ‘Managing People in the Public Services’, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Fairbrother, P. (1996) ‘Workplace Trade Unionism in the State Sector’, in Ackers, P. 
Smith, P.  (eds.) The New Workplace and Trade Unionism, London: Routledge.  
 
Ferner, A. (1988) Government, Managers and Industrial Relations, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
 
 296 
Fiss, P.C. (2008) ‘Institutions and Corporate Governance’, in R. Greenwood, C, 
Oliver, R. Suddaby and K. Sahlin (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism, pp. 389-410. London: Sage. 
 
Flynn, N. (2007) Public Sector Management. Fifth Edition, SAGE Publications    
 
Forsyth, M. (1982) ‘Winners in the Contracting Game’, Local Government Chronicle, 
10 September 
 
Frege, C.M. (2005) ‘Varieties of Industrial Relations Research: Take-over, 
Convergence or Divergence?’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, 43 (2), 179-207.  
 
Freedman, S. and Morris, G. (1989) The State as Employer. London, Mansell. 
 
Gamble, A. (1988) The Free Economy and the Strong State: the politics of 
Thatcherism. 1
st
 edn. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Gamble. A. (2009) British politics and the financial crisis. British Politics, 4, 450-462.  
 
Garud, R. and Karnoe, G. (eds) (2001) Path Dependence and Creation. Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum.  
Geertz, C. (1973) Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in: 
The interpretation of cultures: selected essays. New York: Basic Books, pp 3-30.     
 
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (2000) The Third Way and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Gospel, H. (1992) Markets, Firms, and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain, 
Cambridge: CUP.  
 
Gospel, H and Druker, J (1998) ‘The Survival of National Bargaining in the Electrical 
Contracting Industry:  A Deviant Case?’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36:2 
June 1998 0007 – 1080 pp. 249 - 267  
 
Gottschalk, L. (1968) Understanding History: A primer of historical method. New 
York: Knopf. 
 
Grabher, G. (1993) ‘The weakness of strong ties: the lock-in of regional development 
in the Ruhr area’. In G. Grabher (ed.)., The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics 
of Industrial Networks. London: Routledge, pp.255-77.  
 
Grainger, H. (2006) Trade Union Membership 2005 (London, DTI). 
 
Gray, D.E. (2007) Doing Research in the Real World. Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
 
 297 
Greener, I. (2002) Understanding NHS Reform: The Policy-Transfer, Social 
Learning, and Path Dependency Perspectives. Governance: An International Journal 
of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 15, No. 2.  pp161-183.     
 
Grief, A. and Lanitin, D. (2004) A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 
CDDRL Discussion Paper 15, Stanford University.   
 
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1981) Effective evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
 
Griffiths,W. (1990) ‘Kent County Council: A case of Local Pay Determination’, 
Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 1, No.1 (Autumn 1990) 
  
Gummerson, E. (1991) Qualitative Methods in Management Research. (revised ed.). 
London: Sage Publications Ltd.   
 
Hadiz, V.R. (1997) Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Hall, S. (1997) The great moving-right show. Marxism Today, 23 (1). 
 
Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (1983) The Politics of Thatcherism. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
 
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996) ‘Political science and the three new institutionalisms’. 
Political Studies, 44 (5): 936-57. 
 
Hantrais, L. and Ackers, P. (2005) Women’s Choices in Europe: Striking the Work-
Life Balance. European Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 pp. 197-212. 
SAGE: London. 
 
Harris, J. (1998) ‘Scientific Management, Bureau-Professionalism, New 
Managerialism: The Labour Process of State Social Work’, British Journal of Social 
Work, 28(6): 839-862.   
  
Hebson, G., Grimshaw, D., and Marchington, M. (2003) ‘PPPs and the Changing 
Public Sector Ethos: Case-study Evidence from the Health and Local Authority 
Sectors’, Work, Employment, & Society, 17(3): 481-501.  
 
Hicks, S. and Lindsey, C. (2005) ‘Public Sector Employment’. Labour Market 
Trends, April, 139-147. 
 
Holliday, J. (2000) ‘Is the British State Hollowed Out?’ Political Quarterly, 71 (2), 
167-76.   
  
 
 298 
Hood, C. (1990) ‘Beyond the Public Bureaucracy State? Public Administration in the 
1990s’ inaugural lecture, London School of Economics 
 
Hood, C. (1991) A public management for all seasons, Public Administration, 69 (1), 
3-19. 
 
Hood, C. (2005) ‘Public Management: The Word, the Movement, the Science’, in 
Ferlie, E. Lynne, L. and Pollitt, C. (eds) Oxford Handbook of Public Management, 
Oxford: OUP. 
 
Hope-Hailey, V. (2001) Breaking the mould? Innovation as a strategy for corporate 
renewal. The International Journal of Human Resource Management. Vol. 12, Issue 
7, 1126-1140.   
 
Howell, C. (2005) Trade Unions and the State – The Construction of Industrial 
Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890-2000. Princeton University Press 
 
Howell, C. and Givan, R. (2011) Rethinking Institutions and Institutional Change in 
European Industrial Relations. British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 49, Issue 
2, 231-255)    
 
Ironside, M. and Seifert, R. (1995) Industrial Relations in Schools. London: 
Routledge  
 
Ironside. M. and Seifert, R. (2000) Facing up to Thatcherism – The History of 
NALGO 1979-1993. Oxford University Press 
 
Jackson, M.P., Leopold, J.W., Tuck, K. (1993) Decentralization of Collective 
Bargaining – An Analysis of Recent Experience in the UK. St. Martin’s Press 
 
Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small States in the World Markets: Industrial Policy in 
Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
Kavanagh, D. (1986) Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Kelly, G. (1991) A History of The Local Authorities’ Conditions of Service Advisory 
Board 1947- 1991 – Industrial Relations in Local Government. Centurion Press 
Limited   
 
Kersley, B., Alpin, C., Forth, J., Bryson, A., Bewley, H., Dix, G., Oxenbridge, S. 
(2006) Inside the Workplace: Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey. London: Routledge   
 
Kessler, I., Heron, P., and Dopson, S. (2008) The Shaping of Workplace Roles in the 
Public Services: The Case of the Healthcare Assistant. International Labour Process 
Conference. Dublin 
 
 
 299 
Kessler, I. and Purcell, J. (1996) ‘Strategic choice and new forms of employment 
relations in the public service sector’, International Journal of HRM 7(1): 206-29.  
 
Kessler, I., Purcell, J. and Coyle-Shapiro, J. (2000) ‘New Forms of Employment 
Relations in the Public Services: The Limits of Strategic Choice’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, 31, 17-34. 
 
King, D. (1987) The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
 
King, D. and Stoker, G. (2002) Rethinking Local Democracy. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan.  
 
Kingdom, J. (1991) Local Government and Politics in Britain. Deddington: Philip 
Allan.  
 
Kirkpatrick, I., and Hoque, K. (2005) The decentralisation of employment relations in 
the British public sector. Industrial Relations Journal 36:2 100-120 
 
Klein, R. (1995) The New Politics of the NHS. London: Longman.   
 
Korczynski, M. (1997) Centralisation of collective bargaining in a decade of 
decentralisation: the case of the engineering construction industry, Industrial 
Relations Journal 28: 1 14 – 26.  
 
La Botz, D. (2001) Made in Indonesia: Indonesian Workers since Suharto. 
Cambridge: South End Press. 
 
Labour Party (1997) New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better, London: Labour 
Party  
 
Labour Party (2001) Ambitions for Britain: Labour Manifesto 2001. London: The 
Labour  
Party. 
 
Laffin, M. (1989) Managing Under Pressure: Industrial Relations in Local 
Government. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Laffin, M. (2006) Rediscovering central-local relations in England, Paper presented to 
the Public Administration Committee Annual Conference, Durham University, 4-6 
September. 
 
Laffin, M. (2007) Comparative central-local relations: regional centralism, 
governance and intergovernmental relations, Public Policy and Administration, 22 
(1), pp. 74-91. 
 
Laffin, M. and Entwistle, T. (2000) New professions, old problems: the changing 
national world of local government professions, Policy and Politics 28 (2). pp 207- 
220.    
 
 300 
 
Lansley, S., Goss, S. and Wolmar, C. (1989) Councils in Conflict. London: 
Macmillan.  
 
Leach, S. (2003) ‘Conclusion: scenarios for change’ in S. Leach and H.Davis (eds) 
Enabling or Disabling Local Government, Buckingham: Open University Press    
 
Leach, S. (2006) Local Politics in Britain. Bristol: Policy Press.  
 
Le Grand, J. (2003) Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy, Oxford: OUP.  
 
Levinson, H. (1972) Collective Bargaining by British Local Authority Employees. 
Michigan: University of Michigan. 
 
Loader, I. (2000) ‘Plural Policing and Democratic Governance’, Social and Legal 
Studies, 9 (3), 323-45.  
 
Local Government Association (2007) 2007 Annual Report 
 
Loughlin, M. (1996) Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lowndes, V. and Skelcher, C. (1998) ‘The Dynamics of Multi- organizational 
Partnerships: an Analysis of Changing Modes of Governance’, Public Administration. 
76, 2, 313-33.  
 
Marginson, P. (1998) ‘The Survey Tradition in British Industrial Research: an 
Assessment of the Contribution of Large-Scale Workplace and Enterprise Surveys,’ 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36 (2), 209.   
 
Martin, S.J. (2005) Public service improvement: current developments and future 
research agendas, Local Government Studies, 31(5), pp. 531-540. 
 
McCracken, G. (1988) The Long Interview. Sage Publications Ltd 
 
MacGregor, D. (2001) Jobs in the public and private sectors, Economic Trends, 571, 
35-50. 
 
Miliband, R. (1973) The State in Capitalist Society. London: Quartet.   
 
Morris, J. and Farrell, C. (2007) The ‘post-bureaucratic’ public sector organization. 
New organizational forms and HRM in ten UK public sector organizations. 
International Journal of HRM 18:9 September 1575-1588.  
 
Newman, J. (2001) Modernising Governance: New Labour Policy and Society, 
London: Sage. 
 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) (2003) Local Government Act 1999 
Part 1 Best Value and Performance Improvement, Circular 03/2003, London: ODPM.  
 
 301 
 
Parker, D. and Hartley, K. (1997) ’The Economics of Partnership Sourcing versus 
Adversarial Competition: a Critique’, European Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 3, 2, 115-125.    
 
Paauwe, J., and Boselie, P. (2005) HRM and performance: what next? Human 
Resource Management Journal. Vol, 15, Issue 4, 68-83.   
 
Philips, N., Lawrence, T., and Hardy, C. (2000) ‘Inter-organizational collaboration 
and the dynamics of institutional fields’. Journal of Management Studies 37: 23-43. 
 
Pierson, P. (2000) ‘Increasing returns, path dependency and the study of politics’. 
American Political Science Review, 94 (2): 251-67.   
 
Pollert,A. (2005) ‘The Unorganized Worker: the Decline in Collectivism and New 
Hurdles to Individual Employment Rights’, Industrial Law Journal, 34(3): 217-38.  
 
Pollitt, C. (1993) Managerialism and the Public Services, second edition, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
Pollitt, C. (1993) Managerialism and the Public Services, second edition, Oxford: 
Blackwell.  
 
Pollitt, C.  and Boukaert, G. (2000) Public Management Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis (Oxford, Oxford University Press).  
 
Power, M. (2001) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford: OUP. 
 
Pritchard, A. (2003) Understanding Government Output and Productivity. London: 
National Expenditure and Income Division, Office for National Statistics. 
 
Ranson, S. and Stewart, J. (1994) Management for the Public Domain, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
 
Reed, M. and Anthony, P. (2003) ‘Between an Ideological Rock and an 
Organizational Hard Place’, In Clarke,T., and Pitlis, C (eds.) The Political Economy 
of Privatisation. London: Routledge, pp 185-204.  
 
Reeves Sanday, P. (1979) “The ethnographic paradigm(s).” Qualitative Methodology 
24 (December) : 527-538.   
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1994) ‘The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of 
Public Service in Britain’, Political Quarterly, pp. 138-51.   
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1995) ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’. The 
State of Britain Seminars. Swindon: Economic and Social Research Council     
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996) ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’, 
Political Studies, 44 (4), 652-67.  
 
 302 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2000) Transforming British Government, Volume 2: Changing 
Roles and Relationships. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007) ‘Understanding Governance – Ten Years On’, Organization 
Studies, 28(8): 1243-1264. 
 
Richards, D. and Smith, M.J. (2002) Governance and Public Policy in the United 
Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ridley, N. (1988) The Local Right. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Roper, I., James, P., and Higgins, P. (2005) ‘Workplace Partnership and Public 
Service Provision: the Case of the Best Value Performance regime in British Local 
Government’ Work, Employment and Society, 19(3): 639-49.  
 
Roper, I., Higgins, P., and James, P. (2007) Shaping the bargaining agenda. The Audit 
Commission and public service reform in British local government. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management 18:9 September 1589-1607. 
 
Rubery, J., Earnshaw, J., Marchington, M., Cooke, F.L., and Vincent, S. (2002) 
‘Changing Organizational Forms and the Employment Relationship’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 39: 645-72. 
 
Rupidara, N.S., and McGraw, P. (2010) Institutional Change, Continuity and 
Decoupling in the Indonesian Industrial Relations System. Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 52 (5) 613-630. 
 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2000) Research methods for business 
students. London: FT Prentice Hall. 
 
Schumpeter, J. (1963) History of Economic Analysis. London: George Allen & 
Unwin. 
 
Scott, W.R. (2001) Institutions and Organizations. 2
nd
 edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Scott, W.R. (2008) Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.   
 
Seifert, R. (1989) ‘Industrial relations in the school sector’, in Mailly, B., Dimmock, 
S., and Sethi, A. (eds.) Industrial Relations in the Public Services, London: 
Routledge. 
 
 
Silaban, R. (2009) Reposisi Gerakan Buruh: Peta Falan Gerakan Buruh Indonesia 
Pasca Reformasi. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan. 
 
 
 303 
Silverman, D. (1997) The Logics of Qualitative Research. In Millar, G and Dingwell, 
R. (eds.) Context & Method in Qualitative Research. Sage Publications Ltd 
 
Sinclair, J., Seifert, R., and Ironside, M. (1995) ‘Market driven reforms in education: 
performance, quality, and industrial relations in schools’, in I Kirkpatrick and M.M. 
Lucio (eds.) The Politics of Quality in the Public Sector, London : Routledge. 
 
Smith, C., Child, J. and Rowlinson, M. (1990) Reshaping work: the Cadbury 
experience. Cambridge University Press  
 
Smith, M.J. (1998) ‘Reconceptualizing the British State: Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenges to Central Government’, Public Administration, 76 (1), 45-72. 
 
Smith, P. and Morton, G. (2006) Nine Years of New Labour: Neoliberalism and 
Workers’ Rights. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44: 3, pp 401-420.   
 
Stake, R.E. (1995) The Art of Case Study Research. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Stake, R.E. (2000) The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry, in Gomm, R., 
Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (eds.) Case Study Method. Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Stewart, J (2000) The Nature of British Local Government. Basingstoke: Palgrave.    
 
Stewart, J. (2003) Modernising British Local Government: An Assessment of 
Labour’s Reform Programme. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian. 
 
Stewart, J. and Stoker, G. (1995a) Fifteen years of local government restructuring 
1979-1994: an evaluation. In J. Stewart and G. Stoker (eds), Local Government in the 
1990s, London: Macmillan. 
 
Stewart, J. and Stoker, G. (1995b) Introduction. In J. Stewart and G. Stoker (eds) 
Local Government in the 1990s, London: Macmillan.  
 
Stoker, G. (2006) ‘Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked 
Governance?’ American Review of Public Administration, 36 (1): 41-57.   
 
Strauss, G. and Whitfield, K. (1998) Research Methods in Industrial Relations. In  
Strauss, G. and Whitfield, K. (eds.) Researching the World of Work – Strategies and 
Methods in Studying Industrial Relations. Cornell University Press 
 
Sudman, S. and Bradburn, N.M. (1982) Asking questions: A practical guide to 
questionnaire design. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.   
 
Symon, G. (2011) Organised Labour and State Employment. In Corby, S. and Symon, 
G. (eds.) Working for the State – Employment Relations in the Public Services. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Tailby, S. and Winchester, D. (2005) ‘Management and Trade Unions: Partnership at 
Work? In Bach, S. (ed.) Managing Human Resources, 4
th
 Edition, Oxford: Blackwell.   
 
 304 
 
Teague, P. and Donaghey, J. (2004) ‘The Irish experiment in social partnership’. In H. 
Katz, W. Lee and J. Lee (eds.), The New Structure of Labour Relations. Cornell: ILR 
Press, pp. 10-36.  
 
Teague, P. (2005) Towards Flexible Workplace Governance: Employment Rights, 
Conflict Resolution and Social Partnership in the Irish Republic. Dublin: Policy 
Studies Institute, Trinity University College.  
 
Teague, P. (2009) Path Dependency and Comparative Industrial Relations: The Case 
of Conflict Resolution Systems in Ireland and Sweden. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations. 47: 3 pp. 499-520. Blackwell.   
 
Theakston, K (1998) ‘New Labour, New Whitehall?’, Public Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 13, No.1. pp 13-34.  
 
Teisman, G.R., and Klijn, E.H (2002) Partnership Arrangements: Government 
Rhetoric or Governance Scheme? Public Administration Review. Vol. 62, Issue 2, 
197-205.   
 
Thelen, K. (2002) ‘How institutions evolve: insights from comparative historical 
analysis’. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschmeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis 
in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 208-41.     
 
Thornley, C. (1994) ‘Nursing Pay Policy: Chaos in Context’, paper presented to 
Employment Research Unit annual conference ‘The Contract State: the Future of 
Public Management’, Cardiff Business School, September. 
 
Thornley, C., Ironside, M., and Seifert, R. (2000) UNISON and changes in collective 
bargaining in health and local government. In M. Terry (ed.), Redefining Public 
Sector Unionism: UNISON and the future of Trade Unions. London: Routledge. 
 
Thornqvist, C. (2007). ‘Changing industrial relations in the Swedish public sector: 
new tensions in the old framework of corporatism.’ International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, 20 (1): 16-33.  
 
Timmins, N. (2001) ‘Labour’s private determination to deliver’. Financial Times, 26 
February, p.21.   
 
Travers, T. (2005) ‘Local and Central Government’, Ch.4 in A. Sheldon and D. 
Kavanagh (eds) The Blair Effect: 2001 – 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p.77.   
 
Treasury (1979) The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1980-81, Cmnd 1746, London: 
HMSO  
 
Walsh, K. and Davis, H. (1993) Competition and Service: the Impact of the Local 
government Act 1988. London: HMSO  
 
 
 305 
 
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, Trans.AM 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
 
Wilks-Heeg, S. and Clayton, S. (2006) Whose Town is it Anyway? York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation.  
 
Williams, M. and May, T. (1996) Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Research. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Wilson, D. and Game, C. (2002) Local Government in the United Kingdom, 3
rd
 
edition, Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Winchester, D. (1983) Industrial Relations in the Public Sector, in Bain G. (ed.) 
Industrial Relations in Britain, Oxford: Blackwell.    
 
White, G. (1997) ‘Employment flexibilities in local government’, Public Policy and 
Administration 12(4): 47-59.  
 
Whitfield, K. and Strauss, G. (2000) ‘Methods Matter: Changes in Industrial 
Relations Research and their Implications’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38 
(1), 141-151.   
 
Yin, R.K. (1984) Case Study Research - Design and Methods. Sage Publications Ltd   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 306 
Table of Statutes 
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (1965, c.62) 
Equal Pay Act 1970 (1970, c.41) 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (1971, c.72) 
Local Government Act 1972 (1972, c.70) 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (1975, c.65) 
Race Relations Act 1976 (1976, c.74) 
The Local Government, Planning, and Land Act 1980 (1980, c.65) 
 
The Local Government Act 1988 (1988, c.9) 
 
Employment Act 1989 (1989, c.38) 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (1992, c.52) 
The Local Government Act 1992 (1992, c.14) 
 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (1995, c.50)  
Employment Rights Act 1996 (1996, c.18) 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (1996, c.17) 
National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (1998, c.39) 
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998 (1998, c.8) 
Human Rights Act 1998 (1998, c.42) 
Employment Relations Act 1999 (1999, c.26) 
Local Government Act 2000 (2000, c.22) 
Employment Act 2002 (2002, c.22)  
Employment Act 2008 (2008, c.24) 
Employment rights and Equality Act 2010 (2010, c.15) 
  
 
 
 
 307 
Table of Statutory Instruments 
 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 
 
The Employment Protection (Continuity of Employment) Regulations 1996 
 
The Working Time Regulations 1998 
 
The Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
 
The Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 
2002 
 
The Information and Consultation of Employees (Amendment) Regulations 2006 
 
The Collective Redundancies (Amendment) Regulations 2006 
 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006  
 
Working Time (Amendment) Rights 2007 
 
The Local Government Pension Scheme (Amendment) (No2) Regulations 2008  
 
The Local Government (Structural Changes) (Further Transitional Arrangements and 
Staffing Regulations 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 308 
United Kingdom Case Law 
 
Wilson v St. Helens Borough Council [1998] ICR 1141, HL 
Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health Authority [1986] IRLR Case 
152/84 140 ECJ.  
 
Foster v British Gas [1990] C-188/89  
 
Ratcliffe and others v North Yorkshire County Council [1995] IRLR 398 HL 
 
NUT v Governing Body of the Church of England (Aided) Junior School [1997] 
C.M.L.R 630  
South Ayrshire Council v Morton [2002] IRLR 256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 309 
 
 
                                
                                     
 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
                 
                             
  
 
 310 
Appendices 
 
Appendix One – Interview Request Letter 
 
 
October 2009  
 
 
Dear  
 
I am currently undertaking a piece of research examining collective bargaining 
in English local government. I am endeavouring to trace over a period (1979-
2007) the processes and outcomes of collective bargaining through a sectoral 
study across a number of local authorities.  
 
It is my intention to interview a representative cross section of all the principal 
actors within the Local Government employment relations rubric. I am keen to 
explore the views of individuals like you who are at the heart of the bargaining 
process. I have enclosed a recent conference poster I have produced that will 
give you an insight into my research. 
 
I would be grateful if you could agree to being interviewed by me as part of my 
research. If you would like any further information on my work or would like to 
be a participant please contact me at the following e-mail address: 
P.F.Beszter@lboro.ac.uk  
 
Thank you for considering my request. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Peter Beszter  
 
Researcher – Human Resource Management and 
                       Organisational Behaviour Group     
       
Enc. Conference Poster 
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Appendix One 
 
 
English Local Government Collective Bargaining in Context 
 
• Background- Collective bargaining historically had been the dominant means 
of employment regulation in Britain for most of the 20
th
 century, however, in 
the closing two decades it went into rapid decline (Brown and Nash, 2008). In 
the public sector, collective bargaining is still the dominant form of pay 
determination – it is present in around 83 per cent of public sector workplaces 
and covers around 82 per cent of public sector workers. In contrast only 14 per 
cent of private sector workplaces use collective bargaining, with around 26 per 
cent of private sector workers having their pay set through collective 
bargaining (2004 WERS:181). 
• This study aims to: 
• Explore the reasons why national centralised collective bargaining continues 
to survive in English local government and develop an explanation for its 
continual survival. 
• Research Methods: 
• In-depth institutional sectoral study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sectoral 
Study   
Trade Unions’ 
interviews 
Personnel 
Management 
interviews 
Local and 
National 
Politicians’ 
interviews 
Corporate 
Management 
Interviews 
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Appendix Two - Biographical Profiles of Interviewees 
 
 
S T 
Leisure Section Secretary –UNISON 
Benchmark Authority 
S has been a union representative for eighteen years and has experienced Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering directly as he is a shop steward within the Parks Service. He 
has personally experienced outsourcing when the Parks Service was contracted out of 
direct City Council control in the mid nineteen nineties to a commercial contractor, 
Brophy’s, who were a subsidiary of Severn Trent Water. The service was 
subsequently brought back into City Council control in 2000. 
 
 
B H 
Environmental Section - UNISON 
Benchmark Authority  
Career in Local Government since 1978. He has been an active trade union 
representative for twenty five years (both in NALGO, prior to 1993, and UNISON 
since). B’s occupational background is in Trading Standards and he has 
predominantly represented white collar, professional /clerical workers.    
 
 
S H 
Waste Management Shop Steward -UNITE 
Benchmark Authority 
A Refuse Collector in the Waste Management Division he has been a depot shop 
steward since the mid nineteen seventies. He has been involved in all the reforms that 
have affected the refuse collection service over the last thirty years, from the 
precursor of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Competitive Tendering) in the mid 
nineteen eighties through to the introduction of Best Value under the Labour 
administration in 1997. S’s practical involvement in the key public sector reforms 
which brought in commercialisation to local government gives him a grass roots 
perspective that is shaped by how these changes have affected workers directly. 
 
 
S F  
Branch Secretary – 
UNITE 
Benchmark Authority 
S has been an employee with the City Council for thirty years. As a trade union 
representative he has risen from being a shopfloor steward to the Branch Secretary of 
UNITE. S has been actively involved in all the structural and organizational changes 
that have occurred in the City Council from CCT through to the present BEST 
process.   
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H H 
Deputy Branch Secretary - UNITE 
Benchmark Authority 
He is Deputy Branch Secretary for UNITE and has been an employee of the City 
Council for over twenty five years before taking up his position as a full time 
representative. H has practical experience of both CCT and Best Value and has 
overseen the contracting process in roads maintenance. In his role as Deputy Branch 
Secretary Harry is party to all corporate employment relations issues that occur in the 
City Council. H is a panel member on the West Midlands Trade Unions Congress. 
 
 
B F 
Director of Employment Relations 
Benchmark Authority 
B started his career in 1974 in the Steel Industry. He held a generalist position as a 
Personnel Manager and with the decline of the Industry went to work for C County 
Council in the late 1970s.  He held numerous positions from Organisation Design 
through to Employment Relations. When C County Council was abolished in 1996 
he transferred to M Council where he was Head of HR and subsequently moved to 
a consultancy role where he oversaw the outsourcing of HR services. B has been 
Director of Employment Relations in the benchmark authority since 2001.   
 
 
N B  
HR Manager – Housing and Constituencies Directorate 
Benchmark Authority  
Career in Local Government since 1979. Started as a Trainee Personnel Officer 
with the City Council and has been promoted through the ranks to his present 
position of HR Manager. Extensive experience as an operational practitioner and 
has overseen areas subject to CCT.  
 
 
M C 
HR Manager –  
Fleet and Waste Management 
Benchmark Authority 
Career in Local Government since 1975. Started as a Trainee Personnel Officer 
with the City Council and has been promoted through the ranks. Extensive 
experience in dealing with Blue Collar workers and is recognized within the 
Council as an expert on manual terms and conditions of employment. His areas of 
work have been subject to CCT and he has overseen the transfer of workers under 
TUPE.  
 
 
F F  
Retired Director – Waste Management 
Benchmark Authority  
F retired in 1998 after a forty years’ service in benchmark authority. F began his 
career as a work study trainee and worked in the management services function until 
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the mid-1970s when he moved over to an operational role as a depot manager within 
the waste management function. He became a director in 1990.      
 
 
L T 
Operational Head of Fleet and Waste Management 
Benchmark Authority  
Career in Local Government since 1972. Started as a Trainee Work Study Officer 
with W M County Council. On its abolition in 1986 came to the benchmark 
authority  initially as a Work Study Manager but subsequently becoming a Street 
Cleansing Manager in 1987. He has held a number of managerial positions within 
the Waste Management function. He has been personally involved in three bids 
under the tendering process of CCT.  He is currently looking at the localization of 
waste management services at a constituency level.       
 
 
P G  
Street Cleansing Manager 
Benchmark Authority 
Career in Local Government since 1982. Started as a Beat Sweeper and progressed 
to driving a mechanical sweeper and gaining an HGV. In 1990 promoted to a Depot 
Street Cleansing Supervisor and in 2000 became Street Cleansing Manager for the 
City Centre. He has worked through three tendering processes for CCT.  
 
 
 
M N 
Refuse Collection Manager 
Benchmark Authority  
Career in Local Government since 1979. Started as a Trainee Work Study Officer 
and was in the function until 1984. Moved into Waste Management as a junior 
manager and subsequently was promoted to a Refuse Collection Manager’s position 
and is responsible for the south side of the City. He has worked through three 
tendering processes for CCT. He is currently responsible for looking at the 
localization of the refuse collection service at a constituency level.   
 
 
J M 
Head of Food – Public Health 
Benchmark Authority  
J joined the authority in 1977 as a trainee environmental health officer. She has 
worked her way up the career ladder, moving from an operational role as a 
practitioner, to her present role as head of food, responsible for food safety across 
Birmingham. In J’s present role she manages thirty environmental health officers.      
 
 
J Y 
Operational Head of Trading Standards 
Benchmark Authority  
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J joined the council in 1972 as a trainee trading standards officer. He first started 
working at a district level involved in weights and measures and after ten years 
general experience pursued a management career within the trading standards 
function. He has headed up specialist an investigative unit in counterfeit 
merchandise, before his present role overseeing operational activities across the 
city.  
 
 
R B  
Head of Environmental Health - North 
Benchmark Authority 
Career in Local Government since 1961 as a Trainee Environmental Health Officer. 
Progressed through the management structure to become the Head of 
Environmental Health responsible for the north of the City. An acknowledged 
expert in statutory enforcement he sits on a national panel for Food Safety.   
 
 
T M  
Retired Head of Waste Management 
Benchmark Authority 
Career in Local Government since 1976. Prior to that he was a Personnel Manager 
at a Steel Foundry for ten years. He was appointed as Departmental Personnel 
Officer to the Environmental Services and in 1991 switched to the Waste 
Management function to become its Operational Head. He was one of the principal 
architects for managing the tendering process for CCT in the City. He retired in 
1998.   
 
 
M J 
Retired Director of Waste Management 
Benchmark Authority 
Career in Local Government since 1968. Started as a Trainee Work Study Officer and 
for eighteen years rose within the function to a senior management role. In 1986 moved 
into Waste Management as a general manager overseeing strategy and subsequently 
was appointed Director in 1999. He oversaw the tendering process for three contracts 
under CCT. He retired in 2006. 
 
 
M Al 
Councillor – Labour 
Benchmark Authority  
M has been a councillor since 1982. During Labour’s control of the council (1984-
2004) he was the Chair for the Personnel Committee. Since 2007 he has been on: the 
Equalities and HR Overview and Scrutiny; Personnel Appeals; and Appointments 
Committees.  
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P K  
Councillor – Shadow Cabinet Member – HR - Labour 
Benchmark Authority  
P has been a councillor for seven years. P is a Shadow Cabinet member on the Human 
Resources Committee and is Labour’s spokesman for personnel matters in the 
benchmark authority. Prior to being an elected member Peter was a regional officer in 
T&GWU for thirty five years and was responsible for local government in the West 
Midlands.  
 
 
 
C R 
Councillor – Labour 
Benchmark Authority  
C became a councillor in 1987. For four years, when the authority was under Labour 
control, he was the Chair of the Personnel Appeals Committee which oversees 
disciplinary and grievance issues. With his chairing experience gained while on the 
committee, he is still remains a member on it.     
 
 
 
M  W 
Councillor –  HR Committee – Liberal Democrat   
Benchmark Authority  
M, a Liberal Democrat councillor has been an elected member for twenty years. M sits 
on the Personnel Appeals Committee that oversees disciplinary and grievance issues. 
 
 
 
A R 
Councillor – HR Committee – Conservative 
Benchmark Authority  
A has been a Conservative councillor since 1976. He has been a cabinet member 
since 2004 with special responsibilities for human resources and equalities matters. 
He is a practicing solicitor.  
 
 
 
 
P A 
Chief National Negotiator 
UNITE 
A trade union representative for thirty years he started as a regional organiser for 
agricultural workers in the South East. In the mid-eighties he was given 
responsibility for Local Government and for the last ten years he has been the Chief 
National Negotiator for UNITE and  prior to this the T&GWU.   
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R J 
Director of Research  
UNITE 
R has been in the trade union movement for over the thirty years. With Amicus he 
was the Regional Organiser in the North West. In this role he took a particular interest 
in the NHS and the contracting out process that began in the 1980s. In the mid-
nineties he came down to London to take up the role of Director of Research for 
Amicus and with the merger of Amicus and the T&GWU he has continued in this 
role.    
 
 
A W 
Regional Officer – West Midlands 
UNISON 
A has been a trade union representative for over twenty five years. Starting as a 
steward in the 1980s at a local council and becoming a full-time official with 
UNISON in 1994. A was responsible for overseeing trade union affairs in the 
benchmark authority for over ten years. Her present role sees her responsible for 
dealing with local authorities in the western region (Hereford and Worcestershire) of 
the West Midlands.     
 
 
R S 
Regional Head of Local Government – East Midlands 
UNISON 
Began his local government career in the late eighties as a graduate trainee 
mechanical engineer at a local council. Moved to a district council for more 
experience and in mid-nineties he took up a position as a third tier manager in a City 
Council. At the City Council he became a shop steward and in 2000 joined UNISON 
as a full time officer. In 2007 he became the Regional Head of Local Government in 
the East Midlands. As a trade union officer he has been heavily involved in Single 
Status and equal pay claims.    
 
 
 
T J 
Regional Head of Local Government – South East  
UNISON 
T has been a trade union representative since 1978, when he joined NALGO. He has 
been a regional representative in the South East for UNISON for eighteen years. He 
has been a Labour Councillor in a Unitary authority for ten years. T has a Master’s in 
Industrial Relations.   
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R M 
Midlands Regional Secretary  
UNISON 
R started his career as a Housing Officer in the 1980s at a West Midlands local 
authority before going on to work within the Trade Union Movement for the Public 
and Commercial Services Union.  He then went on to work for the Trade Unions 
Congress in a number of policy roles before taking up his present position with 
UNISON. In the 1990s R was a Labour Councillor for six years. Roger has a Master’s 
in Industrial Relations and has been awarded the Order of the British Empire for his 
work in promoting equality in the workplace.   
 
 
A I 
Researcher -UNISON 
A started her career in a Local government in 1976. First belonging to NALGO, 
where she was a shop steward and a departmental steward in a local authority. In 1994 
became a full time representative in UNISON where she became a regional 
representative and is now a researcher with special responsibilities for local 
government.   
 
 
A T 
Branch Secretary – UNISON – 
Authority 7 
A has worked at authority 7 since 1983.  He started out his career in grounds 
maintenance and became a shop steward for his workplace. In the twenty six years 
at authority 7 he has risen to become the Branch Secretary. A has direct experience 
of CCT and has been involved in the defence of in-house services that have been 
subject to external commercial competition. He is currently engaged in equal pay 
claims under Single Status.   
 
 
T R  
Full Time Regional Officer – UNISON Midlands 
T started his career in Social Services and became an active trade union member 
becoming a shop steward for NALGO. In the mid-nineties he became a full-time 
representative working for UNISON in the West Midlands, where for the last 
twelve years he has been responsible for local government.     
 
 
S C 
Chair of HR Committee and Committee Member on the General Assembly of 
the Local Government Association  
Authority 2 and Local Government Employers 
S has been involved in local government politics since 1983 as a Liberal Democrat 
Councillor in authority 2. 
S is currently the Chair of the HR Committee at authority 2 and is on the General 
Assembly of the Local Government Association which oversees pay and conditions in 
local government. S is a shop steward with the Public and Commercial Services 
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Union and he is a manager in the Borders Agency. 
 
 
L H  
Chief Officer of Human Resources 
Authority 3 
Twenty nine years local government experience starting at D Council as a Trainee 
Personnel Officer moving on to North East as a middle manager and coming to 
authority 3 as Chief Officer in 2004.  
 
 
J R  
Head of Human Resources 
Authority 4 
Started career in the Railway Industry in the 1970s in Derby and took redundancy 
to go back to university.  Started his career in Local Government in the mid-eighties 
as a Trainee Personnel Officer with N City Council going up the promotional ladder 
until he was Head of Employment Relations in 1993. In 1997 was appointed Head 
of Human Resources at authority 4.   
 
 
B M 
Director of Customer and Workforce Services 
Authority 5 
Career in Local Government for the last twenty five years. Started as a Trainee 
Personnel Officer at S Council and subsequently has worked at K Council, M K, and 
authority 5. Her roles have been principally strategic HR Management addressing 
change and business transformation. 
 
 
R W  
Head of  Human Resources 
Authority 6 
R started his local government career thirty years ago. His first job was as a driver 
in the Social Services Department of N Council. He became a shop steward in 
NUPE and rose to become the NUPE Branch Secretary for N. He left the Trade 
Union Movement when UNISON was formed in 1993 and went into Personnel 
Management. He worked for N City Council for twelve years beginning as a 
personnel officer in an operational role but eventually becoming a corporate 
employment relations manager covering the whole of the City Council. In 2006 he 
joined authority 6 as Director of Human Resources.   
 
 
A D 
Chief Human Resources Officer 
Authority 7 
A has been a personnel practitioner for thirty years. She has worked in two local 
authorities in the Midlands, both at an operational and corporate level. In the last 
fifteen years she has focused on corporate employment relations and has been the 
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principal architect for guiding her present council through Single Status. Anne has 
overseen development of commercial partnerships in the provision of local services. 
She is actively involved in the community and is a governor at a local college.   
 
 
S B 
Deputy Head of Employment Relations 
Authority 7 
Began her local government career at W Council in 1985 as a graduate trainee. She 
worked in corporate policy for a few years. Went to work for a community 
organization which was funded by a trade union which looked at health inequalities. 
Joined authority 7 in 1989 and worked in equalities and then moved into a 
generalist personnel role before specializing in employment relations.  
 
 
S R 
Head of Occupational Health and Safety 
Authority 7  
Started in Local Government in 1982 as a Trainee Health and Safety Officer with 
B Council. Promoted to a Departmental Health and Safety Officer’s position in 
1990 and moved to authority 7 in 2001 to take up the role of Head of 
Occupational Health and Safety covering the whole of the City. Extensive 
advisory experience in examining working practices connected to labour 
intensive and mechanized services like waste management and road maintenance.   
 
 
G H  
Corporate Director (People, Policy and Communications) 
Authority 8  
Twenty three years in Local Government. Started at O Council as a Trainee 
Personnel Officer and was promoted to Principal Personnel Officer. Moving South 
to H Council in the mid-nineties and becoming an Assistant Director of HR at H 
Council in 1999. She has been at authority 8 since 2005. In the last ten years she 
has specialized in organizational transformation.  She has been the President of the 
Public Sector People Managers’ Association.  
 
 
A B 
Corporate Director of Personnel and Development 
Authority 9  
A started her career as a trainee personnel officer in the early 1980s. She has primarily 
worked for the Public Sector, and during the early 1990s worked as a self-employed 
HR consultant for five years, advising small and medium size enterprises. A worked 
for three years as Head of HR for Transport for London and came to authority 9 in 
2004.    
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P R 
Head of Employment Strategy 
Authority 9  
Started in local government in the late 1980s. Has worked at authority 9 his entire 
career starting as a trainee and gaining promotion through the organization. P has 
worked in several departments from Education to Social Services and for the last 
ten years has been in a central human resources corporate role.  
 
C W 
Director of Local Government Services 
West Midlands Local Government Association 
C’s career as an employment relations practitioner started thirty years ago as a trainee 
personnel officer at a council in the West Midlands. After a number of promotions 
within the HR function came to the WMLGA in 1990 as an adviser in employment 
relations. C was heavily involved in advising local authorities on Single Status and 
has been the Director of the WMLGA for ten years.  
 
 
D H  
Head of Employment Relations 
West Midlands Local Government Association 
Career in local government since 1995. Prior to this worked in the Retail Industry 
as a Personnel Officer. First local government position was with one of the West 
Midlands authorities in which she did a generalist role. Went on a secondment to 
the West Midlands Local Government Association in 2000 and after year decided 
to remain on a permanent basis. D was made Head of Employment Relations in 
2007. D has extensive experience of Single Status and equal pay issues.   
 
  
S M 
Head of Employment Relations  
Local Government Association - North 
Career in Local Government since 1993. Started at C Council as a Personnel 
Manager within the Social Services Department. Prior to this she had worked at 
Monsanto the Agri-chemical conglomerate as an HR manager. In 1995 moved to L 
Council as an Employment Relations Manager and in 2004 moved to the Local 
Government Association. She has been Head of Employment Relations since 2007.     
 
 
C N 
Retired Executive Director  
Local Government Employers 
C has forty years local government experience. Since 1973 C has worked for all the 
local government negotiating bodies, firstly with The Local Authorities’ Employers 
Organisation, then with the Local Government Management Board, and finally the 
Local Government Employers from which he retired in 2004. In 2007 he was 
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elected onto The European Public Sector Employers’ Federation. C has been a 
principal player in all the national negotiations for the last thirty years and had a 
pivotal role in the national Fire Service Dispute in 2003.    
 
 
P W  
Head of Negotiations  
Local Government Employers 
P started his career in Local Government in 1978 as a personnel officer. In 1989 he 
joined The Local Authorities’ Employers Organisation as a negotiator and for the 
last ten years has been the Head of Negotiations at the Local Government 
Employers. P in the last twenty years has been party to all the national negotiations 
in local government.   
 
 
H H  
Principal Negotiator  
Local Government Employers 
H has ten years’ experience as a negotiator at the Local Government Employers.  
H’s role has been to act as a facilitator in compiling data and researching pay 
claims.  
 
 
S B 
Chair  
Local Government Employers 
S has been connected with local government for over the thirty years as both a 
worker and a politician. He started in the mid-seventies as a policy officer in the 
GLC where he was particularly interested in transport. He was at the GLC until 
its abolition in 1986 and he then went to work for the Local Government 
Association where he did a training role. His political career started in 1982 
when he was elected a Labour councillor at Lewisham. As a councillor he was 
involved in the finance, education, and leisure committees. He became Deputy 
Leader and then Leader of Lewisham in 1988. In 2002 he became a directly 
elected Mayor of Lewisham and he was subsequently re-elected for a second 
term in 2006. Presently he is the Chair of the Local Government Employers 
which oversees the national pay and conditions within local government 
 
 
M M  
Chair of HR Committee and Committee Member on the General Assembly of 
the Local Government Association and Local Government employers 
A Conservative Councillor in [name of authority] for thirty years, she has been 
involved in local government employment relations at an authority, regional, and 
national level for the last twenty five years. She is currently on the national 
negotiating committee. 
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Appendix Three – Interview Questions 
 
 
Corporate Management 
 
What impact does the local government national collective bargaining framework 
have on defining the conduct of employment relations in your authority? 
 
 
What do you perceive to be to the advantage or disadvantage of your authority staying 
within a national collective bargaining framework? 
 
 
In the time you have been employed in local government what changes have you 
observed in the procedural and substantive collective bargaining arrangements?  
 
 
How far have Central Government’s reforms shaped national conditions of service in 
the local government? 
 
 
How has, if at all, national collective bargaining been affected by the 
commercialisation of local government services? 
 
 
What impact did Compulsory Competitive Tendering have on shaping local 
government employment relations policy and what effect did it have in defining the 
process of collective bargaining?   
 
 
What impact has ‘Best Value’ had on shaping employment relations policy and 
collective bargaining outcomes, and how does it differ from Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering?   
 
 
What effect (if any) has Compulsory Competitive Tendering and ‘Best Value’ had on 
your relationship with the trade unions? 
 
 
Over the time you have been employed in local government have you perceived that 
there has been an erosion of the national collective bargaining machinery? If you 
have, what are the consequences of this erosion? 
 
 
As an employer do you feel that the national collective bargaining framework is an 
important foundation for the promotion of joint regulation in the local government 
workplace?   
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Trade Unions  
 
Has the national collective bargaining framework in local government been an 
important mechanism for trade unions securing and improving their membership’s 
interests? 
 
 
What if any, do you see as being beneficial in maintaining and promoting the national 
collective bargaining framework from the trade unions’ perspective? 
 
 
Have you experienced erosion in the local government national collective bargaining 
framework and if so how has this manifested itself? 
 
 
What impact did Compulsory Competitive Tendering have on shaping local 
government employment relations policy and what effect did it have on defining the 
process of collective bargaining?  
 
 
What impact has ‘Best Value’ had on shaping employment relations policy and 
collective bargaining outcomes, and how does this differ from Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering?   
 
 
What effect (if any) has Compulsory Competitive Tendering and ‘Best Value’ had on 
your relationship with management?  
 
 
Over the time you have been a trade union representative how have Central 
Government’s public sector reforms affected the nature of collective bargaining in 
local government from your perspective as a trade unionist?      
 
 
Have you seen a growth in local collective bargaining and if so has this presented an 
opportunity or threat to trade union organisation? 
 
 
Have you noted a change in the way in which substantive and procedural 
arrangements are negotiated in local government? 
 
 
As trade unionists do you feel that the national collective bargaining framework is an 
important foundation for the promotion of joint regulation in the local government 
workplace? 
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Human Resource Management  
 
What role has national collective bargaining had in shaping HR practice in local 
government? 
 
 
What role does the HR function have in the process of joint regulation in the local 
government workplace? 
 
 
What impact has Central Government’s reforms in local government had on shaping 
HR practice and its role in the collective bargaining process?   
 
 
What impact did Compulsory Competitive Tendering have on shaping local 
government employment relations policy and what effect did it have on defining the 
process of collective bargaining? 
 
 
What impact has ‘Best Value’ had on shaping employment relations policy and 
collective bargaining outcomes, and how does this differ from Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering? 
What effect (if any) has Compulsory Competitive Tendering and ‘Best Value’ had on 
your relationship with management and trade unions? 
 
 
As an HR practitioner what changes have you noted in the nature of the collective 
bargaining process and its impact on the conduct of employment relations in local 
government?  
   
 
Does national collective bargaining reinforce or dilute the status and professionalism 
of the HR function in local government? 
 
 
Is the national collective bargaining framework an important foundation stone or a 
strait jacket in shaping the outcomes of the bargaining process between the individual 
local authority and the workforce within it? 
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Elected Members 
 
How do you think that the local government national collective bargaining framework 
has affected the implementation of local political objectives? 
 
 
Do you see the national framework as a conduit or constraint on the development and 
implementation of locally defined political objectives?  
 
 
Do you see national collective bargaining as an extension of central government’s 
control on local authority autonomy or an important mechanism for reflecting the 
collective interests of local authorities across the UK?  
 
 
What impact did Compulsory Competitive Tendering did have on shaping 
employment relations policy in local government? 
 
 
What impact has ‘Best Value’ had on shaping employment relations policy and how 
does this differ from Compulsory Competitive Tendering?  
 
 
What effect (if any) has Compulsory Competitive Tendering and ‘Best Value’ had on 
your relationship with trade unions and management?  
 
 
In the time you have been involved in local government politics what changes have 
you noted in the conduct of employment relations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 327 
Local Government Employers 
 
What role has centralised national collective bargaining had in shaping employment 
relations policy in local government? 
 
 
Why has centralised national collective bargaining continued to survive in local 
government? 
 
 
What benefits does a national collective bargaining framework bring to local 
authorities? 
 
 
Why did some local authorities leave the national framework? 
 
 
Why did most local authorities that left the national framework subsequently return?  
 
 
What impact did Compulsory Competitive Tendering have in shaping local 
government employment relations policy, and what effect did it have on defining 
collective bargaining? 
 
 
What impact has ‘Best Value’ had on employment relations policy and collective 
bargaining outcomes, and how does this differ from Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering?   
 
 
What effect (if any) has Compulsory Competitive Tendering and ‘Best Value’ had on 
your relationship with employers, trade unions and politicians? 
 
 
How far has central government influenced the locus of collective bargaining in local 
government? 
 
 
 
 
